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TOWARD THE SEARCH FOR THE PROPER LIABILITY RULE FOR HARMS 
RESULTING FROM SOURCES OF RISK: A DIFFERENT APPROACH TO THE 
CHOICE BETWEEN STRICT LIABILITY AND FAULT-BASED REGIME 
An important issue in Taiwan today concerns the rising tension between strict 
liability and negligence. Article 191-3 of the Civil Code of Taiwan imposes a 
fault-based standard of liability on persons conducting dangerous activities. On the 
other hand, the majority of scholars believe that to afford greater protection, this rule 
should be changed into a strict liability rule. 
Traditionally, three arguments make it preferable to impose strict liability under 
certain circumstances. First, strict liability induces more safety incentives on the part 
of the defendant. Second, fairness requires that one who benefits from conducting 
dangerous activities should bear the risk of loss. Finally, the defendant is better able to 
spread the loss to the general public. However, based on the analysis of each 
justification, this Dissertation finds that all of these arguments fail. Accordingly, this 
Dissertation argues that intermediate liability, a variation under negligence principles, 
is a proper standard of liability when high risk of harm is involved;—i.e. Article 191-3 
is proper in imposing fault-based liability to dangerous activities—for the following 
  
vii 
three reasons: 1) intermediate liability provides additional safety incentives by 
shifting the burden of proof to the defendant; 2) it conforms to fairness; and 3) it does 
not consider tort law as a means of insurance. 
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1 
Introduction 
 
A. The Difficult Choice Between Strict Liability and Fault-based Regime 
In Taiwanese law today, an important issue concerns the rising tension between 
traditional strict liability and negligence.
1
 The Civil Code of Taiwan,
2
 mostly derived 
from the German Civil Code,
3
 recognizes Gefährdungshaftung, or “risk liability,” a 
broader concept of liability regime than the American doctrine traditionally associated 
with abnormally dangerous activities. Significantly, however, the majority of 
commentators in Taiwan assume that risk liability and the doctrine of strict liability 
are synonyms.
4
 Moreover, they argue that strict liability is a “superior rule” to 
negligence principles.
5
 As a result, the tension between strict liability and negligence 
arises because it becomes difficult for the legal system to draw a line between the 
so-called superior rule and the inferior negligence principles. To solve the issue, this 
                                                     
1
 In American common law, the recurrent tension between strict liability and negligence is also 
observable. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 645 (9
th
 ed. 2008). For a 
definition of traditional strict liability, see Williams v. Amoco Prod. Co., 734 P.2d 1113, 1121 (1987). 
Under this Dissertation’s view, implicit in the traditional strict liability is the concept of “absolute 
liability.” See infra 130. 
2
 Unless otherwise specified, statutes or regulations to which this Dissertation will refer in the 
following text are rules of Taiwan. For a full English version of the CIVIL CODE (Taiwan), please refer 
to: 
http://law.moj.gov.tw/Eng/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?PCode=B0000001. 
3
 For an introduction to German tort liability, see C. C. VAN DAM, EUROPEAN TORT LAW 73-92 (2
nd 
ed. 
2013). 
4
 Wang Tzejian, Chin Chuan Hsing Wei Fa (Tort Law) 663-64 Taipei: San Min Book Co., Ltd., 2011. 
5
 Put simply, most scholars believe that strict liability is a superior rule for resolving legal conflicts and 
encouraging safety. See generally: Liu Cheuntang, Pan Jie Min Fa Jai Bian Tung Tze (Case Analysis 
on General Prov. of Obligation of the Civil Code) 127-28 Taipei: San Min Book Co., Ltd., 2001 
[hereinafter cited as Case Analysis on General Prov. of Obligation of the Civil Code]. 
  
 
2 
Dissertation first argues that risk liability is best understood as a superordinate 
concept waiting for the supplement of an applicable doctrine, which arguably should 
be “intermediate liability.”6  
Under the doctrine of intermediate liability, tort liability is determined by the 
following three criteria: 
 First, once an accident has occurred, there is a rebuttable presumption of 
negligence on the part of the defendant. 
 Second, the defendant bears the burden of proof to rebut the inference of 
negligence. 
 Third, some version of contributory negligence is recognized as a defense. 
Thus, “intermediate” liability is so-called because it is more rigorous to defendants 
than negligence principles, while remaining less rigorous than traditional strict 
liability.
7
  
Table 1: The Concept of Risk Liability and Resulting Categories of Tort Liability 
in Taiwan 
 Traditional View Proposed View 
The Concept of Risk 
Liability 
Risk Liability = 
Strict Liability 
Risk Liability = 
Intermediate Liability 
                                                     
6
 See below for Table 1. 
7
 See Yang Chiayuan, Chin Chuan Hsing Wei Yu Sun Hai Pei Chang Tse Jen (Tort Liability) 6 Taipei: 
Angle Publishing Co., Ltd., 2009.  
  
 
3 
Resulting Categories of 
Tort Liability 
1. Intentional Torts 
2. Negligence / Negligence 
Variations 
3. Risk Liability  
1. Intentional Torts 
2. Negligence / Negligence 
Variations (Risk Liability 
Included) 
Notes: 
 Under this Dissertation’s view, intermediate liability does not change its status as 
a fault-based liability rule because it only shifts the burden of proof regarding 
negligence to the defendant. Hence, the new risk liability, fulfilled by intermediate 
liability, is only a variation under negligence principles. 
 It should be noted that although under the proposed view the concept of risk 
liability is fulfilled by the principle of intermediate liability, intermediate liability 
refers to broader situations in which the shifting of burden of proof is required by 
law, and does not necessarily equate to risk liability. For example, the second 
paragraph of Article 184 is an intermediate liability rule traditionally not 
associated with the concept of risk liability. 
 
 
With risk liability fulfilled by the principle of intermediate liability,
8
 this 
Dissertation further argues that traditional strict liability is untenable and that reforms 
must take place of several rules currently governed by this so-called superior 
doctrine.
9
 In this way, the Taiwanese legal system can best accommodate the rising 
tension between strict liability and negligence.
10
  
                                                     
8
 See above for Table 1. 
9
 The distinction between traditional strict liability and risk liability lies on whether the rule recognizes 
some version of contributory negligence defense. Because risk liability recognizes such a defense, it 
should, as this Dissertation argues, be reinterpreted as the principle of intermediate liability.  
10
 See supra 1. 
  
 
4 
Finally, this Dissertation not only suggests that current rules governed by strict 
liability be changed into rules of intermediate liability but also answers five questions 
raised by Taiwanese legal scholarship. These questions include: 
 What is the scope of Article 191-3 of the Civil Code of Taiwan and how 
does it relate to Article 191?
11
  
Because the plain meanings of the two Articles render themselves rules of 
intermediate liability to govern certain activities, these rules may possibly 
overlap.
12
 However, this Dissertation argues that they are 
distinguishable.
13
  
 What are the defenses to risk liability?14 
 Since this Dissertation argues in favor of substituting strict liability for 
intermediate liability as the operative rule for risk liability,
15
 defenses 
available to negligence, such as comparative negligence and assumption of 
risk, are also available to intermediate liability.
16
  
 Does the legislature need to add limitations on the maximum amount of 
compensation or on damages for emotional distress for risk liability?
17
  
This argument traditionally serves to alleviate the defendant’s burden 
under strict liability. Arguing that intermediate liability should be the rule 
for risk liability, this Dissertation suggests that there is no need to keep 
these limitations. 
 Is a different statute of limitation available to risk liability?18  
Since intermediate liability, rather than strict liability, is the primary rule 
of risk liability, the applicable statute of limitation under negligence law is 
also available to risk liability.
19
 Hence, there is no need to adopt a 
                                                     
11
 See Chen Tsungfu, Chin Chuan Hsing Wei Kuei Tse Yuan Tse Yu Sun Hai Pei Chang (Tort Laws 
of Liability and of Compensation) 200 Taipei: Angle Publishing Co., Ltd., 2008. 
12
 Id. 
13
 See infra 165-166. 
14
 See supra note 4 at 720.  
15
 Intermediate liability does not change its status as a fault-based liability rule for accidental harms. 
See supra 3 for explanations in Table 1. 
16
 See infra 192. 
17
 See supra note 4 at 720-21. 
18
 Id. at 721. 
19
 In Taiwan, the applicable statute of limitation for negligence is a two-year limitation, as the first 
paragraph of Article 197 of the CIVIL CODE provides that:  
The claim for the injury arising from a wrongful act shall be extinguished by prescription, if not 
exercised within two years from the date when the injury and the person bound to make 
compensation became known to the injured person. The same rule shall be applied if ten years have 
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different statute of limitation. However, liability under the Highway Act, 
damages arising out of nuclear disasters, and product-related injuries are 
each subject to special treatments.
20
 
 What is the role of equitable liability under this Dissertation’s 
propositions?
21
  
Even though this Dissertation argues that liability should be determined 
in accordance with the fault of the actor,
22
 it recognizes that special policy 
considerations may require the imposition of tort liability irrespective of 
fault–an insurer-like liability. Accordingly, under this Dissertation’s 
propositions, the German doctrine of equitable liability (or the so-called 
Billigkeitshaftung) is the only recognizable strict liability principle.
23
 
However, such a no-fault doctrine should be absorbed into negligence 
principles as a secondary variation only.
24
 
 
 
B. Methodology 
To finish the tasks, this Dissertation will review statutory regulations, judicial 
decisions, law review articles, and other secondary authorities to analyze the principle 
of strict liability. Additionally, it will compare cases and scholarly works in Taiwan 
with resources in the United States. Since the issues of strict liability have been 
discussed more in the United States than in Taiwan—particularly the policy debates 
over the feasibility and economic analysis of this principle—further reviews on those 
                                                                                                                                                        
elapsed from the date when the wrongful act was committed. 
20
 See infra 194. 
21
 The principle of equitable liability forces one who has the better financial capacity to compensate 
the innocent victims for the injuries even if he is not liable. Although Taiwanese scholars call this 
principle equitable liability, it has nothing to do with common law equity. See the second paragraph of 
Article 188 of the CIVIL CODE for example. 
22
 Stephen R. Perry, The Impossibility of General Strict Liability, 1 Can. J. Law & Jurisprudence 147, 
148 (1988). 
23
 See infra 52-56 for discussions of equitable liability. 
24
 See infra 160. 
  
 
6 
American resources will provide different insights for analyzing the doctrine of strict 
liability. For example, some commentators in the United States have come up with 
abundant analysis arguing that strict liability should be abandoned in product cases or 
that it is unjustifiable in general.
25
 This Dissertation borrows the analysis from the 
United States, and argues that several strict liability rules in Taiwan should be 
changed into intermediate liability rules,
26
 including liability for product 
manufacturers,
27
 liability for transportation providers,
28
 liability for mass rapid 
transit system operators,
29
 liability for aircraft owners,
30
 and liability for nuclear 
facility operators.
31
  
 
C. Chapter Summary 
Chapter One articulates the importance of this research and explicates the issue 
of the rising tension between strict liability and negligence. Specifically, this 
                                                     
25
 See generally: William Powers Jr., A Modest Proposal to Abandon Strict Products Liability, 1991 U. 
Ill. L .Rev. 639 (1991) [hereinafter cited as A Modest Proposal to Abandon Strict Products Liability] 
and Peter M. Gerhart, The Death of Strict Liability, 56 Buff. L. Rev. 245 (2008) [hereinafter cited as 
The Death of Strict Liability]. 
26
 See supra 3. 
27
 Article 7 of the CONSUMER PROTECTION LAW,  
http://law.moj.gov.tw/Eng/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?PCode=J0170001. 
28
 Article 64 of the HIGHWAY ACT,  
http://law.moj.gov.tw/Eng/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?PCode=K0040001. 
29
 Article 46 of the MASS RAPID TRANSIT ACT, 
http://law.moj.gov.tw/Eng/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?PCode=K0120001. 
30
 Article 89 of the CIVIL AVIATION ACT, 
http://law.moj.gov.tw/Eng/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?PCode=K0090001. 
31
 Article 18 of the NUCLEAR DAMAGE COMPENSATION LAW, 
http://law.moj.gov.tw/Eng/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?PCode=J0160003. 
  
 
7 
Dissertation argues not only that the liability rule matters in terms of economic 
efficiency but also that further research into reforms of the liability rule provides 
different insights into societal changes and meets the interests of the general public. 
During early years, tort law was not concerned with the fault of the wrongdoer until 
the close of nineteenth century,
32
 and in the modern era strict liability revived in 
specific fields of law to regulate liability for certain activities.
33
 Strict liability plays 
an important role in the development of modern tort laws by affording greater 
protection to the general public. In this regard, analyzing and critiquing strict tort 
liability not only allow contemporary legal scholars to examine social development 
but also shed some light on future tort reform. Additionally, this chapter distinguishes 
the modest difference between risk liability and strict liability and addresses the rising 
tension between strict liability and negligence in Taiwanese law. Lastly, this chapter 
provides illustrations adapted from recent incidents to show that resolving the issues 
of strict liability serves the interests of the general public. 
Chapter Two outlines the primary functions of Taiwanese tort law, introduces 
Taiwanese negligence principles and their variations, and elaborates the majority’s 
rationales for preferring strict liability to negligence as the rule to regulate certain 
activities and how strict liability is incorporated in Taiwanese legal system. First, it 
                                                     
32
 W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS §75, at 534-35 (5
th
 ed. 1984). 
33
 Case Analysis on General Prov. of Obligation of the Civil Code, supra note 5 at 128. 
  
 
8 
dwells on the rules dealing with damages and punishment, and articulates the 
difference between the tort liability and criminal liability to emphasize that tort law 
should primarily serve as a catalyst of accident avoidance. In addition, it follows a 
historical review of tort liability in Taiwan in order to demonstrate the transition from 
negligence to strict liability and, most importantly, it outlines the similarities between 
Taiwanese law (which maintains strict liability to regulate certain activities) and 
American common law (which initiated a strict products liability revolution during 
the 1960s). When Taiwan inherited its legal system from foreign jurisdictions, 
negligence had already been the dominant law of liability at the time, and a mature 
tort system surrounded by negligence principles had been established.
34
 During 
recent years strict liability has been applied in several fields of law, such as liability 
for nuclear facility operators and products liability.
35
 Hence, the historical 
development of laws of civil liability in Taiwan represents a transition from 
negligence to strict liability. Finally, this chapter re-emphasizes the issue of the rising 
tension between strict liability and negligence, suggesting that further research into 
the policy considerations of strict liability provides the keystone to solve this issue. 
                                                     
34
 When talking about the legislative history of Taiwan, this Dissertation refers to the legislative 
history of the Republic of China, which still occupied mainland China at the time when it inherited 
legal systems from foreign jurisdictions. However, the political issue between China and Taiwan is 
beyond the scope of this Dissertation. 
35
 See supra note 31 for liability for nuclear facility operators and supra note 27 for Taiwanese strict 
products liability. 
  
 
9 
Chapter Three introduces American tort liability and critiques made by American 
scholars. To provide in-depth analysis, this part begins with the general structure of 
American civil liability and refers to tests for strict liability offered by distinguished 
commentators. Following the general review, this chapter turns to scholarly comments 
that endorse a retreat from strict liability. For example, commentators in the area of 
strict products liability argue that: 1) there is no apparent difference in distinguishing 
strict liability from negligence;
36
 2) the assumptions on which strict liability relies are 
faulty and this doctrine should be abandoned, at least in products liability;
37
 and 3) 
strict liability does not evoke higher levels of safety precautions.
38
 Finally, this 
chapter introduces practical reforms that took place in the modern era, such as the 
revitalization of negligence principles in design defect and failure to warn cases. 
Chapter Four shows that analysis of American common law is instrumental to 
the study of Taiwanese strict liability. Although one may doubt the fitness for 
introducing common law analysis, considering Taiwan inherited most of its civil 
liability from Germany and other Civil Law countries, this Dissertation argues that 
                                                     
36
 Reynold M. Sachs, Negligence or Strict Product Liability: Is There Really a Difference in Law or 
Economics?, 8 Ga. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 259 (1978). 
37
 A Modest Proposal to Abandon Strict Products Liability, supra note 25. 
38
 See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 64-65 
(1987) in which the authors tested strict liability with the Learned Hand Formula [hereinafter cited as 
THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW]. For Judge Hand’s test, see United States v. Carroll Towing 
Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). The Hand test is considered an economic meaning of negligence. See 
Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. Legal Stud. 29, 32 (1972) [hereinafter cited as A 
Theory of Negligence].  
  
 
10 
Taiwan should not necessarily follow the same reasoning as they do, and that common 
law analysis, especially the economic approach of tort law, provides Taiwan with a 
different perspective of understanding tort liability. To achieve this goal, this chapter 
will do comparative works on tort law, policy justifications for strict liability, and the 
difference in the areas of law to which this principle applies.  
The second part of this chapter distinguishes the difference among strict liability, 
intermediate liability, and res ipsa loquitur. The third part of this chapter introduces 
how absolute liability fell and how contributory negligence or comparative negligence 
became a valid defense in strict liability actions. Specifically, this Dissertation argues 
that because contributory negligence or comparative negligence is a valid defense to 
strict liability, replacing strict liability with intermediate liability will not sacrifice the 
level of precaution or accident avoidance. 
Finally, this chapter responds to the tests for strict liability and argues that strict 
liability is hardly justifiable as an independent liability regime. Rather, it is 
intermediate liability that satisfies the same test and should be the rule of risk liability. 
Chapter Five demonstrates how intermediate liability could replace strict 
liability as the rule of risk liability and answers several collateral issues. First, Chapter 
Five analyzes the proper standard of liability for Article 191-3.
39
 Although the 
                                                     
39
 The rule is an intermediate liability rule according to its plain meaning. See infra 22. 
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majority of scholars favor strict tort liability as the rule for people engaging in 
dangerous activities, this Dissertation prefers intermediate liability to traditional strict 
liability, arguing that there is no need to revise the rule. In addition, this Dissertation 
argues that Article 191-3 and Article 191 are distinguishable.
40
 Thirdly, by proving 
that there is no compelling evidence suggesting that strict liability helps improve 
safety precaution or accident avoidance, this Dissertation argues that other Taiwanese 
strict liability rules also need to be modified to intermediate liability rules.
41
 Fourthly, 
to provide deeper evaluation, this chapter addresses the issue as to the standard for 
recovery for pure economic loss under intermediate liability, suggesting that pure 
economic loss is not recoverable under this principle.
42
 
Finally, this chapter answers the remaining collateral issues including the 
available defenses to risk liability, ceilings on liability, and issues regarding the statute 
of limitations.
43
 Most importantly, by interpreting risk liability as the principle of 
intermediate liability, the propositions of this Dissertation not only alleviate the rising 
tension between strict liability and negligence, but also establish a new framework of 
                                                     
40
 See supra 4. 
41
 See supra note 27-31 for examples of these rules. 
42
 This collateral issue is relevant to my previous research in which I framed the solution as a standard 
for recovery for pure economic loss in “unintentional torts” to cover both situations under negligence 
and those under strict liability. By rejecting the principle of strict liability in Taiwanese legal system, 
my claim may be reframed as a standard for recovery for pure economic loss in “fault-based regime.” 
See Yang, Wen-Hsuan, Reconstructing the Taiwanese Rule on Pure Economic Loss: Establishing a 
General Standard for Recovery for Pure Economic Loss in Unintentional Torts. Master’s thesis, 
Indiana University Maurer School of Law (Dec. 2014). 
43
 See supra 4-5. 
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Taiwanese tort liability comprising of only intentional torts, negligence principles, and 
negligence variations.
44
 
                                                     
44
 See infra 196 for Chart 1. 
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Chapter One: 
The Importance of Liability Rule and the Origin of Its Issue 
 
 
 
Synopsis 
 
 Legal liability matters in terms of efficiency. 
 The content of tort law has a close connection with social changes and 
development. 
 Resolving the issue on tort liability helps law practitioners deal with everyday 
problems. 
 Risk liability is a liability regime under Taiwanese law traditionally associated 
with strict liability.  
 The rising tension between strict liability and negligence can be demonstrated in 
the debate over Article 191-3 in Taiwan’s Civil Code, leading to the quest to find 
the proper liability rule to regulate dangerous activities. 
 Issue highlighted: Is strict liability a superior rule to negligence? 
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1.1 Liability Rule Matters 
Liability rule matters, for one of the primary concerns of tort law has been 
whether one whose actions harm another should be required to pay compensation for 
the harm done.
45
 Professor Ronald Coase illustrated the importance of legal liability 
in his famous article The Problem of Social Cost
46
 with an example in which a 
cattle-raiser and a farmer who raises crops own neighboring lands in a world of zero 
transaction costs.
47
 When the cattle wander onto the farmer’s land and destroy some 
of the crops, the issue arises as to who should bear the loss.
48
 Assuming the farmer 
has the entitlement to be free from crop damage, the cattle-raiser will be liable for the 
damage and adopt the strategy that permits the highest level of cattle production at the 
lowest costs.
49
 Conversely, if the cattle-raiser has the entitlement to run his cattle on 
the farmer’s land without any liability for the damage to the crops, the farmer will 
bear the costs and adopt the lowest-cost solution,
50
 including not cultivating certain 
strips of his land.
51
 The only difference between these two situations is whether the 
farmer will have to absorb the damage costs himself; however, in a world of zero 
                                                     
45
 MARC A. FRANKLIN ET AL., TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES: CASES AND MATERIALS 1 (9
th
 ed. 
2011). 
46
 Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & Econ. 1 (1960). 
47
 Id. at 2-5. 
48
 Donald H. Gjerdingen, The Coase Theorem and the Psychology of Common-Law Thought, 56 S. Cal.  
L. Rev. 711, 712 (1983). 
49
 DANIEL H. COLE & PETER Z. GROSSMAN, PRINCIPLES OF LAW & ECONOMICS 90-91 (2
nd
 ed. 2011). 
50
 Id. at 91. 
51
 See supra note 46 at 4. 
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transaction costs, the ultimate result in either case will always be efficient through 
bargaining.
52
 In other words, in the absence of transaction costs, the parties would 
bargain to the efficient allocation of resources regardless of the initial placement of 
legal liability.
53
 However, in the real world, the transaction costs are positive and 
never zero, and the resources are scarce.
54
 Furthermore, tort compensation is 
predicated on whether the defendant in a tort action is liable for the plaintiff’s harm.55 
Thus, legal liability always matters in terms of efficiency.
56
 
In addition, tort reform has a strong interaction with social changes, and the 
discussions of legal liability and of its reform matter in terms of social development 
and interest to the general public. During early years, the legal community followed 
principles more akin to strict liability, and a tortfeasor was responsible for the 
resulting damages, irrespective of fault.
57
 During the Industrial Revolution at the 
close of the nineteenth century, the social belief that industries would thrive if they 
were not burdened with all the losses that they caused fostered fault or negligence law, 
even though industrialization enhanced the chances of accidents.
58
 Legislators 
theorized that the imposition of excessive liability might have driven out growing 
                                                     
52
 See supra note 49 at 91-92. 
53
 See supra note 48 at 711 and William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Positive Economic 
Theory of Tort Law, 15 Ga. L. Rev. 851, 854 (1981). 
54
 See supra note 49 at 96-97 and at 2-3. 
55
 See supra note 4 at 11. 
56
 Id. 
57
 John Vargo, Strict Liability for Products: An Achievable Goal, 24 Ind. L. Rev. 1197, 1201 (1991). 
58
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businesses, detrimentally affecting the economy;
59
 thus emerging industries and 
enterprises flourished under the protective cover of negligence principles.
60
Fault 
concepts coincided not only with the social desire of the Industrial Revolution but 
also with the nineteenth century individualism underlying the laissez faire political 
philosophy of the time.
61
 Until the mid-twentieth century, the societal need for the 
expansion of tort liability to afford greater protection to the general public enabled 
strict liability to revive specific fields of law to govern certain activities.
62
 
Historically, strict liability not only plays an important role in the development of 
tort law but also affords greater protection to the general public when societal need of 
such protection arises. For this reason, the analysis of tort liability not only inspires 
tort reform but also makes sure that tort law keeps up with social changes and 
development.  
Finally, there are practical merits from resolving the issues of liability rule, 
because liability rule deals with the everyday problems that law practitioners 
frequently encounter. The world in which we live is one full of risks and harms.
63
 For 
example, mine explosions, workers’ occupational diseases, automobile collisions, 
                                                     
59
 Shieh Jershenq, Hsien Hsing Shang Pin Tse Jen Kuei Fan Te Chien Tao (A Review of the Current 
Products Liability Law) 87 Taipei University L. Rev. 59, 101 (2013). 
60
 See supra note 57. 
61
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62
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aviation accidents, waste pollution incidents, oil spills, product-related injuries, and 
professional malpractices are all daily accidents governed by tort liability.
64
 
According to the statistics published by Taiwanese authority in 2008, the total 
payments from labor insurance to all occupational accident victims were up to 51 
trillion dollars in 2007.
65
 Those accidents led to astoundingly huge amounts of 
monetary damages and the waste of resources.
66
  
On the other hand, the primary function of tort law is to provide each individual 
protection against unlawful harm, affording proper remedies to the injured individual 
and holding the tortfeasor liable for his tortious conduct.
67
 In this way, tort law 
protects both individual autonomy and individual dignity.
68
 The research of tort 
liability helps systematically explicate when a person should be held liable and pay 
for damages done to victims, making sure that tort law serves its important function as 
a mechanism for society to deter future accidents and reduce wastes resulting from 
potential accidents.
69
 Consequently, tort liability matters, and this Dissertation 
contributes enormously to the future development of Taiwanese tort law. 
                                                     
64
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65
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1.2 Defining Risk Liability and Pinpointing the Issue 
 As noted in the very beginning of this chapter, liability rule always matters.
70
 
However, among several possible issues of liability rule, this Dissertation focuses on 
only one of them: risk liability. Before illustrating the issue, this Dissertation has to 
define risk liability and provide the general background to this rule, since risk liability 
might be an unfamiliar term in American legal scholarship. 
A. The Modest Difference Between Risk Liability and Strict Liability 
 In Taiwanese law, negligence is the default rule for unintentional torts.
71
 
However, in certain areas of law, Gefährdungshaftung or “risk liability” is the 
operative rule.
72
 The concept of this liability rule is the product of inheritance from 
Germany’s legal system.73 Risk liability, as demonstrated by its name, is a liability 
regime which attributes one’s legal responsibility to the source of risk of harm.74 In 
other words, the imposition of liability under risk liability is not predicated on whether 
a person intentionally or negligently caused injuries to others; rather, the basis of its 
attribution lies on the fact that the actor owns, manages, or controls the source of risk.
75
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 See supra 14. 
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75
 Id.  
  
 
19 
It is when the source of risk results in injuries to others that the person who owns, 
manages, or controls the source has to compensate the injured victim because under 
these circumstances that person is the one who is better able to control the risk and to 
spread the loss, and he is also the one who benefits from conducting risky activities.
76
  
Because risk liability holds a person liable regardless of the person’s fault, it is a 
rule traditionally associated with the concept of strict liability or with liability without 
fault in the American common law.
77
 However, although risk liability can be identified 
as a rule of strict liability, such conceptualization cannot run backwards. That said, 
although risk liability is a liability regime governed by strict liability, not all strict 
liability rules are risk liability rules.
78
 This is because some forms of liability imposed 
in negligence seem more like strict liability.
79
 For example, equitable liability (or 
Billigkeitshaftung) is a strict liability rule which holds an employer liable in whole or 
in part for damages done by the employee’s negligence within the scope of 
employment, even if he exercised due care in supervising the employee’s works,80 
but it is not a rule of risk liability as its basis of attribution lies on the ground of 
fairness and on the consideration of the parties’ financial conditions rather than on the 
                                                     
76
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77
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78
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79
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source of the risk.
81
 In so defining, although the Dissertation will use strict liability to 
describe the concept of risk liability in the following context, readers are encouraged 
to bear in mind the modest difference between the two concepts. 
B. The Issue of Risk Liability: The Rising Tension Between Strict Liability and 
Negligence 
 So far this Dissertation has defined the meaning of risk liability and identified 
the difference between risk liability and strict liability.
82
 In this section, this 
Dissertation raises the issue of the rising tension between strict liability and 
negligence within liability rule. 
As noted previously, negligence is the default rule for unintentional torts in 
Taiwan.
83
 However, the societal need for the expansion of tort liability to afford 
greater protection to the general public enables strict liability to revive in specific 
fields of law to govern liability for certain activities during the modern era.
84
 The 
basis of this trend is perhaps predicated on the recognition of negligence principle’s 
weakness: negligence’s failure to deal with accidents derived from high risks of 
harm.
85
 Thus several legislative changes have taken place, and many strict liability 
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rules have been established, including liability for product manufacturers,
86
 liability 
for transportation providers,
87
 liability for mass rapid transit system operators,
88
 
liability for aircraft owners,
89
 and liability for nuclear facility operators.
90
 
In 1999, Article 191-3 established general liability rule for dangerous activities; 
however, it has evoked serious debates over Taiwanese legal scholarship. The rule 
also originated from the recognition of high risks of harm and the need to afford 
greater protection to injured victims within modern society.
91
 In modern society, the 
complexity of carrying out businesses or activities makes it more difficult for the 
injured to prove the defendant’s negligence, and the demanding requirements of 
negligence law become obstacles to the ability of the injured to seek recovery.
92
 For 
example, the process of production becomes more complex with the rise of 
mechanization, making it difficult for a victim to prove the negligence of the owner of 
the enterprise in an occupational accident.
93
  
In addition to fairness considerations, three other factors justify a special 
treatment of liability for dangerous activities: 
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1) The operators of dangerous activities are the producers of the sources of risk;  
2) Only the operators of dangerous activities control the risks; and 
3) Those operators benefit from carrying out dangerous activities.
94
 
Under these considerations, Article 191-3 imposes tort liability on those carrying 
out dangerous activities, and the injured who seek recovery under Article 191-3 need 
not prove the defendant’s negligence and causation between risk of harm to the 
damages:
95
  
[T]he person, who runs a particular business or does other work or activity, shall 
be liable for the injury to another if the nature of the work or activity, or the 
implement or manner used might damage to another. Except the injury was not 
caused by the work or activity, or by the implement or manner used, or he has 
exercised reasonable care to prevent the injury.
96
 [emphasis added] 
This rule also is the product of inheritance from a foreign legal system. However, 
although most Civil Code rules were inherited from Germany, this rule was 
specifically inherited from Italy. Article 2050 in the Italian Civil Code provides that:
97
 
[W]hoever causes injury to another in the performance of an activity dangerous 
by its nature or by reason of the instrumentalities employed, is liable for damages, 
unless he proves that he has taken all suitable measures to avoid the injury.
98
 
However, the three justifications for this rule are identical bases for risk liability.
99
 In 
Germany, risk liability rules are found in individual areas of law, and there are no 
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generalized risk liability rules to govern liability for dangerous activities.
100
 On the 
contrary, Article 2050 in the Italian Civil Code provides a generalized risk liability 
rule, but its standard for distinguishing dangerousness and non-dangerousness is 
unclear, thereby making the rule useless and hardly applicable.
101
 
Similarly, Article 191-3 in the Civil Code of Taiwan is subject to heavy criticism. 
In addition to the criticism that the generalized rule has the same predicament as its 
Italian origin in providing the standard for dangerousness, Professor Tzejian Wang 
argues that most of the rules in Civil Code of Taiwan were inherited from Germany, 
and it is highly questionable whether it is appropriate for Taiwan to adopt an Italian 
rule about which Taiwan has little knowledge.
102
 Significantly, this rule is a risk 
liability rule, and it is strict liability rather than negligence that should be the rule for 
risk liability because it is strict liability that provides better protection to the injured 
victims.
103
 Although Article 191-3 shifts the plaintiff’s burden of proving negligence 
to the defendant and relieves the plaintiff of burden of proving causation, shifting or 
relieving the burden of proof does not change the rule’s negligence characteristics.104 
By recognizing that negligence fails to deal with high risks of harm, the majority of 
scholars propose that Article 191-3 should be interpreted as or changed into a rule of 
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strict liability.
105
  
The first two questions regarding the definition of dangerousness and the 
appropriateness of inheriting Italian law do not concern the liability rule, and are of 
secondary importance to this Dissertation. On the other hand, the last question raises 
an issue that deserves more scholarly attention: the rising tension between strict 
liability and negligence. Put simply, strict liability is widely recognized as a superior 
rule to afford greater protection to the victims, but the question remains on how strict 
liability works in that way. To answer the question and argue that strict liability is the 
proper standard of liability for Article 191-3, the scholarship has to analyze the legal 
bases of strict liability so as to find the justifications for this principle’s “superiority.” 
In addition, if strict liability is a “superior” rule to negligence in affording greater 
protection to the victims, more questions arise: why is strict liability still limited to 
small numbers of areas of the law?
106
 Is it possible to expand strict liability to other 
areas of law? More broadly, can strict liability be the default rule for unintentional 
torts? As readers will discover later, this Dissertation argues that strict liability is not a 
superior rule to negligence and that its revival during the modern era originated from 
the underestimation of negligence principles.
107
 For the present, it is more helpful to 
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emphasize the practical merits from solving the issue of strict liability by illustrating 
the types of accidents that are currently governed or arguably should be governed by 
this so-called superior principle. 
 
1.3 Illustrations 
 In Taiwan, strict liability governs few areas of law.
108
 In other words, strict 
liability is the operative rule for only a few categories of accident, including 
product-related injuries,
109
 common-carrier accidents,
110
 aviation incidents,
111
 and 
nuclear-facility disasters.
112
 In addition to those accidents, this section will also 
provide examples of incidents applicable to Article 191-3, since the majority of 
scholars argue that Article 191-3 should be a strict liability rule. For the present, it is 
enough for readers to know that these accidents will be the materials for later 
analysis.
113
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A. Product-related Injury 
1) Manufacturing Defect 
a. Poisonous Milk Case
114
 
 On October 18, 2009, Ms. Sung bought from a retailer a can of powdered milk 
manufactured by Mead Johnson, and opened it immediately. On October 26, 2009, her 
5-month old child consumed the milk, and suffered dropsy and fever for three days. 
The mother then discovered some unknown crystals in the powered milk, and sent it 
for examination. The examination showed that the powdered milk contained 
excessive sodium and melamine, and concluded that the consumption of excessive 
sodium and melamine was the cause of the infant’s dropsy, fever, and reduction of 
urine in the following days. The physician furthered noted that the consumption 
would result in long-term kidney malfunction. Ms. Sung brought a suit against Mead 
Johnson on the theory of manufacturing defect. 
b. Exploding Bottle Case
115
 
 C Company delivered several cases of soda to a restaurant, placing them on the 
floor behind the counter where the cases of soda remained for several hours. W is a 
waitress in the restaurant, and one day she picked up a case and set it upon a nearby 
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ice cream cabinet in front of the refrigerator. She then proceeded to take the bottles 
from the case and put them into the refrigerator. However, when she moved the fourth 
bottle about 18 inches from the case, it exploded in her hand, causing severe injuries 
to her. Testimony from her colleagues revealed that the bottle did not bang either the 
case or the anything else when it exploded. W brought suit against C Company, 
arguing that the exploded bottle was flawed. 
2) Design Defect: Defective Ladder Case
116
 
S worked as a technician for L Company, which provided cable television service 
for L district. L Company purchased the extension ladder and hook assembly used 
during works. One day, S was assigned a routine repair job that required him to rest 
against a cable strand located several feet off the ground. S placed the cable line inside 
the U-shaped hooks that extended from the top of the ladder and rested the ladder 
against the cable. The base of the ladder was on the ground near a utility pole to 
which the overhead cable was attached. S climbed the ladder without securing the 
ladder to the pole or any other stationary object, planning to secure himself to the 
ladder with his safety belt when he reached the top of the ladder, where he would use 
a hand line to attach the ladder to the utility pole. However, after S climbed to the top 
of the ladder, his weight shifted while he reached for his safety belt, causing the 
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ladder to slide sideways from some distance with S hanging onto the ladder. When the 
ladder reached a position near the low point of the line between two utility poles to 
which it was attached, one of the hooks came off the line, and the ladder twisted and 
came to an abrupt halt, causing S to fall to the ground and suffer serious injuries. S 
brought suit against the manufacturer of the ladder arguing that the ladder was 
defectively designed. 
3) Insufficient Warning: Defective Cleaner Case
117
 
O is a bricklayer foreman. One day, O spotted a fifteen-gallon drum of mortar 
cleaner sitting on the ground. To prevent the cleaner drum from freezing to the ground, 
he picked it up and moved it to a nearby pallet. When O dropped the drum on the 
pallet, the bung closure popped out of the drum, splashing hydrochloric acid based 
cleaner into his eyes. O eventually lost sight in one of his eyes. The mortar cleaner 
was manufactured and packaged by P. The fifteen-gallon drum into which P packaged 
the cleaner was manufactured by D, and the bung closure used in the fifteen-gallon 
drum was manufactured by R. However, because O settled with D and R, his only 
action is against P, grounded under the theory of failure to warn. 
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B. Common-carrier Accident  
1) Freight Transportation Case
118
 
T Company imported a machine from the Netherlands. Upon the machine’s 
arrival at the airport, T Company hired W Express for delivery. However, at the time 
of unloading, an employee-driver of W Express not only failed to recognize that he 
parked the truck on a ramp, but also moved it with the back door opening. The 
machine slipped out of the truck, and was entirely damaged.  
2) Carriage of Passenger Case
119
 
On November 21, 2003, P took the bus operated by S Bus Company heading for 
K train station. However, while en route on the Freeway 1, a third party, C, collided 
with a vehicle in front of him and lost control of his car. C’s vehicle subsequently 
struck the bus on which P was riding, and P suffered severe injuries.  
3) Mass Rapid Transit Station Case
120
  
 On May 5, 2001, M took an escalator in a MRT station to travel from the 
platform to the lobby. At the end of his ride, he stumbled over a metal cover and fell. 
Though M felt a subtle headache, he did not go to the hospital. Afterwards, M suffered 
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chronic headache; however, he thought he just caught a cold and took pain-killers. On 
June 16, 2001, M had a severe headache and was sent to the hospital. He died of 
cerebral hemorrhage on July 2, 2001. Further investigation revealed that at the time of 
taking the escalator, the decedent turned around to talk to his spouse, thus not noticing 
that he was close to the end of the trip and falling backwards when he stumbled. 
However, the decedent’s spouse argued that the installment of the escalator was 
improper because there were no signs warning against the risk of taking the escalator 
and because there was no staff advising elders to take the elevator instead. 
C. Aviation Incident 
1) C-Air Flight 711 Incident
121
 
 C-Air flight 711 took off on the sunny afternoon of May 25, 2002, and was 
scheduled to arrive at the H Province Airport within ninety minutes. All on the flight 
crew were highly experienced pilots, but about half an hour after taking off, 
presumably while the plane was still climbing, the flight was lost. All of the crew 
members and passengers onboard died in the accident. 
After three hours of searching for flight 711, the Coast Guard located the 
wreckage. Further investigation found that twenty years prior to the accident, when 
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the same aircraft landed at the H Province Airport, its tail struck the ground and 
scraped along the runway because the pilot landed it with the nose too high. Even if 
C-Air conducted a permanent repair after the incident, the repair was not carried out 
properly because the workers did not follow the instructions in the aircraft 
manufacturer’s structural repair manual. According to the instructions, any damaged 
plate has to be replaced and the new plate must be large enough to cover more than 
thirty percent of the damaged area. However, the repair crews failed to replace the 
damaged plate; rather, they simply covered the area with a plate the same size as the 
damaged area. Because of the improper maintenance, the damaged part of the aircraft 
was gradually weakened as a consequence of metal fatigue, and finally broke on the 
date of the accident.  
2) T-Air Flight 555 Incident
122
  
On the evening of July 23, 2014, T-Air flight 555 took off in the rain, and was 
scheduled to arrive at the P City Airport within an hour. On that day, there were heavy 
rains at the destination because of an approaching typhoon. While the aircraft was 
landing, it deviated from its course and lost altitude. In an effort to land for a second 
time, the aircraft crashed into two houses a few seconds later, causing the deaths of 48 
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out of 58 people on board and inflicting ground injuries on 5 people. Further 
investigation concluded that the aircraft lost control because of extreme weather 
conditions.
123
 
D. Nuclear-facility Disaster
124
 
On March 11, 2011, a 9.0 magnitude earthquake occurred near J Island. A 
nuclear power plant on J Island consisted of three units of nuclear reactors. All 
reactors were automatically shut down at the time the earthquake was detected. 
However, the situation worsened after a tsunami hit the power plant, severely 
damaging the power supply facilities and crashing the emergency-cooling system. 
Subsequently, fuel rods in the reactors melted, causing several explosions and the 
release of radioactive materials. 
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E. Dangerous Activities 
1) The Gasoline Leaks Case
125
 
 C Petroleum Co. is famous for manufacturing and exporting a selection of high 
quality gasoline, and owns an oil refinery in K City. On April 24, 1999, an oil tanker 
owned by W Inc. was anchored at the pier of the K City refinery, preparing to load the 
gasoline ready for export. C Petroleum provided the petroleum pipelines to transmit 
the gasoline onto the cabin of the tanker from its gasoline storage facilities. Five 
minutes after the transmission, one of the pipelines exploded, and the oil leakage 
polluted the marine area around a neighboring pier owned by H. 
2) Electricity Overload Case
126
 
 On April 13, 2002, a fire occurred at B’s office and consumed a neighboring 
house owned by A. Fire investigation revealed that a short circuit was the cause of the 
fire, which resulted from long-term usage of electricity at B’s office. 
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Chapter Two: 
Laws of Tort Liability in Taiwan 
 
 
 
Synopsis 
 
 Tort law serves to compensate the victim for injuries and to deter future accidents, 
not to punish the injurer. 
 The Civil Code of Taiwan adopts negligence as the default liability rule for 
unintentional torts.  
 Negligence is the breach of duty of care of a good administrator or a reasonable 
person. 
 Legislature provides variations of negligence (i.e. intermediate liability and 
equitable liability) to afford greater protections. 
 Although negligence protects freedom of action and induces efficient level of 
care, it is believed to be an inferior option when the risk of harm is high. 
 Strict liability is the operative rule for several high-risk activities, e.g. liability for 
common carriers, liability for nuclear facility operators, liability for civil aviation, 
and products liability. 
 Issue Revisited: What is the proper liability rule for Article 191-3 of the Civil 
Code—intermediate liability or strict liability? 
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2.1 Overview 
 In the first chapter, readers already got general ideas about the importance of 
legal liability, the rising tension between strict liability and negligence, and the 
practical merits from solving the issue of strict liability. The following two chapters 
will introduce the tort liability rules of both Taiwan and the American common law. 
The purpose of these two chapters serves to give the readers more ideas about the 
similarities and differences on tort liability rules from separate entities, which are 
important for later analysis. 
In this chapter, this Dissertation focuses on Taiwanese rules, outlining the 
purpose of tort liability, the default liability rule for unintentional torts, and the 
transition from negligence to strict liability. 
 
2.2 The Primary Purposes of Tort Law 
 Liability for wrongful acts is addressed either by criminal law or tort law, and 
together, criminal law and tort law establish a binary structure to regulate people’s 
behaviors.
127
 Tort law and criminal law share some similarities, since both deal with 
acts that injure a third party.
128
 However, tort law and criminal law serve different 
purposes; while tort law covers civil wrongs, concerning itself with harm against a 
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person’s private rights or property as a result of a tortfeasor’s act,129 criminal law 
concerns crimes, or wrongs against both the victim and society.
130
 Significantly, the 
primary function of criminal law is to punish the perpetrator for violating public 
interests.
131
 In so doing, criminal law indirectly inhibits crimes and protects society 
against criminal offenses.
132
 Additionally, criminal liability concerns offenses against 
society while tort liability cares about the relationship between private parties.
133
  
Thus, in a society where criminal law and tort law separately play their roles, tort law 
does not focus on punishment but rather the following purposes.
134
 
A. Protecting Freedom of Action and Private Interests 
 Tort law serves to balance freedom of action and private interests, focusing on 
regulating under what circumstances and for what types of damage the tortfeasor has 
to be held liable in order to compensate the injured victim.
135
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B. Compensation 
 Traditionally, compensation or reparation is a main function of tort law.
136
 
According to Article 184 of the Civil Code—the statutory basis for tort causes of 
action in general—a tortfeasor is bound to compensate the injured when liability is 
imposed. Specifically, the rule provides that:
137
 
A person who, intentionally or negligently, has wrongfully damaged the rights of 
another is bound to compensate him for any injury arising therefrom; the same 
rule shall be applied when the injury is done intentionally in a manner against the 
rules of morals. 
A person, who violates a statutory provision enacted for the protection of others 
and therefore prejudice to others, is bound to compensate for the injury, except no 
negligence in his act can be proved. 
The purpose of the duty to compensate is not to punish the tortfeasor, for 
determination of tort liability does not consider the tortfeasor’s motives. 138  In 
addition, the amount of compensation under tort liability is irrelevant to the 
seriousness of one’s fault.139 Rather, the duty of compensation derives from the 
notions of fairness and justice, and the purpose of this duty is to enable the injured to 
receive complete and prompt redress.
140
 Through compensation, the victim can shift 
his loss to the tortfeasor who is responsible for the harm.
141
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C. Accident Avoidance 
 Accident avoidance is more important than compensation.
142
 As tort law 
regulates under what circumstances a tortfeasor is liable for the harm to the victim and 
has to pay for the damages, it establishes a norm of behavior which everyone in a 
society has to follow; the threat of compensation achieves the goal of deterrence.
143
 
The Supreme Court of Taiwan also emphasizes the role of deterrence in tort law. 
For example, in Tai Shang Zi No. 1682 of 2001,
144
 a man offered a sacrifice to 
the god at a fishing port. After the sacrifice, he failed to put out the fire and poured the 
flaming remains into the sea. The flames mixed with the floating oil and extended the 
fire to a nearby fishing boat, thereby destroying the boat entirely. The court reasoned 
that the primary purpose of tort law is to deter future accidents and that anyone who 
invites risk has a duty to prevent harm.
145
 Additionally, in Tai Shang Zi No. 1758 of 
2003,
146
 a fire occurred in the defendant’s house and destroyed a neighboring house 
owned by the plaintiff. In reasoning that the defendant has a duty to exercise care in 
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maintaining the electric wires, the court reasoned that the purpose of tort law is to 
prevent accidents.
147
  Thus, the primary function of tort law is accident avoidance.
148
  
 
2.3 Fault-Based Liability—Laws of Negligence 
 In principle, the imposition of liability requires proof of the defendant’s fault. In 
other words, negligence is the default liability rule for unintentional tort in the Civil 
Code of Taiwan, and the plaintiff bears the burden of proof in a lawsuit. The first 
paragraph of Article 184 permits two causes of action in tort premised upon harms to 
rights or to interests,
149
 and under this rule the plaintiff has to prove the following 
facts.
150
 
A. Unlawful Acts 
 Acts refers to conscious moves, including omissions. That said, such moves 
include situations where the defendant proactively hurts the plaintiff, the defendant 
uses another person to hurt the plaintiff, and the defendant is under a duty to act but fails 
to do so, harming the plaintiff. In Taiwan, the duty to act derives from legal rules, 
contractual relationships, public policies, and morals. Furthermore, since society values 
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liberty and individualism, no one could be held liable for the actions of another 
person.
151
  
 In addition, to justify the imposition of liability on the tortfeasor, the act should 
be unlawful or satisfy the requirement of illegality. In determining whether or not an 
example of conduct is unlawful, the court looks to whether the defendant establishes 
affirmative defenses such as self-defense, plaintiff’s consent, or permissible risk, each 
of which may justify the defendant’s conduct under certain circumstances.152 For 
example, a nurse can draw blood from a patient for a test as long as the patient 
consents. However, the plaintiff’s consent is subject to limitation from public policy 
and morals. That said, a person could not grant permission to another to break his arm 
or to kill him. 
Similarly, permissible risk asks society to tolerate dangers in conducting certain 
activities when those activities are useful and beneficial to the general public. For 
instance, a factory is allowed to emit a limited amount of waste gas. However, 
although permissible risk makes it lawful for a person to create dangers in conducting 
certain activities, the actor still has a duty to exercise reasonable care during the 
                                                     
151
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course of the activities. In Tai Shang Zi No. 56 of 1997,
153
 the court reasoned that 
permissible risk is an affirmative defense to liability only if the defendant complies 
with the regulations of relevant activities and exercises due care in conducting them. 
Since the physician in Tai Shang Zi No. 56 of 1997 violated the duty of disclosure 
under Article 46 in the Medical Care Act and was presumed negligent, the court 
denied the physician’s affirmative defense arguing that the plaintiff’s retroverted 
uterus posed permissible risk to the surgery.
154
  
B. Harm to Private Rights or Interests 
 Actions for harm to private rights are regulated under the first part of the first 
paragraph of Article 184, whereas actions for harm to private interests fall under the 
second part of the provision. This distinction is practical because whether a victim can 
bring a negligence action depends on whether or not the injury constitutes harm to 
private rights. Under the first part of the first paragraph of Article 184, only when the 
injury is a recognizable harm to private rights can a victim bring an action either in 
intentional tort or in negligence.
155
 However, if the plaintiff suffers harm to private 
interests, he is only allowed to bring an intentional tort action.
156
 In this regard, 
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defining private rights and private interests is important for applying the first 
paragraph of Article 184. Generally, private rights are those recognized under the 
existing legal system, including property rights, publicity rights, and family status 
rights;
157
  private interests, on the other hand, are not recognized under the existing 
legal system, but are protected by public policies and morals.
158
 For example, a 
person’s opportunity to make a contract with others is protected by public policies and 
morals, thus protected only under the second part of the first paragraph of Article 
184.
159
 
C. Damages 
 As mentioned previously, one of the basic functions of tort law is to compensate 
the injured.
160
 If no one is harmed by the defendant’s acts, there should be no 
recovery.
161
 Tort damages include pecuniary damages and non-pecuniary damages. 
For pecuniary damages, Article 216 in Civil Code provides that: 
Unless otherwise provided by the act or by the contract, the compensation shall be 
limited to the injury actually suffered and the interests which have been lost. 
Interests which could have been normally expected are deemed to be the interests 
which have been lost, according to the ordinary course of things, the decided 
projects, equipment, or other particular circumstances. 
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In this way, pecuniary damages include positive harms and passive harms, and both 
are measured on the basis of decrease in value. In situations where the exact decrease 
in value is hardly ascertained, the court is allowed to exercise discretion in measuring 
the amount of recovery on the basis of totality of circumstances.
162
 Common 
examples for positive harms are losses of property rights or medical expenses, while 
passive harms are lost interests that the victim specifically expected to have gained as 
the result of the ordinary occurrence. As for non-pecuniary damages, they include lost 
intangible interests and pain and sufferings. For instance, Article 194 provides that: 
In case of death caused by a wrongful act, the father, mother, sons, daughters and 
spouse of the deceased may claim for a reasonable compensation in money even if 
such injury is not a purely pecuniary loss. 
Finally, it should be noted that recovery for non-pecuniary loss is permitted only if 
statutes provide such recovery.
163
 
D. Adequate Causation (Zurechnungszusammenhang) 
 In a tort action, the relationship between the defendant’s tortious act and the 
actual damage has to be established.
164
 Adequate causation is the common theory for 
determining whether liability should be imposed and the extent to which the coverage 
of recovery should be. In Tai Shang Zi No. 2210 of 2005,
165
 the court reasoned that 
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adequate causation is a two-prong test comprising of a conditional relation test and an 
adequacy test. A conditional relation test analyzes whether the accident would not 
have occurred but for the defendant’s tortious act. For example, if the defendant did 
not punch the plaintiff, the defendant would not have died. By contrast, an adequacy 
test relies upon whether a reasonable person would have foreseen the possibility of 
the damages under the circumstances. If the answers to the two tests are positive, the 
relation is established between the defendant’s tortious act and the actual damages. 
E. The Defendant’s Fault 
 The imposition of liability generally requires proof of defendant’s fault. A person 
is not liable for a victim’s injuries unless he intentionally or negligently harmed the 
victim. In this way, negligence is the default liability rule for unintentional torts. The 
Civil Code does not define negligence, so courts and scholars traditionally refer to the 
Criminal Code. Article 14 of the Criminal Code provides that:
166
  
A conduct is committed negligently if the actor fails, although not intentionally, to 
exercise his duty of care that he should and could have exercised in the 
circumstances. 
A conduct is considered to have been committed negligently if the actor is aware 
that his conduct would, but firmly believes it will not, accomplish the element of 
an offense. 
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In this way, negligence is defined as a failure to exercise the duty of care, and the 
imposition of liability depends on whether the defendant could have been aware of the 
injuries and exercised care to avoid them. However, since criminal law focuses on 
punishing the actor’s evil mental attitude, criminal negligence has to inquire into the 
deficiency in the state of mind of the individual actor. That is, the individual criminal 
defendant is liable only if he could have been aware of the injuries and avoided them.  
Tort law, on the other hand, serves different purposes from those of criminal law, 
and the test for tort negligence is also different.
167
 To achieve the goal of 
compensation and accident avoidance, an objective standard for tort negligence is 
preferable to a subjective test for criminal negligence.
168
 That said, although the both 
tests for negligence in tort and in criminal actions focus on whether a person exercises 
due care to prevent injury, the due care in a tort action should be measured on an 
objective standard of care of a good administrator rather than on whether the individual 
actor could have foreseen and avoided the harms.
169
 In Tai Shang Zi No. 703 of 
2015,
170
 Supreme Court of Taiwan supported such distinction. In that case, the court 
reasoned that civil liability is different from criminal liability, and whether a defendant 
is negligent in a civil case for defamation depends on whether he breached his duty of 
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care as a good administrator. If the defendant failed to exercise care as a good 
administrator in verifying the allegations, harming the plaintiff’s reputation, he might 
be held civilly liable for negligence even if he was found not guilty of offenses against 
reputation. 
F. Legal Capacity 
 The final requirement of a tort action concerns legal capacity. However, it does 
not come directly from Article 184 but rather from the first paragraph of Article 187 
in which the rule provides that: 
A person of no capacity or limited in capacity to make juridical acts, who has 
wrongfully damaged the rights of another, shall be jointly liable with his guardian 
for any injury arising therefrom if he is capable of discernment at the time of 
committing such an act. If he is incapable of discernment at the time of committing 
the act, his guardian alone shall be liable for such injury. 
Under this test, whether one has the capacity to make juridical acts depends on 
whether the defendant is capable of discernment at the time he acts. If at the time of 
accident a defendant has the capacity to understand that he will be held answerable 
under law, he satisfies the requirement of legal capacity and is liable for the injuries.  
2.4 Variations Under Negligence Principles 
According to Article 277 in the Code of Civil Procedure,
171
 unless otherwise 
provided by law or where the circumstances render it manifestly unfair, the burden of 
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proof lies on the party who alleges facts in his favor. Under negligence law, it is the 
plaintiff who bears the burden of proof in relation to negligence, and liability is 
imposed only when the defendant’s fault has been established.172 However, to afford 
greater protection to the victims, the legislature is allowed to provide different 
variations by either shifting the burden of proof related to negligence or even holding 
the defendant liable regardless of fault. 
A. Intermediate Liability
173
 
Under the Civil Code, five special provisions are intermediate liability rules. The 
common characteristic of these rules is that the defendant can escape liability by 
proving that he has exercised reasonable care to prevent injuries.
174
 However, shifting 
the burden of proof in relation to negligence does not change those rules’ 
characteristics as liabilities for negligence. 
Table 2: Intermediate Liability v. Negligence 
 Intermediate Liability Negligence 
Types of Liability Fault-based 
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The Party Bearing the 
Burden of Proof in 
Relation to Negligence 
Defendant Plaintiff 
 
1) Statutory Violation 
The second paragraph of Article 184 provides a liability rule based on the 
presumption of negligence.
175
 Taiwanese scholarship calls it “intermediate liability,” 
for it is more rigorous to defendants than traditional negligence, yet less rigorous than 
traditional strict liability.
176
 Under intermediate liability, a defendant’s liability is not 
based on proven fault, but rather on his failure to rebut the presumption of fault.
177
 
For an action under the second paragraph of Article 184, the plaintiff has to not only 
prove five out of six elements for an action under the first paragraph of Article 184,
178
 
but he must also prove the defendant’s act of statutory violation. Significantly, two of 
these elements call for special attention. 
a. Harm to Private Rights or Interests 
 Although the first part of the first paragraph of Article 184 holds that a victim 
can bring an action in negligence only if the injury is a recognizable harm to private 
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rights,
179
 the second paragraph of Article 184 dismisses this requirement. In other 
words, the second paragraph expands its protection to both private rights and interests 
as long as such protections are intended by a statutory provision.
180
 However, it 
should be noted that to impose liability under the second paragraph of Article 184, the 
plaintiff must be the class of persons who suffer the class of harms protected by the 
statutory provision.
181
  
b. The Meaning of “Statute” 
 The meaning of “statute” under the second paragraph of Article 184 should 
include all statutory regulations, customs, ordinances, and directive rules.
182
 A 
common example of statutory violation is violation of the Road Traffic Management 
and Penalty Act.
183
 Hence, if the defendant was speeding at the time of the accident, 
he was presumed negligent for injuries to bystanders under the second paragraph of 
Article 184. 
2) Liability for Animals 
Article 190 of the Civil Code imposes intermediate liability on the possessor of 
an animal if the animal kept by the possessor causes harm to the victim. More 
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specifically, it provides that: 
If injury is caused by an animal, the possessor is bound to compensate the injured 
person for any injury arising therefrom, unless reasonable care in keeping 
according to the species and nature of the animal has been exercised, or unless the 
injury would have been occasioned notwithstanding the exercise of such 
reasonable care. 
The possessor may claim for reimbursement against the third party, who has 
excited or provoked the animal, or against the possessor of another animal which 
has caused the excitement or provocation. 
Within this rule, “reasonable care” is in the defendant’s favor, and according to Article 
277 of the Code of Civil Procedure he bears the burden of proof in relation to 
negligence.
184
 Because the possessor is presumptively negligent, Article 190 is a rule 
of intermediate liability. To escape liability, the defendant has to prove that he has 
exercised reasonable care in keeping the animal or the injury would have occurred 
irrespective of the exercise of reasonable care.
185
  
3) Liability for Work Pieces 
Article 191 of the Civil Code imposes intermediate liability on the person who 
privately owns a building or work piece when a victim is injured by the building or 
work piece. Specifically, the rule provides that: 
The injury, which is caused by a building or other work on privately owned land, 
shall be compensated by the owner of such building or work, unless there is no 
defective construction or insufficient maintenance in such building or work, or the 
injury was not caused by the defectiveness or insufficiency, or the owner has 
exercised reasonable care to prevent such injury. 
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In the case of the preceding paragraph, if there is another person who shall be 
responsible for the injury, the owner making compensation may make a claim for 
reimbursement against such person. 
According to this rule, the defendant can prove facts in his favor to escape liability, 
including 1) there is no defective construction or insufficient maintenance in the 
building or work piece; 2) the injury was not caused by the defectiveness or 
insufficiency; or 3) the owner has exercised reasonable care to prevent such injury. 
The second defense is about the causal link,
186
 whereas the first and the third 
defenses are rebuttals to liability. Because it is the defendant that bears the burden of 
proof to rebut negligence, Article 191 is an intermediate liability rule. 
4) Liability for Products 
 Article 191-1 of the Civil Code imposes intermediate liability on the product 
manufacturer and importer if the victim suffers injuries arising out of the ordinary use 
or consumption of the merchandise by providing that: 
The manufacturer is liable for the injury to another arising from the common use 
or consumption of his merchandise, unless there is no defectiveness in the 
production, manufacture, process, or design of the merchandise, or the injury is 
not caused by the defectiveness, or the manufacturer has exercised reasonable care 
to prevent the injury.
187
 
The manufacturer mentioned in the preceding paragraph is the person who 
produces, manufactures, or processes the merchandise. Those, who attach the 
merchandise with the service mark, or other characters, signs to the extent enough 
to show it was produced, manufactured, or processed by them, shall be deemed to 
be the manufacturer. 
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If the production, manufacture, process, or design of the merchandise is 
inconsistent with the contents of its manual or advertisement, it is deemed to be 
defective. 
The importer shall be as liable for the injury as the manufacturer. 
This rule was amended in 1999. The first paragraph of Article 191-1 establishes the 
liability rule for the product manufacturer. Under this rule, the defendant bears the 
burden of proof in relation to negligence and causation, and Article 191-1 is an 
intermediate liability rule.
188
  
5) Liability for Motor Vehicles 
Article 191-2 is the liability rule for a driver of a motor vehicle if the driver 
causes injuries to another. Specifically, it imposes intermediate liability on the driver 
by providing that: 
If an automobile, motorcycle or other motor vehicles which need not to be driven 
on tracks in use has caused the injury to another, the driver shall be liable for the 
injury arising therefrom, unless he has exercised reasonable care to prevent the 
injury. 
Under this rule, the defendant bears the burden of proof in relation to negligence. 
Hence, this rule also is an intermediate liability rule. 
B. Equitable Liability (Billigkeitshaftung)
189
 
 The principle of equitable liability, a second variation under negligence 
principles inherited from the German legal system, forces one who has the better 
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financial capacity to compensate the innocent victims for the injuries even if he is not 
liable.
190
 Although liability under this principle is imposed regardless of fault, its 
justification is different from that of traditional strict liability.
191
 Rather, this principle 
is justified solely on the fairness ground, and is sometimes called “richerse oblige” or 
“liability of the rich.”192 Finally, although Taiwanese scholars call this principle 
“equitable liability,” it has nothing to do with common law equity.193 
 
Table 3: Equitable Liability v. Negligence 
 Equitable Liability Negligence 
Types of Liability No-fault Fault-based 
The Party Bearing the 
Burden of Proof in 
Relation to Negligence  
None Plaintiff 
 
1) Guardian’s Liability 
 The first equitable liability rule is incorporated within Article 187 of the Civil 
Code, which sets up a guardian’s tort liability in situations where a minor wrongfully 
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damages the rights of another. Specifically, the rule states that: 
A person of no capacity or limited in capacity to make juridical acts, who has 
wrongfully damaged the rights of another, shall be jointly liable with his guardian 
for any injury arising therefrom if he is capable of discernment at the time of 
committing such an act. If he is incapable of discernment at the time of committing 
the act, his guardian alone shall be liable for such injury. 
In the case of the preceding paragraph, the guardian is not liable if there is no 
negligence in his duty of supervision, or if the injury would have been occasioned 
notwithstanding the exercise of reasonable supervision. 
If compensation cannot be obtained according to the provisions of the preceding 
two paragraphs, the court may, on the application of the injured person, take the 
financial conditions among the tortfeasors, the guardian and the injured person 
into consideration, and order the tortfeasors or his guardian to compensate for a 
part or the whole of the injury. 
The provision of the preceding paragraph shall apply mutatis mutandis to cases 
where the injury has been caused to a third party by a person other than those 
specified in the first paragraph in a condition of unconsciousness or of mental 
disorder. 
The second paragraph of Article 187 allows the guardian to escape liability by 
proving that he was not negligent in his duty of supervision or that the injury would 
have occurred even if he had exercised reasonable care in supervision. Under Article 
277 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
194
 the burden of proof in relation to negligence 
and causation lies on the guardian, because under Article 187, those facts are in the 
plaintiff’s favor. Therefore, the guardian’s liability is intermediate liability.195  
 However, a person of no capacity or limited in capacity to make juridical acts is 
usually an infant, at least below the age of 20,
196
 as Article 13 of the Civil Code 
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provides that:  
The minor, who has not reached their seventh year of age, has no capacity to make 
juridical acts. 
The minor, who is over seven years of age, has a limited capacity to make juridical 
acts. 
The married minor has the capacity to make juridical acts. 
Because an infant typically has limited financial capacity, the third paragraph plays a 
special role in affording greater protection to a victim by holding a guardian liable 
who could have escaped liability under the second paragraph.
197
 Additionally, the 
court is permitted to take the guardian’s financial conditions into account in 
determining the amount of compensation. Liability under the third paragraph is 
imposed regardless of fault, and the purpose of equitable liability is to achieve the 
goal of distributive justice by holding the one who has the better financial capacity 
responsible for compensating the innocent victim.
198
  
2) Employer’s Liability  
Article 188 of the Civil Code, within which a second equitable liability rule is 
incorporated, establishes the liability of an employer when the employee wrongfully 
damages the rights of another: 
The employer shall be jointly liable to make compensation for any injury which 
the employee has wrongfully caused to the rights of another in the performance of 
his duties. However, the employer is not liable for the injury if he has exercised 
                                                                                                                                                        
of age. 
197
 See LIFAYUAN GONGBAO (Official Gazette of Legislative Yuan of the Republic of China) Vol. 88 
No. 13 273-74 for Sitting Records of Article 187 of the CIVIL CODE (Chinese Source ONLY). 
198
 See supra note 4 at 501. 
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reasonable care in the selection of the employee, and in the supervision of the 
performance of his duties, or if the injury would have been occasioned 
notwithstanding the exercise of such reasonable care. 
If compensation cannot be obtained according to the provision of the preceding 
paragraph, the court may, on the application of the injured person, take the 
financial conditions of the employer and the injured person into consideration, and 
order the employer to compensate for a part or the whole of the injury. 
The employer who has made compensation as specified in the preceding 
paragraph may claim for reimbursement against the employee committed the 
wrongful act. 
The first paragraph renders Article 188 a rule of intermediate liability, since the 
employer is permitted to escape liability if he establishes that he has exercised 
reasonable care or if it can be demonstrated that the injury would have occurred 
notwithstanding the exercise of reasonable care. However, the second paragraph holds 
an employer liable who could have escaped liability under the first paragraph. Hence, 
Article 188 also is an equitable liability rule. 
2.5 Risk Liability 
As noted previously, negligence is the default liability rule for unintentional 
torts.
199
 However, to afford greater protections, the legislature provides risk liability 
or strict liability rules in certain areas of law.
200
 
                                                     
199
 See supra 18. 
200
 Most of the time risk liability and strict liability are interchangeable. Please refer to supra 18-20 for 
the subtle difference between the two terms. 
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A. The Advantages and Disadvantages of Negligence
201
 
Negligence protects freedom of action, so that a person need not worry about 
excessive liability. For example, if liability is imposed regardless of fault, a person 
with a strong sense of responsibility will have little incentive to carry out activities, 
thus impeding social development. On the contrary, a person with little sense of 
responsibility will indulge himself, thus bringing about more accidents. In this way, 
negligence induces an efficient level of care to protect individual rights, for liability 
will be imposed only if the burden of taking precaution is less than the product of the 
magnitude of accident loss and the probability of the accident.
202
  
However, with negligence fostering Industrial Revolution and social 
development, the risk of harm becomes far greater for conducting certain activities in 
a modern society. The costs of preventing those high-risk accidents might be too high, 
and the defendant could avoid his liability under negligence. Moreover, upmost care 
accompanied with the best technology at hand might fail to prevent certain high-risk 
accidents. Secondly, the complexity of carrying out businesses or activities in a 
modernized society sometimes makes it more difficult for an innocent victim to prove 
a tortfeasor’s negligence, and the demanding requirements of negligence law become 
                                                     
201
 Unless otherwise annotated, the following comments on negligence are cited and modified from 
Case Analysis on General Prov. of Obligation of the Civil Code, supra note 5 at 127-28. Please refer to 
it for more details. 
202
 A Theory of Negligence, supra note 38 at 32. 
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obstacles to the victim’s ability to seek recovery. 203  With the above reasons, 
negligence is believed to be an inferior option when the risks of harm are high and 
when the victim encounters hardship in burden of proof,
204
 and strict liability meets 
the societal need in affording greater protection.  
B. Rise of Strict Liability
205
 
In Taiwan, strict liability is the governing rule for several high-risk activities, 
including liability for common carriers, liability for nuclear facility operators, liability 
for civil aviation, and liability for products.
206
 
1) Liability for Aviation Incident 
In 1953, the Civil Aviation Act introduced the first strict liability rule in Taiwan 
to regulate damages arising out of aviation incidents. According to Article 89 of the 
Civil Aviation Act:
207
 
Where casualties or damage to property occur as a result of aircraft accident, the 
owner of the aircraft shall be liable for compensation regardless of whether such 
accident is due to willful action or negligence. Such an owner of the aircraft shall 
also be liable for damage caused by force majeure. The same also applies to 
damage caused by falling or dropping of objects from the aircraft. 
                                                     
203
 See supra 21. 
204
 See also: supra note 4 at 326-27. 
205
 Unless otherwise annotated, the following text about Taiwanese strict liability rules is cited and 
modified from supra note 4 at 667-721. Please refer to it for more details. 
206
 See infra 58-67. 
207
 In the 1953 version, this rule was in Article 77 with similar language. See LIFAYUAN GONGBAO 
(Official Gazette of Legislative Yuan of the Republic of China) Vol. 42 No. 11 70-71 for Sitting 
Records of Article 77 of the 1953 CIVIL AVIATION ACT (Chinese Source ONLY). 
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Moreover, Article 91 in the same Act regulates the liability of an aircraft operator 
when the passenger incurs harm in the aircraft or while embarking or disembarking 
the aircraft, as well as the aircraft operator’s liability for delay. Specifically, the rule 
provides that:
208
 
The aircraft operator shall be liable for accidental death or injury of passengers in 
the aircraft or while embarking or disembarking the aircraft. But if such death or 
injury is attributed to the passenger’s fault, such liability may be exonerated or 
reduced. 
The aircraft operator shall be liable for causing damage to passengers because of 
flight delay, provided that the aircraft operator can prove the delay is caused by 
force majeure. The liability shall be limited to the necessary extra expense 
incurred to the passengers through the flight delay. 
Liability under Article 89 is “absolute liability,” for the owner of the aircraft is liable 
not only regardless of fault but also for the damage caused by unexpected and 
uncontrollable events. As for Article 91, it is a strict liability rule. However, there is a 
ceiling on the liability under Article 91, since Article 3 in Regulations of 
Compensation for Damage Caused to Air Passengers and Freight provides that: 
The aircraft operator or consignor, as held liable to each and every passenger for 
damage under the first paragraph of article 91 of This Act,
209
 shall adhere to the 
standards below for making compensation. Nevertheless, if the victim can prove 
damage was much greater, he or she may request compensation beyond the set 
amount： 
1) Death: NT$3,000,000. 
2) Severe injury: NT$1,500,000. 
 
                                                     
208
 In the 1973 amended version, this rule was in Article 69 with similar language. 
209
 “This Act” means CIVIL AVIATION ACT because REGULATIONS OF COMPENSATION FOR DAMAGE 
CAUSED TO AIR PASSENGERS AND FREIGHT are enacted in accordance with the first paragraph of 
Article 93 of the CIVIL AVIATION ACT. 
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If damage did not cause death or severe injury, compensation shall be 
commensurate with actual harms done, but not exceeding NT$1,500,000 at the 
highest. 
The so-called severs injury conforms in meaning to Item 4, Article 10 of the 
Criminal Code. 
The ceiling on the liability will disappear if the damage to the passenger or freight 
resulted from willful or major neglect or wrongdoing on the part of the aircraft operator, 
consignor, or their employee or representative in the execution of duties.
210
 
Furthermore, the Civil Aviation Act does not preempt the plaintiff’s tort cause of 
action under the Civil Code, and an aircraft owner or consignor will be liable for full 
compensation if the plaintiff pursues his cause of action under Article 184 of the Civil 
Code. However, if the damage results from the intentional act or negligence of a crew 
or a third party, the owner, lessee or borrower of the aircraft has another cause of action 
against such crew or third party.
211
 Finally, aircraft owners and civil air transport 
enterprises are mandated to purchase liability insurance.
212
  
2) Liability for Nuclear Disaster 
Article 18 of the Nuclear Damage Compensation Law imposes strict liability on 
the operator of a nuclear facility in cases of nuclear accidents by providing that: 
The operator of a nuclear installation shall, in accordance with this Law, be liable 
for nuclear damages arising from the occurrence or expansion of a nuclear 
incident regardless of whether it is caused intentionally or through negligence, 
                                                     
210
 Article 6 of the REGULATIONS OF COMPENSATION FOR DAMAGE CAUSED TO AIR PASSENGERS AND 
FREIGHT. 
211
 Article 92 of the CIVIL AVIATION ACT.  
212
 Article 94 of the CIVIL AVIATION ACT. 
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except when the nuclear incident is caused directly by international armed 
conflicts, hostilities, domestic rebellion, or grave natural calamity. 
Liability under this rule is strict liability. However, the operator is not an insurer to a 
nuclear disaster, and is permitted to escape liability by proving that the nuclear 
incident is caused directly by international armed conflicts, hostilities, domestic 
rebellion, or grave natural calamity. Moreover, comparative negligence is a valid 
defense.
213
 Third, Article 24 of this Law provides a ceiling on the liability, and the 
liability of a nuclear installation operator for nuclear damages arising out of each single 
nuclear incident is limited to NTD 4,200,000,000, not including interest and costs of 
litigation.
214
 Fourth, a nuclear installation operator is mandated to maintain liability 
insurance or financial guarantee unless the operator is the Central Government, 
provincial or municipal government or their research organizations.
215
 Finally, special 
statutes of limitation are applicable to causes of action arising under this Law: 
a. Article 28 of this Law provides that:  
Claims of compensation for nuclear damage shall be extinguished if an action is 
not brought within three (3) years after knowledge of the damage and of the 
nuclear installation operator liable for the damage; however the period shall in no 
case exceed ten (10) years from the date of the nuclear incident. 
b. Article 29 of this Law provides that: 
Where the nuclear material causing a nuclear incident is stolen, lost, jettisoned or 
abandoned, the statute of limitations of the right to claim compensation shall be 
governed by the preceding Article. However, when making a claim for 
                                                     
213
 Article 19 of the NUCLEAR DAMAGE COMPENSATION LAW. 
214
 Article 24 of the NUCLEAR DAMAGE COMPENSATION LAW. 
215
 See Article 25, 26, and 31 of the NUCLEAR DAMAGE COMPENSATION LAW. 
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compensation against the original nuclear installation operator of the said nuclear 
material, the claim shall be made within twenty (20) years from the time the 
nuclear material is stolen, lost, jettisoned or abandoned. 
3) Liability for MRT Accident 
According to the first paragraph of Article 46 of the Mass Rapid Transit Act,
216
 
the operation organization of a mass rapid transit system is strictly liable for personal 
death or injury of passengers and for damage or loss caused by trains or other rail 
accidents such as derailments.
217
 Similarly, the operator is mandated to maintain 
liability insurance.
218
 
4) Liability for Common Carrier 
Article 64 of the Highway Act holds a transportation provider strictly liable for 
traffic accidents by providing that:
219
 
In the case of traffic accidents causing injury or death to passengers or other 
people, or damage or loss to money or property, automobile or trolley 
transportation providers shall be liable for the damage and compensate for it. 
However, the providers are not liable to pay damage compensation if it can be 
proven that the accident was due to force majeure or fault of the shipper or 
recipient of carried goods. 
Damage compensation of damaged or lost goods under this article shall [equal] up 
to NTD 3000 per piece unless the shipper has declared and stated clearly about the 
quality and value of the goods, on the carry agreement before shipping. 
The rule of damage compensation applicable to the injury or death of passengers 
or other people will be separately determined by the MOTC. 
                                                     
216
 Article 46 of the MASS RAPID TRANSIT ACT. 
217
 See also: supra note 4 at 689. 
218
 Article 47 of the MASS RAPID TRANSIT ACT. 
219
 Article 64 of the HIGHWAY ACT. 
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This rule was amended in 2000. Under the first paragraph of the rule, automobile or 
trolley transportation providers are strictly liable for the damage to passengers or 
other people. However, if the accident resulted from an act of God, the transportation 
providers might escape liability. In addition, the second paragraph provides a ceiling 
on the liability for damaged or lost goods, and the third paragraph refers to a rule 
separately determined by the Ministry of Transportation and Communications 
regarding the ceiling on the liability for harms to persons or properties.
220
 Finally, 
Article 65 in the same Act requires the transportation providers to purchase liability 
insurance by stating that:
221
 
Automobile owners should have liability insurance under this article. 
Trolley owners should have liability insurance before applying to highway 
authorities for the issuance of license plates, under rates provided by the MOTC. 
Insurance premiums are set by the MOTC. Automobile or trolley transportation 
providers should have liability insurance for passengers, and the minimum 
insurance coverage set by the MOTC may be exempted from the liability 
insurance under this article. 
Transportation providers that fail to pay insurance premiums shall be fined at least 
NTD 100,000 but not more than NTD 500,000. 
                                                     
220
 For more details (Chinese Source ONLY) about this rule, see 
http://law.moj.gov.tw/LawClass/LawAllIf.aspx?PCode=K0040026.  
221
 Article 65 of the HIGHWAY ACT. 
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5) Liability for Products 
Article 7 of the Consumer Protection Law is a special provision governing the 
liabilities for a manufacturer of commercial product and for a service provider. The 
rule imposes strict liability by providing that:
222
 
Business operators engaging in the design, production or manufacture of goods or 
in the provisions of services shall ensure that goods and services provided by them 
meet and comply with the contemporary technical and professional standards of 
the reasonably expected safety prior to the sold goods launched into the market, or 
at the time of rendering services. 
Where goods or services may endanger the lives, bodies, health or properties of 
consumers, a warning and the methods for emergency handling of such danger 
shall be labeled at a conspicuous place. 
Business operators violating the two foregoing two paragraphs and thus causing 
injury to consumers or third parties shall be jointly and severally liable therefor, 
provided that if business operators can prove that they are not guilty of negligence, 
the court may reduce their liability for damages. 
In contrast to the products liability provision under the Civil Code,
223
 Article 7 of the 
Consumer Protection Law holds a manufacturer strictly liable for damages caused by 
product defects. Together they establish a dual system to regulate product-related 
accidents, and both premise liability upon the defect of the product.
224
 However, 
some distinctions are worth mentioning. 
First, although both Article 191-1 of the Civil Code and Article 7 of the 
Consumer Protection Law regulate liability for product-related injuries, the former 
                                                     
222
 Article 7 of the CONSUMER PROTECTION LAW. 
223
 See supra 51-52. 
224
 The concept of defect encompasses manufacturing defect, design defect, and warning defect. See 
supra note 4 at 704-05. 
  
 
65 
rule imposes intermediate liability on product manufacturers, whereas the latter one 
holds product manufacturers strictly liable. This could be demonstrated by the third 
paragraph of Article 7 of the Consumer Protection Law, for the court may reduce 
rather than exempt the manufacturer’s liability when the manufacturer proves that he 
was not negligent.
225
 As for liability for retailers, the first paragraph of Article 8 of 
the Consumer Protection Law imposes intermediate liability on them because they 
may escape liability if they have exercised due care to prevent the injury or if the injury 
would still have occurred even though they had exercised due care.
226
 On the other 
hand, since Article 191-1 of the Civil Code does not extend to the liability for retailers, 
intermediate liability does not apply and the plaintiff bears the burden of proof related 
to negligence in an action brought under the Civil Code.
227
  
 Second, Article 191-1 of the Civil Code protects “everyone” from harm caused by 
a defective product. On the other hand, Article 7 in Consumer Protection Law protects 
“consumers and third persons” only.228 According to the first provision of Article 2 of 
this Law, the term “consumers” means those who enter into transactions, use goods, or 
accept services for the purpose of consumption.
229
 “Consumers” under Article 7 of this 
Law are those not intending to use the products for manufacturing or resale but are 
                                                     
225
 Id. at 700. 
226
 See the first paragraph of Article 8 of the CONSUMER PROTECTION LAW for text. 
227
 See supra 37 for the first paragraph of Article 184 of the CIVIL CODE. 
228
 See supra note 4 at 707-08. 
229
 Article 2 of the CONSUMER PROTECTION LAW. 
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rather “end users.”230 As for “third parties” under Article 7 of this Law, they are limited 
to foreseeable victims injured in the course of an end user’s consuming behaviors. For 
example, a pedestrian injured in a car accident resulting from tire blow may bring an 
action under Article 7 of this Law against the tire manufacturer.
231
 The linchpin of an 
action under Article 7 of the Consumer Protection Law is whether an end user’s 
“consuming behaviors” causes harm. 
 Third, while Article 191-1 of the Civil Code does not regulate liability for service 
providers, Article 7 of the Consumer Protection Law imposes strict liability on them if 
harm to consumers or third parties is adequately attributed to defective services. 
However, medical services are excluded from this rule.
232
 Finally, punitive damages 
are not available in a product-related action under the Civil Code, whereas they are 
available under the Consumer Protection Law because Article 51 of this Law provides 
that: 
In a litigation brought in accordance with this law, the required consumer may 
claim for punitive damages up to 3 times the amount of actual damages as a result 
of injuries caused by the willful act of misconduct of business operators; however, 
if such injuries are caused by negligence, a punitive damage up to one time the 
amount of the actual damages may be claimed. 
                                                     
230
 See supra note 4 at 707. 
231
 Id. at 708. 
232
 Article 82 of the MEDICAL CARE ACT. 
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However, since the primary function of tort law is accident avoidance, the availability 
of punitive damages in a products liability action is subject to criticisms.
233
 
Table 4: Manufacturer Liability Under Civil Code v. Manufacturer Liability 
Under Consumer Protection Law
234
 
 
Manufacturer Liability 
Under Civil Code 
Manufacturer Liability 
Under Consumer 
Protection Law 
Liability Rule Intermediate Liability Strict Liability 
Parties Protected Everyone 
Consumers and Third 
Parties 
Liability for Defective 
Services 
Not Available Available 
Punitive Damages Not Available Available 
C. Issue Revisited: The Rising Tension Between Strict Liability and 
Negligence—Article 191-3 of the Civil Code 
 With the introduction about Taiwanese strict liability rules, readers may discover 
that while negligence is still the default liability rule for unintentional torts, strict 
                                                     
233
 See supra note 7 at 10. 
234
 See supra note 150 at 263 for a more detailed comparison. 
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liability becomes the operative rule for certain activities.
235
 In Taiwan, the expansion 
of tort liability represents a transition from negligence to strict liability. In situations 
where the risks of harm are high and when the victim encounters hardship in bearing 
the burden of proof, strict liability is considered to be preferable to negligence.
236
 It 
stands to reason that the proper liability rule for dangerous activities should be strict 
liability.
237
 However, Article 191-3 of the Civil Code contradicts this logic and 
imposes intermediate liability on persons conducting dangerous activities.
238
 This 
logical discrepancy raises scholarly debates and draws attention to the tension 
between strict liability and negligence. To solve the issue and choose the proper 
liability rule for Article 191-3, this Dissertation needs to analyze whether and under 
what circumstances strict liability is a superior option.
                                                     
235
 See supra 18. 
236
 See supra 58. 
237
 See supra 23. 
238
 See supra 22. 
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Chapter Three: 
Laws of Tort Liability in the American Common Law 
 
 
 
Synopsis 
 
 In the American common law, negligence also is the default liability rule for 
unintentional torts.  
 Negligence is breach of duty of care of a reasonable person. 
 In the American common law, strict liability applies to animals, abnormally 
dangerous activities, and products. 
 American commentators not only provide in-depth analysis on whether and under 
what circumstances strict liability is a superior option but also challenge the policy 
justifications for strict liability theory. 
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3.1 Overview 
 As mentioned in Chapter One, the early common law followed principles more 
akin to strict liability, and “fault-based” liability marked the legal progress of the late 
nineteenth century by benefiting the emerging industry of that time.
239
 After the 
1960’s, the American products liability revolution revitalized strict liability and 
initiated the modern expansion of liability without fault.
240
 Hence, laws of liability in 
the American common law and the scholarly analysis of strict liability are 
instrumental for this Dissertation to find whether and under what circumstances strict 
liability is a superior option. 
3.2 Negligence 
A. General Principle 
In the United States, negligence also is the default liability rule for unintentional 
torts. Take automobile accidents for instance: in Hammontree v. Jenner,
241
 while 
driving home from work, the defendant suffered an epileptic seizure and became 
unconscious, thereby crashing through the plaintiffs’ bicycle shop and hurting the 
                                                     
239
 See supra 15 and supra note 32. 
240
 For example, the European Economic Community adopted the Products Liability Directive in 1985, 
bringing about the movement toward strict products liability outside of the United States. See Council 
Directive 85/374/EEC, of 25 July 1985 on the Approximation of the Laws, Regulations and 
Administrative Provisions of the Member States Concerning Liability for Defective Products at: 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31985L0374:en:HTML (last visited 
Oct. 7, 2016). 
241
 20 Cal.App.3d 528 (Ct. App. 1971). 
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plaintiffs.
242
 Plaintiffs Hammontree and her husband sued the defendant for personal 
injuries and property damages arising out of the automobile accident.
243
 In refusing to 
hold the defendant liable for the accident, the court reasoned that the liability of a 
driver in an automobile accident rests on principles of negligence.
244
  
In general, the burden of proof in an action for negligence lies with the plaintiff 
unless circumstances suggest that the court alleviate such burden.
245
 In Brown v. 
Kendall, the defendant raised his stick to interfere with the fighting between his dog 
and the plaintiff’s but accidently struck and injured the plaintiff. 246  The court 
reasoned that if the act of hitting the plaintiff was unintentional on the part of the 
defendant, and done while performing a lawful act, then the defendant was not liable 
unless it was done in the want of exercise of due care adapted to the exigency of the 
case, and therefore such want of due care became part of the plaintiff's case, and the 
burden of proof was on the plaintiff to establish it.
247
 Thus, in an action for negligence, 
the plaintiff has to prove the following facts: breach of duty, causal connection, and 
damages.
248
  
                                                     
242
 Id. at 530. 
243
 Id. at 529-30. 
244
 Id. at 531. 
245
 For example, where a person was struck by a barrel falling from a window of a house next to a 
street, such facts suggest prima facie evidence of negligence on the part of the owner of the house. See 
Byrne v. Boadle, 2 H. & C. 722 (1863). 
246
 60 Mass. 292 (1850). 
247
 Id. at 297. 
248
 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §328A (1965) states that: 
In an action for negligence the plaintiff has the burden of proving 
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1) Duty: Standard of Care 
All people in society owe a duty to refrain from conduct that creates 
unreasonable risk of harm.
249
 A person must act as an ordinarily careful person or a 
reasonably prudent person under similar circumstances.
250
 As stated by Professor 
William Prosser:
251
 
In negligence cases, the duty is always the same, to conform to the legal standard 
of reasonable conduct in light of the apparent risk. What the defendant must do, or 
must not do, is a question of the standard of conduct required to satisfy the duty. 
For instance, an ordinary individual knows that when a tire is worn through to the 
fabric, its further use is dangerous and it should be removed.
252
  
However, no one has any duty to guard against unforeseeable or extraordinary 
peril. In Adams v. Bullock, a 12-year-old child swung an 8-feet-long wire while 
crossing a bridge, and his wire came into contact with a nearby overhead wire used by 
the defendant for its trolley system.
253
 The child was shocked and burned.
254
 The 
court reasoned that ordinary caution did not involve forethought of this extraordinary 
peril and refused to hold the defendant liable.
255
 Additionally, although no one has any 
                                                                                                                                                        
(a) facts which give rise to a legal duty on the part of the defendant to conform to the standard of 
conduct established by law for the protection of the plaintiff, 
(b) failure of the defendant to conform to the standard of conduct, 
(c) that such failure is a legal cause of the harm suffered by the plaintiff, and 
(d) that the plaintiff has in fact suffered harm of a kind legally compensable by damages. 
249
 See supra note 133 at 409. 
250
 Jones v. Chicago HMO Ltd. of Illinois, 191 Ill. 2d 278, 295, (2000). 
251
 W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS §53, at 324 (4
th
 ed. 1971). 
252
 Delair v. McAdoo, 188 A. 181 (Pa. 1936). 
253
 125 N.E. 93 (1919). 
254
 Id. 
255
 Id. 
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duty to act or help under general circumstances, a person has a duty to avoid any 
affirmative actions which may make a situation worse.
256
 If the defendant does attempt 
to aid a person, and takes charge and control of the situation, he is regarded as entering 
voluntarily into a relation which is attended with responsibility.
257
 Such a defendant 
will then be liable for a failure to use reasonable care for the protection of the plaintiff's 
interests.
258
   
As for means to establish the required standard of care, although expert 
testimony is not required in a usual case, it is generally necessary when the case comes 
to that of professional malpractice. Specifically, to establish the duty of care owed by 
the professional, the plaintiff has to offer expert testimony unless the alleged negligence 
is so obviously shown that the trier of fact could recognize it without expert 
testimony.
259
 Such expert testimony is necessary to establish the relevant standard for 
the trier of fact because professional standards are often beyond the knowledge of the 
average person.
260
  
Another way to delineate the standard of care of a professional is to apply the 
locality rule. For example, in an accountant malpractice case the plaintiff has to 
establish the standard of care of the accountant. This may include the general 
                                                     
256
 Farwell v. Keaton, 240 N.W.2d 217, 220 (1976). 
257
 Id. 
258
 Id. 
259
 Schultz v. Bank of Am., N.A., 990 A.2d 1078 (2010). 
260
 Id. at 1086. 
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expectation that the accountant will render his services with certain degree of skill, care, 
knowledge, and judgment usually possessed and exercised by members of the 
profession in the particular locality.
261
 Accordingly, in a professional malpractice case, 
the “locality rule” requires the professional to act with ordinary and reasonable care in 
accordance with the customs or practices of professionals from a particular geographic 
region. Such standard can be the same community standard,
262
 a regional standard
263
 
or a national standard,
264
 depending on what law the state court applies.
265
 
2) Breach of Duty 
A plaintiff in a negligence action must establish breach of duty. Often a duty is 
based on the reasonable person standard.
266
 The test for breach of duty is whether the 
defendant failed to do what a reasonable person would do under similar circumstances.  
In United States v. Carroll Towing,
267
 a barge, without a bargee on board, broke adrift 
and crashed through a tanker.
268
 The tanker’s propeller broke a hole in the barge, and 
the barge sank, with its cargo lost.
269
 In holding the barge’s owner liable under 
                                                     
261
 Kemmerlin v. Wingate, 261 S.E.2d 50 (1979). 
262
 Noll v. Rahal, 219 Va. 795, 250 S.E.2d 741 (1979). 
263
 Shipley v. Williams, 350 S.W.3d 527 (Tenn. 2011). 
264
 Nwaneri v. Sandidge, 931 A.2d 466 (D.C. 2007). 
265
 The standard of care applicable to accountants is the same as that applied to doctors and other 
professionals furnishing skilled services for compensation; that standard requires reasonable care and 
competence therein. See Gammel v. Ernst & Ernst, 72 N.W.2d 364, 365 (1955). 
266
 See supra note 250. 
267
 See supra note 38 for case citation. 
268
 Id. at 171. 
269
 Id. 
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negligence, the court reasoned that it was reasonable to expect the barge owner to have 
had a bargee on board to prevent the risk of the barge breaking adrift from the moorings 
under the circumstances of the incident.
270
 Thus, the barge owner’s failure to have a 
bargee on board without any reasonable excuse was breach of duty of reasonable care; 
in other words, the barge owner failed to do what a reasonable person would do under 
similar circumstances.
271
 
3) Causation 
With the establishment of breach of duty, the plaintiff must also prove a causal 
connection between the defendant’s negligence and the plaintiff’s injuries, offering 
both factual cause and proximate cause. The plaintiff first must prove the “but for” 
causation (i.e., but for the defendant’s negligence, the plaintiff would not have 
suffered injuries).
272
 However, where there are two or more causes of harm to the 
plaintiff and either of the causes alone would have been sufficient to bring about harm, 
the “substantial factor” test applies for the first causal determination (i.e., where each 
of several defendants was a substantial factor in causing injury).
273
  
                                                     
270
 Id. at 174. 
271
 Id. 
272
 The “but-for” test of negligence is the appropriate test for actual causation in majority of 
circumstances. Vincent by Staton v. Fairbanks Mem'l Hosp., 862 P.2d 847, 851 (Alaska 1993). 
273
 Because under such circumstances a strict application of the “but-for” test “would allow each 
tortfeasor to avoid liability, courts made the policy decision to nevertheless impose liability ‘if [the 
defendant's conduct] was a material element and a substantial factor in bringing [the event] about.’” 
Gerst v. Marshall, 549 N.W.2d 810, 815 (1996). 
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After establishing factual causation, the plaintiff next must prove proximate 
cause. Proximate cause concerns under what circumstances the law will recognize 
liability and involves the question of the scope of duty.
274
 Thus, the foreseeability of 
the plaintiff’s injury is relevant.275 In Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co.,276 the 
plaintiff was standing on a platform at the defendant's railroad, waiting for a train.
277
 At 
the same platform, another train was leaving and two men were running forward to 
catch it.
278
 One of them got on the train, but another man with a small package seemed 
unsteady when jumping onto the car.
279
 A guard on the car reached forward to help the 
second man in, and another guard on the platform pushed him from behind.
280
 Instantly, 
the package fell and its contents exploded, striking the plaintiff at the other end of the 
platform.
281
 Because nothing in the appearance indicated that the package contained 
fireworks, the court held that the risk of harm to the plaintiff was not reasonably 
foreseeable to the ordinarily prudent eye and that the defendant was not liable.
282
 In 
other words, liability should not attach if the risk of harm to a person was not within the 
zone of danger in the eyes of a reasonable person.
283
 Thus, even if an act of God comes 
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into play, a defendant may still be held liable for the injury resulting from it as long as it 
is foreseeable.
284
 
4) Damages 
There is no liability for negligence in the absence of damages to the plaintiff.
285
 
Damages include many perspectives: financial losses, personal injuries, harm to 
property, increased risk of disease, and fear.
286
 In general, there are two types of 
damages available to a plaintiff in a tort action: compensatory damages and punitive 
damages.
287
 Compensatory damages include both economic and non-economic losses 
resulting from personal injuries or property damages.
288
 Compensatory damages are 
the primary instrument of recovery in tort, and they seek to restore the plaintiff to the 
status quo before suffering harm by paying an amount equal to the value of interests 
diminished or destroyed.
289
 On the other hand, punitive damages are awarded only 
for particularly egregious behavior.
290
 Sometimes punitive damages can properly be 
awarded in strict liability actions.
291
 However, although punitive damages do punish 
the tortfeasor, the primary purpose of punitive damages is to create additional 
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deterrence where an actual damages remedy is deemed insufficient to induce an 
efficient level of deterrence.
292
 
B. Liability for Common Carriers  
In Taiwan, liability for common carriers is subject to special treatment.
293
 
However, in the American common law, negligence still is the liability rule for 
common carriers. In Bethel v. New York City Transit Authority,
294
 the plaintiff 
boarded a bus operated by the defendant and was injured when the “wheelchair 
accessible seat” collapsed upon his sitting down.295 The trial court instructed the jury 
that a common carrier has a duty to use the highest degree of care in the maintenance 
of its vehicles and equipment, but the New York Court of Appeals held that the single, 
reasonable person standard is sufficiently flexible by itself to allow the court to instruct 
the jury to fully take into account the ultrahazardous nature of a tortfeasor's activity.
296
 
Specifically, the court reasoned that:
297
 
There is no empirical or policy basis why, in the case of common carriers, the 
reasonable care standard is not similarly sufficient to permit triers of fact to take 
into account all of the hazardous aspects of public transportation in deciding 
whether due care was exercised in a particular case. 
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For this reason, the court concluded that the rule of a common carrier's duty of 
extraordinary care is no longer viable.
298
  
Similarly, in Andrews v. United Airlines, Inc.,
299
 the plaintiff was a passenger on 
a United Airlines flight; upon the plane’s arrival at the gate, a briefcase fell from an 
overhead compartment, seriously injuring the plaintiff.
300
 The court reasoned that the 
degree of care and diligence which the common carrier must exercise is only such as 
can reasonably be exercised consistent with the character and mode of conveyance 
adopted and the practical operation of its business.
301
 Under this rule, a common carrier 
is not an insurer of its passenger’s safety, and the negligence principle applies.302 
However, in the situation of ground damages resulting from an aviation activity, 
Section 520A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts imposes strict liability on the 
operator or the owner of an aircraft by providing that:
303
  
If physical harm to land or to persons or chattels on the ground is caused by the 
ascent, descent or flight of aircraft, or by the dropping or falling of an object 
from the aircraft, 
(a) the operator of the aircraft is subject to liability for the harm, even though 
he has exercised the utmost care to prevent it, and 
(b) the owner of the aircraft is subject to similar liability if he has authorized 
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or permitted the operation. 
 
3.3 Strict Liability 
 Strict liability is liability without fault–liability imposed upon the defendant even 
if he neither intentionally acted nor failed to exercise reasonable care.
304
 Because this 
doctrine is extremely ancient, there is no clear demarcation of the emergence of this 
principle in the context of historical development of common law.
305
 Typically, strict 
liability is available in three categories of cases: liability for animals, abnormally 
dangerous activities, and products liability. 
A. Liability for Animals  
One of the earliest forms of strict liability in common law involves those who 
possess, confine, and manage animals that are capable of causing harm both to 
persons and property when they escape confinement.
306
 In McKee v. Trisler,
307
 the 
plaintiff brought an action against the defendant to recover damages for the killing of 
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one mule and injury to another mule by the defendant’s trespassing bull. The court 
reasoned that:
308
 
It was the rule of the common law that the owner of domestic animals such as 
cattle was bound at his peril to keep them off the lands of other persons or respond 
in damages for their trespasses. No man was bound to fence his close against an 
adjoining field, but every man was bound to keep his cattle in his own field at his 
own peril, and it made no difference that he was guilty of no actual negligence in 
not properly guarding them or that they escaped against his will and without such 
negligence. 
Thus, the keeper of animals of a kind likely to roam and harm others is strictly liable 
for their trespass under traditional common law.
309
 
In other situations, the cases involve wild animals. Generally, courts impose 
strict liability on the possessors of livestock and wild animals, but they hold 
possessors of domestic animals liable only if the plaintiff proves that the defendant 
knew that the animal had vicious propensities.
310
 In Lewis v. Great Southwest 
Corp.,
311
 the plaintiff purchased a ticket and entered the defendants’ petting zoo with 
her son and her grandchildren.
312
 Although there was no harassment of the animals 
and nothing had occurred which would be calculated to cause excitement to the animals, 
one of the goats in the petting zoo struck the plaintiff in the knee, knocking her down.
313
 
Because there was no evidence 1) of prior knowledge on the part of the defendants as to 
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danger; 2) that the defendants should have been on notice of danger; and 3) that the 
domestic goats in question were not by law “naturally” dangerous, the court refused to 
impose strict liability on the defendants.
314
 
In the case of wild animals, courts tend to apply strict liability. In Marshall v. 
Ranne,
315
 the plaintiff and the defendant owned neighboring farms.
316
 The 
defendant’s hog escaped from the farm and entered the plaintiff’s farm several weeks 
before the incident.
317
 One day the plaintiff went to feed his hog and saw the 
trespassing hog a hundred yards behind the barn.
318
 On the plaintiff’s way back home, 
the defendant’s hog attacked him.319 The court held that a suit for damages caused by 
vicious animals should be governed by principles of strict liability.
320
  
The common law rules of liability for animals were then synthesized in the 
Restatements of the Law published by the American Law Institute.
321
 In the latest 
edition, the rules for animals are provided in the following three provisions. 
1) Section 21 in the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional 
Harm holds a possessor of livestock or other animals strictly liable when his livestock 
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or animals intrude upon the land of another and cause injuries. Specifically, the rule 
states that:
322
 
An owner or possessor of livestock or other animals, except for dogs and cats, that 
intrude upon the land of another is subject to strict liability for physical harm 
caused by the intrusion. 
 
2) Section 22 in the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional 
Harm imposes strict liability on a possessor of a wild animal by providing that:
323
 
(a) An owner or possessor of a wild animal is subject to strict liability for physical 
harm caused by the wild animal. 
(b) A wild animal is an animal that belongs to a category of animals that have not 
been generally domesticated and that are likely, unless restrained, to cause 
personal injury. 
 
3) Section 23 in the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional 
Harm imposes strict liability on the possessor of an animal if he knows or reasonably 
should know that the animal has certain dangerous propensities:
324
 
An owner or possessor of an animal that the owner or possessor knows or has 
reason to know has dangerous tendencies abnormal for the animal's category is 
subject to strict liability for physical harm caused by the animal if the harm ensues 
from that dangerous tendency. 
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B. Abnormally Dangerous Activities 
In the contemporary world, the traditional animal rules are of trivial 
consequence.
325
 Rather, a more important common law doctrine of strict liability 
concerns the liability for ultrahazardous activities.
326
 This rule emerged from an early 
English case addressing non-natural use of land: Rylands v. Fletcher.
327
 In that case, 
the plaintiff was a tenant mining coal under agreement with the landowner; and the 
two defendants were operating a cotton mill on a nearby land.
328
 The defendants 
erected a reservoir on their land.
329
 However, the water broke out of the reservoir and 
flooded into both the abandoned mining shafts beneath the defendants’ land and into 
the adjoining coalmines owned by the plaintiff.
330
 The House of Lords affirmed the 
judgment of the Court of Exchequer Chamber, holding that because the defendants 
engaged in non-natural use of their land, they were strictly liable for the injuries to the 
plaintiff resulted from the escape of water.
331
 Justice Blackburn, for the Court of 
Exchequer Chamber, wrote that:
332
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[T]he true rule of law is, that the person who, for his own purposes, brings on his 
land and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must 
keep it in at his peril; and if he does not do so, is primâ facie answerable for all the 
damage which is the natural consequence of its escape.  
Given the qualifications stipulated by the House of Lords, the emphasis was thus 
shifted to the abnormal and inappropriate character of the defendants’ reservoir in coal 
mining country rather than the mere tendency of all water to escape.
333
 
The American doctrine of strict liability for hazardous activities developed when 
courts began to embrace strict liability theory proposed by Rylands.
334
 The doctrine 
was enlisted in the first edition of the Restatements of Torts
335
 and was expanded in 
the second edition, with a change of label from “ultrahazardous activities” to 
“abnormally dangerous activities.” Section 519 in the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
imposes strict liability on a person carrying on an abnormally dangerous activity by 
providing that:
336
 
(1) One who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is subject to liability for 
harm to the person, land or chattels of another resulting from the activity, although 
he has exercised the utmost care to prevent the harm. 
(2) This strict liability is limited to the kind of harm, the possibility of which 
makes the activity abnormally dangerous. 
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When determining whether an activity is “abnormally dangerous,” Section 520 of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts writes that the following six factors must be 
considered:
337
 
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land or 
chattels of others; 
(b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great; 
(c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care; 
(d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage; 
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on; and 
(f) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous 
attributes. 
In the latest edition of the Restatements of Torts, the two sections in the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts are combined into Section 20 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: 
Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm:
338
 
(a) An actor who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is subject to strict 
liability for physical harm resulting from the activity. 
(b) An activity is abnormally dangerous if: 
(1) the activity creates a foreseeable and highly significant risk of physical harm 
even when reasonable care is exercised by all actors; and 
(2) the activity is not one of common usage. 
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The typical cases for abnormally dangerous activities involve the storage of 
explosives or inflammable liquids, blasting, the accumulation of sewage, the emission 
of creosote fumes, or pile driving, which causes excessive vibration.
339
 
Recently, the doctrine has extended to nuclear incidents. In Cook v. Rockwell 
Intern. Corp.,
340
 plaintiffs brought an action against the defendant who operated a 
nuclear weapon manufacturing facility—the Rocky Flats Nuclear Weapons 
Plant—under government contract.341  This action arose under the Price–Anderson 
Act
342
 because it was an action in which the plaintiffs sought to impose liability arising 
out of a nuclear incident—releases of plutonium and other hazardous substances from 
the plant.
343
 The court reasoned that the existing Price–Anderson system rests on the 
assumption that courts would apply “legal principles akin to those of strict liability in 
the event of a serious nuclear incident.”344 To accomplish this goal, Congress required 
participants in the nuclear industry to waive certain defenses to liability including any 
issue or defense based on the fault of the nuclear actor and the conduct of the injured 
party.
345
 Furthermore, Congress explicitly reiterated that strict liability be the standard 
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of care for ENOs
346
 when it reauthorized the waiver requirements in the 1988 Price–
Anderson Amendments Act with the imposition of “federal strict liability or ‘no-fault’ 
standard” for any extraordinary nuclear occurrence. 347  As for non-extraordinary 
nuclear occurrence, Congress also expressed its intent that strict liability would apply to 
non-ENO nuclear incidents.
348
  
C. Products Liability 
Modern expansion of strict liability doctrine began with the products liability 
revolution during the 1960s. Justice Traynor is a pioneer in the process because of his 
concurring opinion in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.
349
 In that case, the plaintiff 
waitress suffered injuries when a bottle of Coca Cola broke in her hand and she brought 
an action arguing that the defendant company was negligent in selling bottles 
containing a carbonated beverage, which was dangerous and likely to explode on 
account of excessive pressure of gas or by reason of some defect in the bottle.
350
 The 
majority opinion held that because the defendant had exclusive control over both 
charging [the bottles with pressurized gas] and inspecting them, the plaintiff was 
entitled to rely on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to supply an inference of negligence 
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on the defendant’s part.351 However, Justice Traynor suggested that a manufacturer 
incur an absolute liability when an article that he has placed on the market, knowing 
that it is to be used without inspection, proves to have a defect that causes injury to 
human beings.
352
 Specifically, Traynor reasoned that:
353
 
It is to the public interest to discourage the marketing of products having defects 
that are a menace to the public. If such products nevertheless find their way into 
the market it is to the public interest to place the responsibility for whatever injury 
they may cause upon the manufacturer, who, even if he is not negligent in the 
manufacture of the product, is responsible for its reaching the market…The injury 
from a defective product does not become a matter of indifference because the 
defect arises from causes other than the negligence of the manufacturer, such as 
negligence of a submanufacturer of a component part whose defects could not be 
revealed by inspection or unknown causes that even by the device of res ipsa 
loquitur cannot be classified as negligence of the manufacturer…[In the 
MacPherson case,]
354
 Judge Cardozo's reasoning recognized the injured person as 
the real party in interest and effectively disposed of the theory that the liability of 
the manufacturer incurred by his warranty should apply only to the immediate 
purchaser. It thus paves the way for a standard of liability that would make the 
manufacturer guarantee the safety of his product even when there is no negligence. 
 
In Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.,
355
 the plaintiff brought an action for 
damages against the retailer and the manufacturer of a combination power tool.
356
 The 
plaintiff received the power tool from his wife as a present, and at one time he used the 
tool as a lathe for turning a large piece of wood he wished to make into a chalice.
357
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After he had worked on the piece of wood several times without difficulty, a part of the 
machine suddenly flew out, striking him on the forehead and inflicting serious 
injuries.
358
 Justice Traynor delivered the opinion of the court and held that a 
manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the market, knowing 
that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that causes 
injury to a human being.
359
 
The purpose of imposition of strict liability is to insure that the costs of injuries 
resulting from defective products are borne by the manufacturers that put such products 
on the market rather than by the injured persons who are powerless to protect 
themselves.
360
 Under this doctrine, to establish the manufacturer’s liability it was 
sufficient that the plaintiff proved that he was injured while using the power tool in the 
way it was intended to be used, as a result of a defect in design and manufacture of 
which the plaintiff was not aware, that rendered the power tool unsafe for its intended 
use.
361
  
Greenman marked an important step of the products liability revolution and the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts further adopted this case’s strict liability rationale in 
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1965. Under Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts:
362
  
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to 
the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm 
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if 
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and 
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial 
change in the condition in which it is sold. 
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although 
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his 
product, and 
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any 
contractual relation with the seller. 
Comment a. on Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts explicitly states that 
the rule is one of strict liability, making the seller subject to liability to the user or 
consumer even though he has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of 
the product.
363
 Thus, a manufacturer can be held liable even if it maintained reasonable 
quality control and there was no negligence in the design process, and a retailer can be 
held liable even though it was not involved in the manufacturing or design process.
364
  
After the United States initiated the strict products liability scheme, the liability 
revolution expanded to Europe when the European Economic Community adopted the 
Products Liability Directive in 1985.
365
 In 1994, strict products liability was further 
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introduced to Taiwan under Article 7 of the Consumer Protection Law.
366
 
3.4 Tests for Strict Liability 
The common law liability rule does not suggest a transition from negligence to 
strict liability. Rather, common law followed a liability rule akin to strict liability 
before the invention of negligence.
367
 However, although strict liability is an old 
common law doctrine, its legal justifications have evolved over time. Specifically, 
legal scholars of different generations provided distinct insights into this doctrine, and 
the next part of this Dissertation will introduce the different tests for the doctrine of 
strict liability. 
A. Posner’s Comments on Strict Liability 
Richard Posner analyzed strict liability under economic theories. In Strict 
Liability: A Comment,
368
 he argued against using the principle of strict liability to 
resolve legal conflicts over resource use.
369
 In addition, he argued that the economic 
goal of liability rules in an accident is to maximize the joint value of the interfering 
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activities,
370
 and the value-maximizing solution involves changes by both parties in 
their present behavior, or by one or another only, or by neither.
371
 Significantly, 
negligence approach, with a contributory negligence defense, will lead to an efficient 
solution by invoking cost-justified precautions.
372
 On the other hand, a principle of 
strict liability, without a defense of contributory negligence, would not lead to an 
efficient solution in cases where the efficient solution is for the plaintiff alone to take 
avoidance measures and where the efficient solution consists of precautions by both 
parties.
373
 To induce the plaintiff to take cost-justified precautions, we need to pair 
strict liability with a contributory negligence defense.
374
 Accordingly, under 
economic theory, there is no preference for negligence or for strict liability, provided 
that some version of contributory negligence defense is recognized.
375
  
However, there are differences in economic effect. First, under negligence a 
defendant will not be held liable for unavoidable accidents, whereas under strict 
liability he will be.
376
 Yet the imposition of strict liability on the defendant gives the 
plaintiff no incentive to change his activity level despite the fact that the plaintiff’s 
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change of activity will eliminate damages at zero cost.
377
 Second, strict liability 
expands the universe of claims and encourages more monetary expenses on the 
litigation by increasing the scope of liability.
378
 Third, strict liability permits the loss 
to be spread more widely.
379
 If the cost of insuring is lower for the defendant than for 
the plaintiff, there is a ground to prefer strict liability.
380
 Additional considerations 
come into play where there is a buyer-seller relationship between the victim and the 
injurer.
381
 If the buyers are risk-preferring, they may be unwilling to pay for a safety 
improvement, and a higher level of safety is not optimum in the economic sense 
because it is higher than consumers want it to be.
382
 Moreover, in circumstances 
where consumers lack knowledge of product safety or even neglect small hazards or 
great but otherwise unknown risks, sellers may be discouraged from advertising, 
marketing, or even adopting safety improvements because they may lose to their 
rivals by disclosing to consumers that the products contain hazards of which they may 
not have been aware or may have been only dimly aware.
383
 In this regard, even if we 
hold the sellers strictly liable, the sellers still will adopt cost-justified precautions to 
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minimize liability to injured consumers.
384
 Even if we assume producers in other 
industries will stand to gain from exposing an unsafe product, the gain is possibly 
small if their products are not close substitutes for the unsafe product.
385
 In summary, 
whether a general substitution of strict liability for negligence will improve efficiency 
seems to be conjectural.
386
  
In Indiana Harbor Belt R. Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co.,
387
 the defendant loaded 
20,000 gallons of liquid acrylonitrile, a toxic chemical, into a railroad tank car to be 
shipped to a Cyanamid plant in New Jersey.
388
 The car arrived at the Blue Island yard 
owned by the plaintiff on the morning of January 9, 1979.
389
 Several hours after its 
arrival, the toxic fluid cargo broke out of the bottom outlet of the car.
390
 The Illinois 
Department of Environmental Protection ordered the plaintiff to take decontamination 
measures, and the plaintiff brought an action to recover the expenses alleging that 1) the 
defendant was negligent in maintaining the tank car and 2) the transportation of 
acrylonitrile in bulk through the Chicago metropolitan area is an abnormally dangerous 
activity.
391
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As a judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Posner 
delivered the opinion of the case. In this case, he spent considerable time discussing 
the choice between negligence and strict liability. Specifically, he reasoned that:
392
  
The baseline common law regime of tort liability is negligence. When it is a 
workable regime, because the hazards of an activity can be avoided by being 
careful, there is no need to switch to strict liability. Sometimes, however, a 
particular type of accident cannot be prevented by taking care but can be avoided, 
or its consequences minimized, by shifting the activity in which the accident 
occurs to another locale, where the risk or harm of an accident will be less, or by 
reducing the scale of the activity in order to minimize the number of accidents 
caused by it. By making the actor strictly liable … we give him an incentive … to 
experiment with methods of preventing accidents that involve not greater 
exertions of care, assumed to be futile, but instead relocating, changing, or 
reducing … the activity giving rise to the accident. The greater the risk of an 
accident and the costs of an accident if one occurs, the more we want the actor to 
consider the possibility of making accident-reducing activity changes; the stronger, 
therefore, is the case for strict liability … [I]f an activity is extremely common … 
it is unlikely either that its hazards are perceived as great or that there is no 
technology of care available to minimize them; so the case for strict liability is 
weakened. 
The analysis encompassed all elements of Section 520 of the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts to determine whether an activity is abnormally dangerous.
393
 In short, Judge 
Posner suggested that strict liability is preferable only if negligence is inadequate in 
deterring accidents—for example, in situations where changes in activity level are 
desired as the means of accident avoidance. In this case, the leak was not caused by the 
inherent properties of acrylonitrile but rather was caused by carelessness, and such 
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accidents are adequately deterred by the threat of liability for negligence.
394
 Moreover, 
the plaintiff failed to show that the transportation of acrylonitrile in bulk by rail through 
populated areas is so hazardous an activity, even when due care is exercised, that the 
law should seek to create incentives to relocate the activity to non-populated areas, or to 
reduce the scale of the activity, or to switch to transporting acrylonitrile by road rather 
than by rail.
395
 In fact, Judge Posner argued that the accident in this case might have 
been prevented at reasonable cost by greater care on the part of those who handled the 
tank car of acrylonitrile, but it is difficult to see how it might have been prevented at 
reasonable cost by a change in the activity of transporting the chemical.
396
 Hence, he 
suggested this not be the case for strict liability.
397
  
B. Calabresi’s Cheapest Cost Avoider Test for Strict Liability 
 Guido Calabresi (now Senior Judge) suggested that the principal function of 
accident law be to reduce the sum of accident costs and accident avoidance costs.
398
 
In Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts,
399
 he and Professor Jon Hirschoff 
rejected the cost-benefit analysis under the Hand test because it entails impractical 
assumptions that injurers had the requisite foresight with regard to costs of accident 
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avoidance.
400
 Rather, they proposed that the proper test for liability is the cheapest 
cost avoider test.
401
 Put simply, the court just needs to find out whether the injurer (at 
a category level) or the victim (at a category level) was in better position to make the 
cost-benefit analysis and to act on it.
402
 The question for the court reduces to a search 
for the cheapest cost avoider.
403
 For example, strict products liability is preferable 
when the manufacturer (as a category) is in a better position to compare the existing 
accident costs with the costs of avoiding a certain type of accident by developing 
either a new products or a test which would serve to identify the chance of risk.
404
 
Similarly, in determining whether to impose strict liability on the injurer for 
conducting ultrahazardous activities or to discharge the injurer’s liability through the 
doctrine of assumption of risk, the courts in effect express judgments as to whether 
the injurer (as a category) or the victim (as a category) is in a better position to avoid 
the risk by altering his behavior.
405
 Therefore, the shift to the strict liability test is 
premised partly upon a desire to accomplish better primary accident reduction 
because strict liability, with the test to search for the cheapest cost avoider, is better 
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able to accomplish a minimization of the sum of accident costs and of accident 
avoidance costs.
406
 
In addition, strict liability is a more approachable test than the Hand test that 
requires calculus of fault.
407
 Finally, other considerations will often predominate in 
determining liability rules and should be taken into account, including the preference 
of loss spreading or of a given distribution of wealth (e.g. better wealth equality or 
compensation of maltreated castes) and a desire to instead further dynamic efficiency 
goals by favoring the entrepreneurs in a society.
408
 Nevertheless, all of them, together 
with the efficiency notion of minimizing the sum of accident and accident avoidance 
costs, are part of what is at times called “justice.”409 Thus, the move away from the 
Hand test toward a test of strict liability can be explained by articulating the different 
distributional effects and goals between the two.
410
  
C. Schwartz on the Ethics of Strict Liability  
Professor Gary Schwartz demonstrated similarities between negligence and strict 
liability, arguing that the ethics of strict liability are not so hostile to the negligence 
                                                     
406
 Id. at 1074-75. 
407
 Id. at 1075-76. 
408
 Id. at 1078. 
409
 Id. 
410
 Id. at 1082-84. 
  
 
100 
principle.
411
 First, he found that the developments of the strict liability regime were 
either simply consistent with some forms of reasonableness tests or immaterial to the 
proposal for additional strict liability rules.
412
 For example, liability for 
ultrahazardous activities bears some inquiries of reasonableness, such as the 
cost-benefit analysis.
413
 Furthermore, modern design defect determination requires 
risk-benefit analysis.
414
 The same features also are available in workers’ 
compensation schemes in which the injured employee is a participant in the tort 
system and employer’s negligence still plays an important role in determining the 
ultimate liability; a question arises concerning how convincing the arguments on strict 
liability’s behalf are.415  
Second, the ethics of strict liability are similar to negligence features.
416
 
Significantly, the purely ethical arguments in favor of strict liability seem to 
frequently encounter difficulties of a sort that encourage their supporters to seek the 
assurance of negligence-like positions.
417
 In Siegler v. Kuhlman,
418
 the defendant 
drove a truck with loaded gasoline in the truck tank and the trailer tank.
419
 While 
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running downgrade on the off-ramp of a highway interchange, the defendant felt a jolt 
and found that the trailer disengaged and crashed through a highway fence, landing 
upside down on the road.
420
 An explosion ensued, killing the plaintiff when her vehicle 
encountered a pool of the spilled gasoline.
421
  
After analyzing the concurring opinion in Siegler, Schwartz found that the 
concurrence demonstrates the plain persistence of the negligence idea (i.e. the court’s 
effort in inquiring into the cause of the jolt, its willingness to apply res ipsa loquitur 
with respect to the cause of the jolt, and its proposition that strict liability applies only if 
the explosion occurred without the apparent intervention of any outside force beyond 
the control of the manufacturer, the owner, or the operator of the truck).
422
 In this 
regard, only when an inquiry into the accident ends up in complete frustration (e.g. 
evidence regarding proof of negligence was destroyed during explosion) does the 
imposition of strict liability on the activity itself become acceptable as a fallback 
solution.
423
  
In summary, Schwartz argued that it is negligence rather than strict liability that 
plays a substantial role in a tort system.
424
 Thus, in a society where only rarely can 
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human activities directly result in harms even when nothing goes wrong,
425
 whatever 
ethical notions relate to the simple factor of causation will plainly not suffice to justify 
any major new proposals for strict liability.
426
  
D. Priest’s Historical Review of Strict Enterprise Liability  
Professor George Priest provided the most commonly cited justifications for the 
doctrine of strict liability in Taiwan. In The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A 
Critical History of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law,
427
 he analyzed 
how strict enterprise liability was invented by introducing 1) Francis Bohlen’s benefit 
theory and the theory’s relevance to internalization and risk distribution rationales; 2) 
Fleming James’ advocacy of the centrality of risk distribution and his effort to extend 
the internalization concept to automobile accidents; and 3) Friedrich Kessler’s studies 
on the unequal bargaining power resulting from the monopoly of large enterprises and 
from their uses of standardized contract, the renunciation of freedom of contract, and 
the need to protect the consumers by direct efforts.
428
 Together, their works constitute 
the basis of the theory of strict enterprise liability and contribute to the outbreak of 
strict products liability during the 1950s and the 1960s.
429
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Additionally, Priest demonstrated why the movement toward strict products 
liability was successful.
430
 After thirty years of scholarship, cases such as Henningsen 
v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.
431
 and Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.
432
 along 
with Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
433
 contribute to the wide 
recognition of the strict enterprise liability founded on the rising consensus of that 
time regarding the advantages of internalization and risk distribution and on the need 
to protect the relatively powerless consumers.
434
 Moreover, strict enterprise liability 
appoints the judge an agent of the modern state.
435
 In contrast to negligence or 
warranty law, which focus on the one specific incident of product use before the court, 
strict enterprise liability charges the judge to internalize costs, to distribute risks, and 
to aid the poor.
436
 By incorporating a conception of a stronger judicial role in a 
complex governing state, strict enterprise liability gained quick acceptance within the 
judicial system.
437
  
To summarize, Priest believed that the development of strict enterprise liability 
was premised upon three presuppositions: 1) relatively greater power of the 
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manufacturer to control product safety; 2) manufacturer’s ability to spread loss 
through a small insurance premium in the price charged for the product; and 3) the 
benefit of internalization in encouraging safety investments.
438
  
 
3.5 Retreat From Strict Liability? 
Strict liability is not bulletproof after its mid-twentieth century expansion. 
Specifically, the six-factor test for abnormally dangerous activities and 
product-related actions premised upon defective design and failure to warn raise 
intractable questions for the doctrine of strict liability. The following discussions 
present important critiques to strict liability, which in effect, reflects a general concern 
over the widely-applauded “superior doctrine.” 
A. Scholarly Comments 
1) Abnormally Dangerous Activities 
 As Schwartz observed, strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities bears 
some inquiries of reasonableness and raises the concern as to how convincing the 
arguments in favor of strict liability are.
439
 The imposition of strict liability under the 
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second version of the Restatement of Torts is premised upon the determination of 
whether an activity is abnormally dangerous.
440
 To determine whether an activity is 
abnormally dangerous, the test under Section 520 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
includes the following six factors: 1) the existence of a high degree of risk of some 
harm to the person, land or chattels of others; 2) the likelihood that the harm that 
results from it will be great; 3) the inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of 
reasonable care; 4) the extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage; 5) 
the inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on; and 6) the 
extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous 
attributes.
441
 The Section 520 test involves cost-benefit evaluation with respect to the 
reasonableness of a specific activity.
442
 Hence, applying the Section 520 test, the 
courts unavoidably conduct negligence determinations if all six factors are to be 
considered, as Judge Posner did in Indiana Harbor Belt R. Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co.
443
 
For example, the fifth element under the test is essentially a test of negligence.
444
 
Additionally, the sixth element within the test calls for a balancing of the costs and 
benefits of an activity, and courts are capable of conducting such analysis well under a 
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rule of negligence, thereby eliminating the need to shift from negligence to strict 
liability.
445
 
Furthermore, for disputes under strict liability to be adjudicable, the boundaries 
of the liability must be relatively specific and must not depend on fact-sensitive 
risk-utility calculations.
446
 In other words, the court cannot rely on the reasonableness 
test under Section 520 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts to define abnormally 
dangerous activities and to impose strict liability on the defendant for harms resulting 
from dangerous activities.
447
 Otherwise, the bases of strict liability are better 
interpreted under negligence theory by asking whether the injurer made reasonable 
decisions about activity based matters, thus reducing the doctrine of strict liability to 
an unjustified and superfluous doctrinal container for addressing unintentional torts.
448
 
In that case, strict liability is better absorbed within negligence.
449
 
2) Products Liability 
The situations are more difficult for strict liability in product cases. Schwartz 
made the following comments about the matter:
450
 
[Products liability law] largely comprises merely an intelligent rounding off of 
the rights independently available under a mature negligence system…[T]o say 
that a product is “defective” is to say that the product is “wrong” or “faulty” in 
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some significant respect, and product fault is almost always associated with some 
negligence for which the manufacturer properly can be held responsible.  
More particularly, strict products liability does not function very well in design defect 
and failure to warn cases. In Potter v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Company,
451
 the 
plaintiffs brought a design defect action for injuries incurred from using pneumatic 
hand tools manufactured by the defendants, claiming that the tools were defectively 
designed because they exposed the plaintiffs to excessive vibration.
452
 In imposing 
strict liability on the defendants, the court reasoned that:
453
 
[W]e emphasize that our adoption of a risk-utility balancing component to our 
consumer expectation test does not signal a retreat from strict tort liability. In 
weighing a product's risks against its utility, the focus of the jury should be on the 
product itself, and not on the conduct of the manufacturer. 
However, this product-conduct distinction is illusory, for in effect the court held the 
defendant liable for failure to adopt a cost-justified safer design, which was a 
conduct-oriented determination.
454
 Perhaps the courts simply refused to acknowledge 
that the doctrine of negligence truly is the legal standard to be applied in risk-utility 
determinations of design defect cases.
455
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Secondly, although courts talk about the manufacturer’s liability for failure to 
warn as though strict liability applies,
456
 such liability actually rests on negligence 
because it identifies the important aspects of product use and consumption that 
manufacturers can and should control through their marketing and renders them 
adjudicable by insisting on credible and technically legitimate evidence regarding 
how the manufacturers could have reduced generic product risks at acceptable 
costs.
457
 As a matter of fact, some courts openly apply negligence for failure to warn 
rather than stick to the doctrine of strict liability. In Olson v. Prosoco, Inc.,
458
 the 
plaintiff suffered injuries as a result of the splashing of hydrochloric acid based cleaner 
because the bung closure of the drum storing the cleaner popped out of the drum while 
he was moving it.
459
 He and members of his family brought a failure to warn action 
against the defendant.
460
 The court explicitly held that the correct submission of 
instructions regarding a failure to warn claim for damages falls under a theory of 
negligence and the claim should not be submitted as a theory of strict liability.
461
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Thirdly, comment j. on Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
illustrates the importance of knowledge in failure to warn cases:
462
 
Where … the product contains an ingredient to which a substantial number of the 
population are allergic, and the ingredient is one whose danger is not generally 
known, or if known is one which the consumer would reasonably not expect to 
find in the product, the seller is required to give warning against it, if he has 
knowledge, or by the application of reasonable, developed human skill and 
foresight should have knowledge, of the presence of the ingredient and the danger. 
Once the court requires proof of knowledge as a necessary element of failure to warn 
in applying Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the strict liability 
action begins to look much like its negligence counterpart.
463
 This argument could 
fairly be demonstrated by the text of Section 388 of the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts:
464
  
One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for another to use is 
subject to liability to those whom the supplier should expect to use the chattel with 
the consent of the other or to be endangered by its probable use, for physical harm 
caused by the use of the chattel in the manner for which and by a person for whose 
use it is supplied, if the supplier 
(a) knows or has reason to know that the chattel is or is likely to be dangerous 
for the use for which it is supplied, and 
(b) has no reason to believe that those for whose use the chattel is supplied will 
realize its dangerous condition, and 
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to inform them of its dangerous condition or 
of the facts which make it likely to be dangerous. 
In other words, the analysis for strict liability failure to warn is virtually identical to 
negligent failure to warn, which requires proof of defendant’s knowledge and involves 
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risk-utility test to determine whether a warning is required; under either theory the 
reasonableness of the manufacturer’s conduct effectively becomes the determinative 
factor.
465
  
When product cost is a factor in the risk-utility test for determining defectiveness, 
“strict” products liability is merely a reflection of the burdens of the manufacturing 
process, thereby making the distinction between defectiveness and negligence 
unnecessary.
466
 In this way, when “strict” products liability requires the plaintiff to 
prove defectiveness to make the defendant liable, it is very much like negligence 
liability because the concept of defectiveness is so close to negligence that a 
distinction is not worth the effort to maintain.
467
 Finally, although strict liability is 
desired for affording greater protection to the victim through inducing more care on 
the part of the potential injurer, this argument is illusory.
468
 Even though the 
proposition of greater safety is practicable, it fails to explain the selective application 
of strict liability to product cases only.
469
 Therefore, while strict liability is widely 
considered a huge step of progress in the Taiwanese legal system, American scholars 
identified several predicaments in applying this doctrine. A question to be answered is 
whether strict liability is a superior option to negligence in any respect.  
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B. Practical Reforms 
As mentioned previously, aviation is considered an abnormally dangerous 
activity under Section 520A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, and the operator or 
owner of an aircraft is subject to strict liability for ground damages resulting from 
aviation activities.
470
 However, according to a special note by the Reporter under 
comment k. on Section 20 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical 
and Emotional Harm, aviation is no longer an abnormally dangerous activity.
471
 
Specifically, the note states that:
472
 
[T]he majority opinion in Crosby v. Cox Aircraft Co.
473
 is correct in concluding 
that aviation does not fit the formal Restatement criteria for an abnormally 
dangerous activity. The risk of serious ground damage when all reasonable care is 
exercised is very small; and given both the number of flights and the percentage of 
the population that travels by air, commercial aviation is in common usage. 
Nevertheless … one rationale for strict liability relates to the defendant's exclusive 
control over the instrumentality of harm, and this rationale is impressively 
applicable in aviation ground-damage cases … Even so, the doctrinal argument 
against strict liability—that almost all airline crashes are due to 
negligence—confirms that the strict-liability issue is no longer one that has major 
practical significance. 
 
Similar reforms took place in the Products Liability Restatement. Section 2 in the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability applies a reasonableness test to 
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determine whether a product is defectively designed or whether a warning of a 
product is insufficient:
474
 
A product is defective when, at the time of sale or distribution, it contains a 
manufacturing defect, is defective in design, or is defective because of inadequate 
instructions or warnings. A product: 
(a) contains a manufacturing defect when the product departs from its intended 
design even though all possible care was exercised in the preparation and 
marketing of the product; 
(b) is defective in design when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the 
product could have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable 
alternative design by the seller or other distributor, or a predecessor in the 
commercial chain of distribution, and the omission of the alternative design 
renders the product not reasonably safe; 
(c) is defective because of inadequate instructions or warnings when the 
foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been reduced or 
avoided by the provision of reasonable instructions or warnings by the seller or 
other distributor, or a predecessor in the commercial chain of distribution, and 
the omission of the instructions or warnings renders the product not reasonably 
safe. 
In contrast to manufacturing defects, design defects and defects based on inadequate 
instructions or warnings are predicated on a different concept of responsibility.
475
 
Subsection (b) adopts a “risk-utility balancing” test as the standard for judging the 
defectiveness of product designs.
476
 Specifically, the test determines whether a 
reasonable alternative design would, at reasonable cost, have reduced the foreseeable 
risks of harm posed by the product and, if so, whether the omission of the alternative 
design by the seller or a predecessor in the distributive chain rendered the product not 
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reasonably safe.
477
 In so interpreting, consumer expectations do not play a 
determinative role in judging the defectiveness of product designs because consumer 
expectations alone do not take into account whether the proposed alternative design 
could be implemented at reasonable cost, or whether an alternative design would 
provide greater overall safety.
478
 Nonetheless, consumer expectations about product 
performance and the dangers attendant to product use still affect how risks are 
perceived and relate to foreseeability and frequency of the risks of harm.
479
 As for 
warning defect, Subsection (c) also adopts a reasonableness test for judging the 
adequacy of product instructions and warnings.
480
 The rule thus parallels Subsection 
(b), which adopts a similar standard for judging the safety of product designs.
481
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Chapter Four: 
Analysis of Risk Liability 
 
 
 
Synopsis 
 
 Common law and Civil law share similar laws of negligence. 
 Common law and Civil law share similar policy justifications for strict liability, 
thereby justifying the introduction of common law analysis to discuss Taiwanese 
strict liability rules. 
 Although the areas of law to which strict liability applies are different between the 
Taiwanese legal system and the American legal system due to socioeconomic 
differences, American laws are still instrumental to Taiwan. 
 Intermediate liability is a variation under negligence principles which shifts the 
burden of proof to the defendant; in this regard, it also is different from res ipsa 
loquitur under which the burden of proof still remains on the plaintiff. 
 Implicit in traditional strict liability is absolute liability under which any form of 
contributory negligence is not a valid defense. 
 Availability of comparative negligence in strict liability, in effect, cripples the 
traditional strict liability, but it adequately adjusts the doctrine to induce safety 
incentives from both parties. 
 Strict liability does not provide greater accident avoidance than negligence does. 
 Benefit theory cannot justify the selective application of strict liability. 
 Loss spreading alone should NOT be the paramount policy of tort because tort is 
an inferior way of insurance.  
 Intermediate liability is superior to strict liability in regulating highly risky 
activities. 
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4.1 Overview 
 In this chapter, this Dissertation proposes that intermediate liability be the 
operative rule for risk liability. First, it shows several comparisons to demonstrate 
how analysis in the American common law is instrumental for Taiwan, including the 
similarities between negligence laws in Taiwan and those in the United States, as well 
as the similarities between their policy justifications for strict liability. Furthermore, it 
compares how strict liability works differently in the two legal systems. Although the 
areas to which strict liability applies are different in the two legal systems, such 
distinction is moderate and does not cripple the usefulness of the American law. 
Second, it identifies the differences among intermediate liability, res ipsa loquitur, and 
strict liability. Third, it analyzes how strict liability was reduced from an absolute 
liability principle to a negligence-like doctrine. Fourth, it responds to the tests for 
strict liability mentioned in Chapter Three, and argues that strict liability fails to 
justify itself on those grounds as an independent liability regime. In contrast, the only 
practicable strict liability rule is the doctrine of equitable liability.
482
 Finally, it argues 
that intermediate liability satisfies the tests for strict liability and is superior to strict 
liability as the operative rule for risk liability. 
                                                     
482
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4.2 Comparative Tort Laws 
Although Taiwan inherited its Civil law system from Germany and developed its 
legal theories under the influence of Japanese law, American law influenced the rising 
subjects of torts, such as strict products liability, privacy laws, and the concepts of 
wrongful birth and informed consent.
483
 Moreover, the negligence principles between 
Taiwan and the United States are similar.
484
 The following comparisons demonstrate 
that although Taiwanese tort law and American tort law are different in certain ways, 
both share some common characteristics and American tort law is still instrumental. 
A. Comparing Laws of Torts 
1) Differences  
a. Sources of Negligence Law 
In Taiwan, negligence is based on the first part of the first paragraph of Article 
184.
485
 Under this rule, the plaintiff must prove six statutory elements to recover.
486
 
On the other hand, negligence in the United States is established by case law.
487
 Thus, 
a primary distinction between negligence laws of the two systems lies on the sources 
of law: Taiwan establishes its rule by statute, whereas the United States adopts case 
                                                     
483
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484
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485
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487
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law. 
b. Structures of Tort Law 
The American legal system distinguishes tort law from contract law, but in a 
Civil law system both contractual and non-contractual civil wrongs fall under the 
heading of laws of obligations.
488
 In Taiwan, tort and contract rules are parts of the 
Civil Code, and the primary tort causes of action are based upon Article 184 of this 
Code.
489
 
2) Similarities 
a. Functions of Torts 
While Taiwanese tort law and American tort law come from different sources, 
both share similar characteristics. First, both try to balance individual freedom of 
action and the protection of individual rights.
490
 Section 767 in the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts illustrates the balancing test:
491
  
In determining whether an actor's conduct in intentionally interfering with a 
contract or a prospective contractual relation of another is improper or not, 
consideration is given to the following factors: 
(a) the nature of the actor’s conduct, 
(b) the actor’s motive, 
(c) the interests of the other with which the actor's conduct interferes, 
                                                     
488
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489
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490
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(d) the interests sought to be advanced by the actor, 
(e) the social interests in protecting the freedom of action of the actor and the 
contractual interests of the other, 
(f) the proximity or remoteness of the actor's conduct to the interference and 
(g) the relations between the parties.   
Second, both tort laws in Taiwan and in the American common law ask the tortfeasor 
to compensate for actual loss.
492
 Article 184 of the Civil Code explicitly requires the 
tortfeasor to carry out justice by compensating the victim for injury arising out of 
tort.
493
 The same concern is found in American common law in which compensatory 
damages are the primary instrument of recovery in tort in order to restore the plaintiff 
to the status quo before suffering harms.
494
 Finally, both Taiwanese tort law and 
American tort law serve to deter future harms.
495
 By establishing clear rules about what 
a person could and could not do, tort law facilitates deterrence.
496
 
b. Definitions of Negligence 
Negligence is defined as breach of duty of care in both Taiwan and the United 
States. More specifically, in Taiwan, negligence occurs when a defendant fails to 
exercise duty of care of a good administrator.
497
 On the other hand, in American 
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common law, negligence is breach of duty of care of a reasonably prudent person under 
similar circumstances.
498
 Although the terms are different, the meanings are similar.
499
  
c. Causal Theories 
Both Taiwanese tort law and American tort law relies on a two-prong test of 
causation. Significantly, Taiwan adopts the theory of adequate causation, which 
comprises a conditional relation test and an adequacy test.
500
 A conditional relation 
test analyzes whether the accident would not have occurred but for the defendant’s 
tortious act,
501
 which is the same test applied under the “but-for” causation in 
American common law.
502
 An adequacy test relies upon whether a reasonable person 
would have foreseen the possibility of the damages under the circumstances,
503
 which 
is the same test applied under the proximate cause limitation of American tort law.
504
 
Thus, this Dissertation argues that although Taiwanese tort law and American tort law 
are different in terms of sources and structures, both share common characteristics in 
primary functions, definitions of negligence, and causal theories. 
                                                     
498
 See supra 74. 
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B. Comparing Policy Justifications for Strict Liability  
In Taiwan, strict liability is justified on the following grounds. First, certain 
enterprises or owners of dangerous facilities have control over sources of danger and 
thus are better able to avoid harms by taking precautions.
505
 In addition, those 
enterprises and owners benefit from the exploitation of the sources of danger, and 
holding them strictly liable satisfies the notion of justice.
506
 Finally, strict liability 
assists loss spreading because enterprises are usually those who conduct dangerous 
activities and they are better able to shift the losses through pricing mechanisms or 
insurance.
507
 Thus, three justifications speak on behalf of strict liability, including 
accident avoidance, justice, and loss spreading. 
In the United States, strict liability rules are those involving extraordinary risks 
whose existences call for a special responsibility in which tort defendants are held 
liable even though they are not negligent or otherwise at fault for the plaintiff’s 
harm.
508
 As mentioned previously, modern strict liability doctrine is premised upon 
three presuppositions: 1) the defendant’s relatively greater power to control risks; 2) 
the defendant’s ability to spread loss through a small insurance premium in the price 
charged for the product; and 3) the benefit of internalization in encouraging safety 
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investments.
509
 In this way, both Taiwan and the United States share the same policy 
justifications for the doctrine of strict liability, thereby justifying this Dissertation’s 
introduction of common law analysis to discuss Taiwanese strict liability rules. 
Table 5: Comparative Policy Justifications for Strict Liability 
 Taiwan United States 
Defendant’s Ability to 
Control Risks 
✔ ✔ 
Safety Incentives ✔ ✔ 
Loss Spreading ✔ ✔ 
C. Comparing Areas to Which Strict Liability Applies 
Both Taiwan and the United States have strict liability rules within their legal 
systems; however, the areas of law to which strict liability applies are different 
because of the distinctions in social economics and legal institutions.
510
 Please refer 
below to Table 6 for detailed comparisons. 
 
                                                     
509
 See supra 103-104 and supra note 133 at 417-18. 
510
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Table 6: Comparative Strict Liability Rules 
 Taiwan United States 
Default Rule 
for 
Unintentional 
Torts 
Negligence 
Common 
Carriers 
Absolute Liability
511
  
Negligence 
Strict Liability
512
 
Abnormally 
Dangerous 
Activities 
Intermediate Liability Strict Liability 
Animals Intermediate Liability Strict Liability 
                                                     
511
 Article 89 of the CIVIL AVIATION ACT.  
512
 See Article 91 of the CIVIL AVIATION ACT, Article 46 of the MASS RAPID TRANSIT ACT, and Article 
64 of the HIGHWAY ACT. 
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Nuclear 
Disasters 
Strict Liability 
Products 
Liability 
Civil Code 
Consumer 
Protection 
Law 
Manufacturing 
Defect 
Design 
Defect 
Warning 
Defect 
Intermediate 
Liability 
Strict 
Liability 
Strict Liability Negligence Negligence 
 
4.3 Distinguishing Strict Liability, Intermediate Liability, and Res Ipsa Loquitur 
The doctrine of strict liability is straightforward. Under strict liability, a person is 
held liable regardless of his fault.
513
 Because strict liability does not consider the 
defendant’s fault, it admits fewer issues than negligence.514 More particularly, there are 
just three considerations to take into account in any strict liability case: 1) whether the 
defendant caused the plaintiff’s harm; 2) the extent of harm; and 3) whether the plaintiff 
acted reasonably.
515
 As a result, the relative certainty of the defendant’s liability under 
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514
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515
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strict liability reduces the rate of litigation by encouraging pre-litigation settlements.
516
 
In other words, a defendant subject to strict liability should be more likely to settle out 
of court, thereby significantly reducing the costs of administering the tort system.
517
 
Moreover, the average administrative costs of resolving strict liability claims are 
likely to be lower than the costs of resolving negligence claims, because under 
negligence principles, the court has to calculate the cost and effectiveness of different 
levels of care that might have reduced the probability or magnitude of harm.
518
 
In contrast, the doctrine of intermediate liability still works under a fault-based 
liability regime, since the common characteristic of intermediate liability rules is that 
the defendant bears the burden of proof regarding the exercise of reasonable care.
519
 
Put simply, the principle of intermediate liability is only a variation under negligence 
principles by shifting the burden of proof in relation to negligence to the defendant. 
Accordingly, the court also has to conduct the calculus of fault, and the average 
administrative costs of resolving intermediate liability claims are higher than the costs 
of resolving strict liability claims.
520
  
                                                     
516
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517
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The same is true for the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Because the doctrine’s 
primary function is to permit an inference or raise a presumption of negligence,
521
 res 
ipsa loquitur is also a rule under negligence principles. Consequently, unlike the clear 
demarcation between strict liability and fault-based liability, the distinction between 
intermediate liability and res ipsa loquitur is vague and deserves more discussion. 
According to Section 328D of the Restatement (Second) of Torts:
522
 
(1) It may be inferred that harm suffered by the plaintiff is caused by negligence of 
the defendant when 
(a) the event is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of 
negligence; 
(b) other responsible causes, including the conduct of the plaintiff and third 
persons, are sufficiently eliminated by the evidence; and 
(c) the indicated negligence is within the scope of the defendant's duty to the 
plaintiff. 
(2) It is the function of the court to determine whether the inference may 
reasonably be drawn by the jury, or whether it must necessarily be drawn. 
(3) It is the function of the jury to determine whether the inference is to be drawn 
in any case where different conclusions may reasonably be reached. 
Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase meaning “the thing speaks for itself.”523 This 
concept originated from an old English case, Byrne v. Boadle.
524
 Under the majority 
rule, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is merely a rule of evidence, permitting the jury to 
draw, from the occurrence of an unusual event, the conclusion that it was the 
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defendant's fault.
525
  
In McDougald v. Perry,
526
 the plaintiff was driving behind a tractor-trailer driven 
by the defendant.
527
 As the defendant drove over some railroad tracks, the 130-pound 
spare tire came out of its cradle underneath the trailer and fell to the ground.
528
 The 
trailer's rear tires then ran over the spare tire, causing the spare tire to bounce into the air 
and collide with the windshield of the plaintiff’s vehicle.529 The spare tire was housed 
in a cradle underneath the trailer and was secured by a chain that was wrapped around 
the tire and was secured to the body of the trailer by a latch device.
530
 The court held 
that the spare tire escaping from the cradle underneath the truck, resulting in the tire 
ultimately becoming airborne and crashing into the plaintiff’s vehicle, is the type of 
accident which, on the basis of common experience and as a matter of general 
knowledge, would not occur but for the failure to exercise reasonable care by the person 
who had control of the spare tire.
531
 Specifically, the court reasoned that:
532
 
[Res ipsa loquitur] is a rule of evidence that permits, but does not compel, an 
inference of negligence under certain circumstances. The doctrine is merely a rule 
of evidence. Under it an inference may arise in aid of the proof … Essentially the 
injured plaintiff must establish that the instrumentality causing his or her injury 
was under the exclusive control of the defendant, and that the accident is one that 
                                                     
525
 See supra note 523. 
526
 716 So.2d 783 (Fla. 1998). 
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would not, in the ordinary course of events, have occurred without negligence on 
the part of the one in control … The plaintiff is not required to eliminate with 
certainty all other possible causes or inferences … All that is required is evidence 
from which reasonable persons can say that on the whole it is more likely that 
there was negligence associated with the cause of the event than that there was not. 
 
In this way, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is very similar to the concept of 
prima facie proof (Anscheinsbeweis), which is also a procedural doctrine that 
alleviates the plaintiff’s burden of proof in cases where the occurrence of an event, on 
the basis of common experience, allows the court to infer the defendant’s negligence.533 
For example, the fact that a truck driver drove onto a sidewalk permits the court to 
infer that the driver was negligent in driving.
534
 The primary function of prima facie 
proof (Anscheinsbeweis) is to enhance the judge’s ability to determine the facts by 
free evaluation.
535
 This concept has nothing to do with the placement of burden of 
proof but rather concerns the appraisal of evidence (Beweiswürdigung).
536
 Accordingly, 
under both res ipsa loquitur and prima facie proof (Anscheinsbeweis) the burden of 
proof always remains on the plaintiff.
537
 From this point of view, strict liability, 
intermediate liability, and res ipsa loquitur are distinguishable. The common 
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characteristic of the three principles is that all of them, to some degree, relieve the 
plaintiff’s burden of proof in relation to the defendant’s negligence. However, strict 
liability completely discards the negligence inquiries, whereas intermediate liability 
and res ipsa loquitur still require the calculus of fault, with different placements of 
burden of proof.  
 
Table 7: Distinguishing Strict Liability, Intermediate Liability, and Res Ipsa 
Loquitur 
 
Strict Liability 
Intermediate 
Liability 
Res Ipsa Loquitur 
Liability Regime No-Fault Fault-Based Fault-Based 
Placement of 
Burden of Proof in 
Relation to Fault 
None Defendant Plaintiff 
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4.4 The Fall of Absolute Liability 
A. Absolute Liability: Defendant Held as an Insurer 
 Strict liability holds a defendant liable regardless of his fault.
538
 Given such 
heightened responsibility, it is difficult to assess the plaintiff’s proper share of the 
overall liability when a claim is litigated.
539
 Take products liability, for instance. 
Early on in the products liability revolution, courts struggled with the question of 
whether one could compare fault with defect.
540
 To answer the question, the 
presuppositions of strict enterprise liability are illustrative, including: 1) relatively 
greater power of the manufacturer to control product safety; 2) manufacturer’s ability 
to spread loss through a small insurance premium in the price charged for the product; 
and 3) the benefit of internalization in encouraging safety investments.
541
 As stated 
by Professor Fleming James:
542
 
[A] system of absolute liability tends to increase the pressure towards accident 
prevention on large groups and enterprises, where we have seen it will do the 
most good, rather than on the individual, where it will do relatively little good. 
This is so for three reasons: 1) large units are involved in many accidents and 
appear often as defendants, rare as claimants; 2) even where the accident is 
caused by an individual while acting for himself, in his aspect as potential 
defendant he is increasingly becoming covered by liability insurance, so that the 
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pressure of increased liability is put in the first instance on the insurance 
company; and 3) abolition of the defense of contributory negligence–which 
usually accompanies a shift to absolute liability–clearly adds a further incentives 
to safety on the part of perennial defendants, and if there is a corresponding loss 
of incentive it is on the part of the individuals who are potential accident victims. 
 
The implication of the three presuppositions is absolute liability, which means 
that any form of contributory negligence is not a valid defense in a strict liability 
action.
543
 Under James’ belief, absolute liability is preferred over a system of liability 
based on fault wherever there is an enterprise or activity that benefits society but also 
takes a more or less inevitable (if accidental) toll on human life and limb, as strict 
enterprise liability helps to cut down accidents and minimize administration costs.
544
 
Significantly, absolute liability totally rejects defenses of any kind, including defenses 
that negate causation, defenses that inculpate the plaintiff, and defenses that exonerate 
the defendant.
545
 For example, under Article 89 of the Civil Aviation Act, the owner of 
the aircraft is liable not only regardless of fault but also for the damage caused by 
force majeure.
546
 Because a defendant is liable for the injury resulting from an act of 
God as long as it is foreseeable,
547
 the term “force majeure” under Article 89 of this Act 
should be interpreted as “an act of God” or events that are unexpected and 
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uncontrollable.
548
 In so defining, Article 89 of the Civil Aviation Act is an absolute 
liability rule which satisfies the three presuppositions of strict enterprise liability.
549
 
The same is true for strict products liability, as Justice Traynor wrote in his concurring 
opinion for Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.
550
 Specifically, he wrote that:
551
 
In my opinion it should now be recognized that a manufacturer incurs an absolute 
liability when an article that he has placed on the market, knowing that it is to be 
used without inspection, proves to have a defect that causes injury to human 
beings. 
By insuring against unavoidable accidents as well, strict liability has a larger 
insurance component,
552
 and under this doctrine there was no room for the court to 
assess the plaintiff’s share of the overall liability.553 
B. The Availability of Comparative Negligence 
The early absolute liability rule was not free from criticism. Turning back to 
Coase’s example of cattle raising and farming,554  the starting point of Coase’s 
analysis is that both activities are reciprocal.
555
 The presence of both cattle raising 
and farming is a prerequisite to any damage to either, so that avoiding harm to one 
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party necessarily harms the other.
556
 The idea of reciprocity of harm leads to the 
rationale that inquires into the plaintiff’s contributory negligence.557 In other words, 
if Coase is right about the reciprocal nature of harm, and it is possible that the plaintiff, 
often enough, would prove to be the cheapest cost avoider, then it becomes important 
to take into account the plaintiff’s role in creating or avoiding accidents subject to 
strict liability.
558
  
However, under absolute liability the plaintiff has no incentive to take 
precautions that might reduce or eliminate the expected accident costs.
559
 Specifically, 
under absolute liability the potential victim knows that even if he takes no care, the 
injurer will be liable if an accident occurs.
560
 Additionally, there are no ways that the 
injurer can escape liability unless he prevents the accident.
561
 Knowing all this, the 
potential victim has no incentive to spend anything on preventing the accident.
562
 
Consequently, a principle of absolute liability is not efficient in cases where the 
efficient solution is for the victim alone to take avoidance measures and where the 
efficient solution consists of precautions by both injurers and victims.
563
 On the other 
hand, contributory negligence serves an essential allocative purpose in a strict liability 
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regime by inducing safety incentives from the potential victim.
564
 From an economic 
point of view, the plaintiff’s contributory negligence should be a valid defense in a 
strict liability action and a defendant cannot be an insurer against all possible types of 
accidents and injuries.
565
 Accordingly, years after Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.,
566
 
Justice Traynor supported the view that the manufacturer is not an insurer for all 
injuries caused by its product.
567
  
 As stated previously, the question that baffled early case law was whether one 
could compare fault in a strict liability action.
568
 Under the traditional approach, 
contributory negligence is not a defense to strict liability. In McCown v. International 
Harvester Co.,
569
 the plaintiff sued the defendant under a strict products liability 
theory for injuries sustained while driving a tractor manufactured by the defendant.
570
 
Specifically, the plaintiff struck a guardrail adjoining a shoulder with the right front tire 
of the tractor when driving it.
571
 The collision caused the steering wheel to spin rapidly 
in the direction opposite to the turn, and the spokes of the spinning steering wheel 
                                                     
564
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struck the plaintiff’s right arm, fracturing his wrist and forearm.572 The court explicitly 
rejected contributory negligence as a defense to actions grounded under strict products 
liability.
573
  
However, the traditional rule is obsolete. After the invention of comparative 
negligence under which the plaintiff’s recovery would not be completely barred, courts 
have opted for the apparent justice of making each party to an accident bear 
responsibility for the losses attributable to that party’s breach of good behavior.574 In 
Daly v. General Motors Corp.,
575
 the decedent crashed his vehicle onto a metal 
divider fence.
576
 After the initial impact between the vehicle and the fence the vehicle 
spun counterclockwise, the driver's door was thrown open, and the decedent was 
forcibly ejected from the car and sustained fatal head injuries.
577
 The decedent's widow 
and three surviving minor children sued the defendants under the theory of strict 
products liability.
578
 In holding that comparative negligence applies to a strict liability 
action, the court reasoned that:
579
 
[P]rinciples of comparative negligence … apply to actions founded on strict 
products liability, thereby reducing plaintiff's recovery only to the extent that his 
own act of reasonable care contributed to his injury … Application of comparative 
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principles to strict products liability actions treats alike defenses to both 
negligence and strict products liability actions; in each instance, defense, if 
established, will reduce but not bar plaintiff's claim … [The] reason for extending 
full system of comparative fault to strict products liability is that it is fair to do 
so … (remaining text omitted.) 
 
The recognition of comparative negligence in a strict products liability action was 
further realized by the Products Liability Restatement. Under Section 17 of the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability,
580
 
(a) A plaintiff's recovery of damages for harm caused by a product defect may be 
reduced if the conduct of the plaintiff combines with the product defect to cause 
the harm and the plaintiff's conduct fails to conform to generally applicable rules 
establishing appropriate standards of care. 
(b) The manner and extent of the reduction under Subsection (a) and the 
apportionment of plaintiff's recovery among multiple defendants are governed by 
generally applicable rules apportioning responsibility. 
 
 Having recognized the availability of comparative negligence in a strict liability 
action, courts still need to justify their approaches in comparing apples and oranges.
581
 
In Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co.,
582
 the decedent died in a crash of an airplane 
manufactured by the defendant.
583
 His widow brought an action against the defendant 
alleging that design and manufacturing defects in the legs of the cockpit seats caused 
                                                     
580
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the seat legs to break during the crash, thus causing the decedent’s death. 584  In 
discussing the availability of comparative negligence in an action grounded under strict 
liability, the court reasoned that:
585
  
Many courts and commentators have labeled this type of loss allocation system 
comparative fault. We choose comparative causation instead because it is 
conceptually accurate in cases based on strict liability … in which the defendant's 
“fault,” in the traditional sense of culpability, is not at issue … Under comparative 
causation, Plaintiffs will continue to be relieved of proving that the manufacturer 
or distributor was negligent in the production, design, or dissemination of the 
article in question. Defendant's liability for injuries caused by a defective product 
remains strict … [T]he product supplier's incentive to eliminate or to reduce 
product hazards should remain intact. 
Under this rationale, comparative negligence sneaks up in the proximate cause 
evaluation as a causal defense. This reasoning might work perfectly when the court 
applies contributory negligence to strict liability, since a plaintiff’s misconduct is 
considered a superseding cause of the injury under the principle of contributory 
negligence, which justifies a complete bar to his recovery.
586
 However, when 
comparative negligence applies to strict liability, the primary function of this principle 
is to apportion responsibility between or among the parties.
587
  To accomplish this 
task, the principle considers determinative factors that include the plaintiff’s 
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misconduct, causation, and damages.
588
 That said, comparative negligence neither 
compares the parties’ fault only, nor does it merely explore the percentage of cause 
assigned to the plaintiff. The apportionment of liability should rest on the combined 
evaluation of the determinative factors rather than on a single element of an accident, 
since any single element alone cannot justify the imposition of liability on a chosen 
party.
589
 Similarly, negligence holds a person liable only when there is “negligent 
conduct” that “causes harm.”590 Because the principle of comparative negligence in 
effect compares the plaintiff’s overall responsibility for failure to exercise care, it is a 
rule of liability defense rather than a causal defense. 
 Assuming, in an accident governed by strict liability, the plaintiff was liable for 
his own misconduct for 30% of his injuries, and assuming the defendant could 
establish the plaintiff’s comparative negligence, the defendant’s proof of comparative 
negligence demonstrated two things: 1) 30% of the injuries resulted from the 
plaintiff’s fault and 2) the defendant was not liable in negligence for the 30% injuries. 
From a theoretical point of view, requiring the defendant to prove that he was not 
negligent is exactly how the doctrine of intermediate liability works.
591
 The 
distinction between strict liability and intermediate liability lies on the 70% of the 
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plaintiff’s injuries, for under strict liability the defendant was nonetheless liable, but 
under intermediate liability he was able to escape liability by proving that he was not 
negligent in causing the injuries. The bottom line is that while the availability of 
comparative negligence in a strict liability action is important on the ground of 
economic efficiency, it cripples the principle’s character as a rule of absolute liability 
and makes it similar to intermediate liability. In other words, strict liability with a 
defense of comparative negligence is closely analogous to negligence per se.
592
 Thus, 
Schwartz was right that modern strict liability bears negligence characteristics and 
that strict liability and negligence are hardly distinguishable.
593
 
In Taiwan, comparative negligence is the only recognized form of contributory 
negligence. Under Article 217 of the Civil Code:
594
 
If the injured person has negligently contributed in causing or aggravating the 
injury, the court may reduce or release the amount of the compensation. 
If the reason of a grave injury was unknown to the debtor and the injured person 
has omitted to call the attention of the debtor beforehand, or to avert, or mitigate 
the injury, the injured person will be deemed to be negligently contributed in the 
injury. 
The provisions of the preceding two paragraphs shall apply mutatis mutandis to 
the situation when the agent of the injured person or the person performing the 
obligation for the injured person has negligently contributed to the injury. 
                                                     
592
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Similar rules also are available in the Nuclear Damage Compensation Law
595
 and in 
the Civil Aviation Act.
596
 Different from the struggles in American case law, courts in 
Taiwan widely accept the availability of comparative negligence in an action 
grounded under strict liability. In Tai Shang Zi No. 2734 of 1990,
597
 the Directorate 
General of Telecommunications brought a suit against a defendant for recovery 
because during construction work the defendant cut the cables that deliver electricity 
to telecommunications facilities. At the same time, the defendant argued that the 
plaintiff was at fault in changing the original plan and placing the cables beneath his 
land without informing him of this fact. According to the second paragraph of Article 
45 of the Telecommunications Act,
598
 compensation shall be made in the event of 
damages to telecommunications facilities arising from repairs or construction of 
buildings, roads, irrigation ditches, or the laying of underground pipes, cables or other 
projects.
599
 Because compensation under this rule is not premised upon the fault of the 
defendant, it is a strict liability rule. In holding that the appellate court erred in failing to 
address the plaintiff’s fault, the Supreme Court of Taiwan reasoned that comparative 
negligence also is an available defense in a strict liability action. With comparative 
                                                     
595
 Article 91 of the NUCLEAR DAMAGE COMPENSATION LAW. 
596
 Article 19 of the CIVIL AVIATION ACT. 
597
 Zuigao Fayuan, 79 Nian Tai Shang Zi No. 2734 (Tai Shang Zi No. 2734 by Supreme Court of 
Taiwan in 1990), http://mywoojda.appspot.com/j5m/j5m?id=107 (last visited on Oct. 20, 2015). 
598
 Article 45 of the TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT. 
599
 At the time of the decision, the cited statute was the 1977 version and the rule was in the second 
paragraph of Article 26 with similar language. Please refer to LIFAYUAN GONGBAO (Official Gazette of 
Legislative Yuan of the Republic of China) Vol. 66 No. 3 11 for details (Chinese Source ONLY). 
  
 
140 
negligence holding up as a valid defense in a strict liability action, strict liability in 
Taiwan also bears negligence characteristics. 
C. Proximate Cause as a Limitation to Liability 
In the early days of the products liability revolution, in an effort to distinguish 
the then-new strict products liability from negligence, some courts and commentators 
sought to eliminate the proximate cause limitation of negligence law.
600
 However, 
this effort proved futile, and proximate cause is alive and well as an element of claims 
for strict products liability.
601
 Because the relevant issue for proximate cause is the 
scope of duty,
602
 the court in a strict liability action still needs to conduct a 
negligence inquiry, thus undermining the claim that strict liability is cheaper to 
administer compared with negligence.
603
 The same is true for Taiwanese law because 
both Taiwan and the United States adopt similar causal theories.
604
 Accordingly, the 
distinction between strict liability and negligence is not worth the effort to 
maintain.
605
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4.5 Responses to Tests for Strict Liability 
Because so much has been written about the economic choice between 
negligence and strict liability, to examine whether the courts employ negligence 
where it is more efficient than strict liability, and vice-versa,
606
 this Dissertation does 
not need to go through that topic in detail.
607
 Rather, in the following section this 
Dissertation will respond to the tests for strict liability mentioned in Chapter Three.
608
  
A. Learned Hand Test v. Cheapest Cost Avoider Test  
Before addressing Calabresi’s cheapest cost avoider test, this section has to 
briefly discuss the Hand test mentioned in United States v. Carroll Towing.
609
 Under 
the Hand test, if the probability be called P; the injury L; and the burden B; then liability 
depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by P (i.e., whether “B<PL”).610 
Under this test, if B is greater than PL, a reasonable person may not take the 
precaution.
611
 If, however, B is less than PL, legal liability may be imposed to induce 
the party to prevent accidents, thereby avoiding damages in a civil judgment equal to 
                                                     
606
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PL.
612
 Hence, assuming a victim can do nothing to prevent the accident, a potential 
injurer is negligent if B is less than PL.
613
  
The Hand Formula works on two assumptions. First, it assumes that risks are 
neutral.
614
 Second, it assumes that calculable risks exist.
615
 However, where risks 
cannot generally be estimated, courts usually justify the exemption of duty with B and 
L where B is extremely high and L is only moderate.
616
 One may argue that it is 
unrealistic to expect a layperson to calculate whether B is less than PL before he 
acts;
617
 Judge Hand himself admitted that the calculus of fault under the Hand test is 
rarely possible. In Moisan v. Loftus,
618
 the plaintiff guest passenger brought an action 
in negligence against the defendant driver for injuries sustained during the ride, and 
Judge Hand wrote the following text:
619
  
[The difficulties in applying the B<PL test] arise from the necessity of applying a 
quantitative test to an incommensurable subject matter; and the same difficulties 
inhere in the concept of “ordinary” negligence. It is indeed possible to state an 
equation for negligence in the form, C equals P times D, in which the C is the care 
required to avoid risk, D, the possible injuries, and P, the probability that the 
injuries will occur, if the requisite care is not taken. But of these factors care is the 
only one ever susceptible of quantitative estimate, and often that is not. The 
injuries are always a variable within limits, which do not admit of even 
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approximate ascertainment; and, although probability might theoretically be 
estimated, if any statistics were available, they never are; and, besides, probability 
varies with the severity of the injuries. It follows that all such attempts are illusory; 
and, if serviceable at all, are so only to center attention upon which one of the 
factors may be determinative in any given situation. 
However, when applying the Hand test, courts typically estimate the accident 
avoidance costs of the average person in each party’s situation and rely on rough 
judgments only.
620
 Applying an average person standard to determine whether B is 
less than PL not only conforms to the layperson’s experience but also prevents courts 
from incurring higher costs in administering the legal system.
621
 Secondly, the Hand 
test corresponds to the economic model of individual choices premised upon the 
assumption that people rationally take precautions that would generate greater 
benefits in avoiding accidents than the precautions would cost.
622
 Where B is less 
than PL, a rational individual will prevent the accident to avoid damages in a civil 
judgment equal to PL under the threat of legal liability.
623
 Finally, active insurance 
markets play a critical role in supplying much of the information to the tort system 
about the expected values of the costs of accidents and accident avoidance measures, 
thereby making the calculus of risk possible under the Hand test.
624
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 As mentioned previously, the reason that Calabresi chose the cheapest cost 
avoider test for legal liability, rather than the cost-benefit analysis under the Hand test, 
is that the latter entails impractical assumptions that injurers had the requisite 
foresight regarding costs of accidents.
625
 However, as this Dissertation has argued, in 
a practical sense the Hand test never expects perfect foresight from the injurer but 
rather rough judgments as a reasonable person could have made prior to the 
accident.
626
 The burdens of required foresight and choices of behavior under the 
Hand test are the same in degrees as what the negligence law requires a reasonable 
person to do under certain circumstances, and not more.
627
 Additionally, applied to a 
strict products liability scenario, Calabresi’s approach will almost eliminate the 
incentive of the potential victim—the user—to adopt a more economical method of 
preventing the injury, because liability is almost always imposed on the manufacturer, 
who is in the better position to make the cost-benefit analysis and to act on the 
decision.
628
 By rejecting any kind of cost-benefit analysis, Calabresi’s liability rule is 
the traditional absolute liability, which does not recognize any form of contributory 
negligence as a valid defense.
629
 Finally, because Calabresi’s approach presumes that 
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every accident is worth preventing, placing legal liability on the party who is the 
cheapest cost avoider (but fails to prevent the accident), it is doubtful that “the 
cheapest cost avoider” nevertheless will take any precautionary measure when B is 
greater than PL or will simply forgo accident avoidance under such circumstances.
630
 
B. Incentives for Accident Avoidance 
1) Increased Level of Care v. Due Care  
 Many judges and commentators believe that strict liability would induce 
potential injurers to be more careful than they would be under a negligence 
standard.
631
 For instance, Justice Traynor wrote the following text in his concurring 
opinion for Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.
632
 
Even if there is no negligence, however, public policy demands that responsibility 
be fixed wherever it will most effectively reduce the hazards to life and health 
inherent in defective products that reach the market. It is evident that the 
manufacturer can anticipate some hazards and guard against the recurrence of 
others, as the public cannot. 
However, such belief is illusory because a defendant at most will exercise due 
care—the point where the burden of taking care equals the expected cost of 
liability—under either negligence or strict liability.633  The Hand test,634  though 
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announced in a negligence case, could properly be applied to this issue.
635
 Assuming 
B—the cost of accident avoidance—is less than PL, the defendant will be liable for 
failure to avoid the accident under either negligence or strict liability.
636
 Because the 
most desirable option for the defendant to avoid legal liability is to take due care, due 
care is induced.
637
 In contrast, where B is greater than PL, the defendant will not be 
liable for failure to avoid the accident under negligence but nonetheless will be liable 
under strict liability. By definition, at any level of care greater than the level of due 
care, the cost of the marginal unit of care to the defendant is greater than the expected 
reduction in his liability for the plaintiff’s injuries.638 Similarly, if the defendant takes 
the care below the level of due care, another unit of care will cost him less than the 
reduction in his expected cost of liability does.
639
 Accordingly, the defendant’s net 
income is greater at the level of due care than at any other level of care, and he will 
choose due care even if he is held strictly liable for the plaintiff’s injuries.640 Indeed, 
there are situations where the defendant’s expected cost of liability is less than the 
cost of accident avoidance, and under such circumstances the defendant is better off 
not taking any precaution.
641
 The bottom line is that strict liability will not induce a 
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higher level of care than the care level induced by negligence.
642
  
 
2) Effect on Activity-level 
Many legal analysts think that strict liability invokes greater accident avoidance 
by encouraging an individual to reduce the level of an activity rather than by simply 
inducing more care.
643
 Judge Posner specifically addressed this point in Indiana 
Harbor Belt R. Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co.
644
 In short, Judge Posner argued that strict 
liability is superior to negligence because it induces both due care and changes in 
activity level, whereas negligence could only induce due care.
645
 Where the accident 
cannot be prevented by taking care, but can be avoided by 1) shifting the activity in 
which the accident occurs to another location where the risk or harm of an accident will 
be less, or 2) reducing the scale of the activity in order to minimize the number of 
accidents, the case is strong for strict liability.
646
 
 Indeed, changes in activity level bring about accident avoidance. However, an 
issue arises as to whether legal liability should be predicated upon an individual’s 
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activity-level decisions. If strict liability’s avoidance mechanism works on the 
premise that, under this doctrine, an individual has an incentive to abandon or to 
reduce the frequency of an activity, legal liability, in effect, is predicated on the 
individual’s decisions to conduct the activity—the activity-level decisions—rather 
than on whether the individual did something wrong in conducting the activity.
647
 
From the standpoint of freedom of activity, legal liability should not be imposed on 
the activity-level decisions because society does not expect or require an individual to 
evaluate such decisions, especially those about how frequently an activity should be 
undertaken.
648
 This argument is particularly effective against the doctrine of strict 
liability because strict liability imposes liability on both those who make reasonable 
activity-based decisions and those who make unreasonable ones.
649
 If legal liability 
needs to be placed on activity-level decisions to prevent abuse of freedom of action, it 
should be placed solely on unreasonable activity-based decisions because it is unjust 
to impose liability on the exercise of personal freedom that is reasonably 
undertaken.
650
  
When the reasonableness of activity-level decisions comes into play, the calculus 
of fault is relevant to the imposition of liability and the issue can easily be identified 
                                                     
647
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and addressed under negligence.
651
 For example, when the value of an activity is so 
low and the risks of the activity so high that the activity ought to be forgone, the 
decision to engage in such activity is unreasonable.
652
 As such, the existence of 
reasonable and safe alternatives for uprooting a tree makes a person’s decision to get 
rid of it by blast unreasonable.
653
 Furthermore, the inquiry into activity-level 
decisions (i.e. about method, time, or location) is the same as the inquiry into 
reasonable care, for both ask what the defendant could have done differently and what 
impact any different decisions on the defendant’s part would have had on the 
victim.
654
 In fact, courts often use rule-based negligence (e.g. statutory negligence per 
se, customs, or judge-made rules about reasonableness of activity-level decisions) to 
regulate activity levels.
655
 Comment a. on Section 297 of the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts illustrates this point with the following text.
656
  
The act of driving a car along a well-paved road is commonly regarded as not 
dangerous in itself, although the road is bordered by ditches, trees, or telegraph 
poles. Driving along such a road may be made dangerous if the driver does not 
look where he is going, if he drives at too high rate of speed, if he is a beginner 
who does not know how to control the car, if the car has a defective brake, or if he 
fails to sound his horn before coming to intersecting roads. On the other hand, 
there are many mountain roads which may properly be regarded as dangerous no 
matter how careful and skillful the driver may be and no matter how perfect his car, 
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or which at the least are dangerous unless unusual care is exercised by an 
unusually skillful driver, with a car in perfect condition. A reasonable man would 
recognize that there is an inescapable risk in driving down a narrow and illkept 
mountain road, winding along precipices unguarded by walls or railings, 
particularly if rain, snow, or ice has rendered the road slippery. The mere use of 
such a route under the circumstances described may be negligent unless the utility 
of the route is very great. 
Thus, courts are able to entertain unreasonable (e.g. extraordinarily high risk) 
activity-level claims,
657
 whereas commentators often underestimate the capacity of 
negligence by defining it only in terms of care and excluding from it any possibility of 
activity-level consideration.
658
 When only unreasonable activity-level decisions are 
the targets of the legal system and negligence is able to address the reasonableness of 
activity-level decisions, the argument for strict liability is untenable.
659
  
C. Fairness: The Benefit Theory 
In Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp.,
660
 plaintiffs brought strict products 
liability actions against manufacturers and distributors of asbestos products for injuries 
resulting from their exposure to asbestos for varying periods of time.
661
 In holding that 
product manufacturers or distributors are strictly liable for failure to warn even if the 
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risks are unknowable at the time of manufacture or distribution, the court reasoned 
that:
662
 
One of the most important arguments … for imposing strict liability is that the 
manufacturers and distributors of defective products can best allocate the costs of 
the injuries resulting from it. The premise is that the price of a product should 
reflect all of its costs, including the cost of injuries caused by the product. This can 
best be accomplished by imposing liability on the manufacturer and distributors. 
Those persons can insure against liability and incorporate the cost of the insurance 
in the price of the product. In this way, the costs of the product will be borne by 
those who profit from it: the manufacturers and distributors who profit from its sale 
and the buyers who profit from its use. It should be a cost of doing business that in 
the course of doing that business an unreasonable risk was created. 
According to this rationale, anyone who benefits from engaging in an activity should 
rightly bear the costs associated with that activity.
663
 However, benefit theory cannot 
justify the selective application of strict liability to limited cases (like product 
cases).
664
 Particularly, benefit theory has also been used to justify the imposition of 
“negligence liability.” For example, a driver benefits from the activity of driving 
because driving brings about convenience to him. However, the liability of a driver in 
an automobile accident rests on principles of negligence rather than strict liability.
665
 
Significantly, even where the cases involve financial gains to the actors, most of the 
time the actors are subject to negligence liability rather than strict liability—for 
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instance, innkeepers are liable in negligence for failure to protect their guests from 
unreasonable risks of harm.
666
 Finally, benefit theory fails to explain why enterprises 
should be held strictly liable to their customers, who are both beneficiaries and 
potential victims of enterprise activity.
667
 
 
D. Loss Spreading Effects 
 The last policy justification for strict liability is that this doctrine broadly spreads 
the risk of loss.
668
 Again, Justice Traynor addressed this point in his concurring 
opinion for Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. by providing that:
669
 
The cost of an injury and the loss of time or health may be an overwhelming 
misfortune to the person injured, and a needless one, for the risk of injury can be 
insured by the manufacturer and distributed among the public as a cost of doing 
business. 
Loss spreading, through manufacturers of products or large enterprises, may be 
viewed as little more than a form of judicially mandated liability insurance.
670
 By 
imposing strict liability on product manufacturers or large enterprises, the tort system 
properly shifts losses from innocent victims to those who are better able to distribute 
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losses among society through pricing mechanisms.
671
  
 Loss spreading policy may have provided the most powerful argument for the 
doctrine of strict liability, especially for its applicability to product cases. However, 
two issues arise as to 1) what the primary function of tort law is; and 2) whether loss 
spreading should be the paramount policy for the imposition of strict liability.
672
 
Because the 1960s strict products liability revolution originated from the 
accumulative effect of previous legal reforms,
673
 it is helpful to understand the 
historical background before the year 1960.  
 Health insurance was not widely available in the United States until the 1950s.
674
 
Before then, the choice for most consumers who purchased products was between 
seller-provided tort insurance and little or no insurance.
675
 During this period, 
consumer expectations supported the insurance rationale for tort liability.
676
 Accident 
injuries were often financially ruinous for individuals in this era, thus making it 
doubtful whether consumers actually preferred to be uninsured or underinsured.
677
 
Moreover, while product sellers were not offering guaranteed compensation for 
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injuries caused by non-defective products, ordinary consumers presumably preferred 
to have this insurance.
678
 As a result, consumer expectations justified the imposition 
of legal liability so that the sellers would be forced to provide insurance or tort 
compensation for injuries caused by non-defective products.
679
 Consistently with this 
rationale, tort commentators in the first half of the twentieth century suggested that 
tort compensation be justified as a mode of insurance.
680
 
 Accordingly, implicit in loss spreading policy is the belief that the primary 
function of torts is compensation.
681
 However, as this Dissertation has consistently 
argued, the primary function of tort law is accident deterrence rather than 
compensation.
682
 First, the tort system is an expensive—and generally 
unsuitable—mode of social insurance, since it entails high administrative costs and 
litigation costs.
683
 Second, in the contemporary world, market insurance is readily 
accessible and both accident and liability insurance are available to prospective 
victims of accidents and injurers alike.
684
 If people who want insurance and are 
willing to pay for it can obtain insurance in the insurance market or some informal 
substitute, there is no reason to use the tort system to provide insurance.
685
 In other 
words, the ability of individuals to purchase insurance that will provide them with 
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protection (should an accident occur) makes the compensation function of tort law 
less essential.
686
  
Even if insurance becomes the primary concern of tort law, several problems 
suggest insurance might not function well in the form of torts. As was stated by Judge 
Posner, if the cost of insuring was lower for the defendant than for the plaintiff, there 
is a ground to prefer strict liability.
687
 Significantly, under negligence the consumers 
could insure themselves against uncompensated accident injuries, thus distributing 
accident costs among customers of commercial insurance carriers.
688
 On the other 
hand, under strict liability the manufacturers would pass on the losses to a group of 
consumers through pricing mechanisms.
689
 However, because it is uncertain whether 
the defendant-manufacturers are the lower cost insurers than the plaintiff-consumers, 
there are no strong reasons to believe that strict liability is a superior rule to achieve 
loss spreading.
690
  
Even though manufacturers indeed are more efficient insurers, another issue 
arises as to insurability. As was argued by Professor James Henderson, for any 
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insurance system to be viable, the risks insured against must be ascertainable and 
quantifiable ahead of time.
691
 For example, the prices of goods—the 
premiums—should proportionally reflect the contributions of the insureds to the 
relevant risk pools by classifying the risks involved.
692
 However, since the premiums 
charged are uniform across insureds under strict liability without adequate 
classification, the insurance pools will disproportionally attract high-risk insureds, 
thereby threatening the viability of the pools.
693
 Additionally, when strict liability 
requires enterprises to function as insurers, it must be able to prevent moral hazard.
694
 
For example, the manufacturer’s liability may be limited to the defect presented at the 
original time of distribution, or the enterprises are not held liable for harm to the 
victims when victims deliberately place themselves at risk.
695
 However, such a 
condition is difficult for strict liability to satisfy.
696
 Even if defenses such as 
contributory negligence, product misuse, or product modification are available to 
product manufacturers (who are subject to strict liability), such defenses could never 
adequately accommodate the variety of post-distribution product uses and modes of 
consumption that would remarkably affect an enterprise’s exposure to liability.697  
                                                     
691
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692
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693
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694
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696
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Finally, loss spreading cannot justify the selective application of strict liability to 
limited cases.
698
 If it is desirable that tort law distributes losses widely, strict liability 
should also spread the losses from other accidents currently governed by 
negligence—for example, automobile accidents.699 Perhaps a more efficient approach 
is to incorporate in the tort system a mechanism of mandatory insurance
700
 or 
completely replace the tort system with a more comprehensive no-fault accident 
insurance scheme.
701
 In summary, this Dissertation argues that the primary function 
of tort law is accident avoidance and that loss spreading should not be the paramount 
policy of tort law to justify the choice of strict liability over negligence.  
 
4.6 Afterwards—The New Role of Strict Liability 
A. The Net Distinction Between Strict Liability and Negligence 
With several justifications for strict liability undermined, the remaining issue 
concerns whether there are other reasons to justify this doctrine. From the plaintiff’s 
perspective, under strict liability he need not prove the defendant’s negligence 
                                                     
698
 A Modest Proposal to Abandon Strict Products Liability, supra note 25 at 645-46. 
699
 Id. at 646. 
700
 See supra note 212, supra note 215, supra note 218, and supra note 221. 
701
 For a brief discussion about New Zealand’s no-fault accident insurance system, see supra note 49 at 
333-37. 
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because strict liability holds a person liable regardless of the person’s fault.702 In other 
words, a major distinction between strict liability and negligence is that strict liability 
improves the plaintiff’s position by no longer requiring that the right to compensation 
depends on the plaintiff’s proof of the defendant's negligent conduct.703 However, the 
plaintiff encounters another difficulty in satisfying his burden of proof in an action 
grounded under strict liability. For example, in a strict products liability action the 
plaintiff has to prove the defect of the product and such a task is almost equal in 
difficulty to the proof of negligence.
704
  
Similarly, intermediate liability, though grounded under negligence, shifts the 
burden of proof in relation to negligence to the defendant.
705
 From the plaintiff’s 
standpoint, he also need not prove any negligent conduct on the defendant’s part. 
Accordingly, this Dissertation argues that the plaintiff’s relief in proof of fault does 
not provide tort law with a strong reason to switch to a strict liability regime, since 
shifting the burden of proof related to negligence could accomplish the task.
706
  
                                                     
702
 See supra 19. 
703
 See supra note 3 at 298. 
704
 See supra note 36 at 263. 
705
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706
 Placing the burden of proof in relation to negligence on the defendant almost equals imposing 
quasi-strict liability on the defendant. See supra note 150 at 187. 
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B. The Alternative Policy Consideration of Strict Liability 
Another distinction between strict liability and negligence is that the former 
ensures the plaintiff’s recovery.707 In this regard, an alternative justification for strict 
liability may possibly lie on the defendant’s financial capacity. In Taiwan, equitable 
liability is a no-fault variation under negligence principles rather than an independent 
liability regime.
708
 The doctrine of equitable liability gives the court discretion to 
force one who has the better financial capacity to compensate the innocent victims for 
part or all of the injuries even if he is not liable.
709
 When applying equitable liability, 
the court considers the parties’ financial conditions only.710 Put simply, the only 
policy justification for this no-fault doctrine lies on the defendant’s superior capacity, 
compared with that of the plaintiff, to afford the costs of harm.
711
 Thus, strict liability 
indeed can be justified upon the “deep pockets” rationale.712  
However, because the alternative deep pocket policy alone is insufficient to 
justify strict liability as an independent liability regime,
713
 this Dissertation argues 
that strict liability should be incorporated in the form of equitable liability as a 
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fallback variation only. More specifically, this Dissertation does not oppose adopting 
any no-fault rule to ensure the plaintiff’s recovery, but rather argues that such a rule 
should be absorbed into negligence principles as a secondary variation only, since 
compensation is not the paramount consideration of tort law.
714
  
C. Intermediate Liability Tested 
So far this Dissertation has demonstrated that strict liability cannot justify itself 
to be an independent liability regime.
715
 To further argue that intermediate liability is 
a superior option to strict liability in regulating highly risky activities, this 
Dissertation has to examine intermediate liability through the tests for strict liability 
mentioned previously.
716
 First, intermediate liability induces greater accident 
avoidance and reduces administration costs. Under intermediate liability, the 
defendant has to bear the costs of proof related to negligence and the increased burden 
provides the defendant with additional incentives to avoid litigation costs, either by 
preventing accidents through exercising due care or through making reasonable 
activity-level decisions, or by settling tort claims out of court. On the other hand, such 
incentives will almost be the same under either negligence or strict liability, for the 
defendant does not bear the costs of proof in relation to negligence under either 
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715
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716
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liability regime.
717
  
Second, intermediate liability is fairer because 1) it places the burden of proof in 
relation to negligence on those who have superior knowledge and ability to prevent 
accidents and 2) it works under a fault-based regime that imposes liability only when 
the defendant fails to take cost-justified precautions. Accordingly, although Taiwanese 
commentators consider strict liability a huge step of progress in the legal system,
718
 
this Dissertation argues that the imposition of intermediate liability is sufficient to 
afford greater protection to innocent victims. 
 Finally, under intermediate liability, loss spreading is not the paramount policy 
of tort law and equitable no-fault liability comes into play as a fallback measure 
only.
719
 Specifically, even if the defendant could escape liability by proving that he 
was free from negligence, equitable liability authorizes the court to require one who 
has the better financial capacity to compensate the innocent victims in whole or in part, 
thus ensuring the plaintiff’s recovery.720 Therefore, the doctrine of intermediate 
liability is a superior option to strict liability in regulating highly risky activities. 
                                                     
717
 However, strict liability indeed provides the defendant with greater incentives to settle out of court 
than negligence does. See supra 124. 
718
 The fancy toward the doctrine of strict liability is probably derived from the fact that Taiwan did 
not have strict liability rules until after the 1950s. See supra 58. 
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Chapter Five: 
Proposed Revisions and Collateral Issues 
 
 
 
Synopsis 
 
 Several rules currently governed by strict liability should be modified into 
intermediate liability rules.  
 Pure economic loss is not recoverable under risk liability. 
 Defenses available to negligence are all available to risk liability. 
 No cap on amount of compensation is necessary for risk liability. 
 A regular two-year statute of limitation is applicable to risk liability. 
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5.1 Overview 
As of this point, this Dissertation has made the following seven averments in 
response to the traditional policy justifications for strict liability, demonstrating its 
preference for intermediate liability:  
 Traditional strict liability without any form of contributory negligence is 
unjustifiable.
721
  
 Either form of contributory negligence not only cripples the effect of 
traditional strict liability but also turns modern strict liability into a 
negligence-like doctrine.
722
 
 There is no compelling evidence suggesting that strict liability invokes 
greater accident avoidance.
723
  
 Fairness cannot justify the imposition of strict liability.724 
 Loss spreading is not the paramount policy of tort law.725  
 Strict liability should be reduced to a fallback variation under negligence 
principles.
726
 
 Intermediate liability, though also a variation under negligence principles,727 
is superior to strict liability in regulating highly risky activities.
728
  
In this chapter, this Dissertation specifically addresses how current strict liability rules 
should be revised. Because this Dissertation presumes that the current strict liability 
rules reflect the legislature’s intent that these specific types of accident call for special 
responsibility, choosing intermediate liability rather than regular negligence should be 
preferable to these areas of law. 
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5.2 Proposed Revisions and Their Applications to Real Accidents 
A. Argument for Preserving Dangerous Activities Intermediate Liability 
Under Article 191-3 of the Civil Code, a person’s liability in negligence is 
presumed if the nature of the work or activity performed, or the implements or manner 
used in performing the work or activity, is dangerous.
729
 To escape liability, the 
defendant has to prove that he exercised reasonable care to prevent the injury to the 
victim.
730
 Consequently, Article 191-3 is an intermediate liability rule under which the 
defendant bears the burden of proof in relation to negligence. Although the majority of 
commentators suggested that this rule be changed into a strict liability rule,
731
 this 
Dissertation argues that the rule is proper in adopting the doctrine of intermediate 
liability and that Taiwanese legislature need not revise it.  
However, an issue arises as to the scope of Article 191-3. The liability under 
Article 191-3 is predicated upon whether the work or activity, or the implements or 
manner used, is dangerous. Yet danger is everywhere. Accordingly, this rule fails to 
provide clear guidance with regard to what degree of danger would call for special 
responsibility under this rule. To establish a proper guideline for applying Article 191-3, 
this Dissertation argues that the reasonableness test under Section 520 of the 
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730
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Restatement (Second) of Torts is instrumental, as Article 191-3 is also a fault-based rule. 
Consistently with this proposition, the rule shall apply only when 1) the work or activity 
is unusual, excessive, bizarre, and non-natural,
732
 or 2) the value of the work or 
activity, or benefit of using the implements or manner in performing the work or 
activity, is too low and the risk of harm too high.
733
 In other words, Article 191-3 shall 
only apply to the abnormally dangerous work or activity or to the situation where the 
implements or manner used in performing the work or activity is abnormally 
dangerous.
734
 
A more complicated issue concerns the relationship between Article 191-3 and 
Article 191 of the Civil Code. While Article 191-3 applies whenever the work or 
activity performed, or the implements or manner used, is abnormally dangerous, 
Article 191 applies where the victim’s injury is caused by a building or work piece on 
privately owned land.
735
 The two rules may overlap where the cases involve the storage 
of extremely dangerous materials on a privately owned land, such as the storage of 
gasoline or chemicals.
736
 However, this Dissertation argues that the two rules are 
distinguishable. Because liability under Article 191-3 is predicated upon whether the 
nature of the work or activity, or the implements or manner used, is abnormally 
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dangerous,
737
 the rule shall be prioritized in cases involving abnormally dangerous 
activities even though the construction or maintenance of buildings or work pieces is 
also at issue. In contrast, Article 191 shall apply where the construction or maintenance 
of buildings or work pieces has nothing to do with abnormally dangerous activities.
738
 
It is true that before Article 191-3 was enacted in 1999, courts often applied Article 191 
where the construction or maintenance of buildings or work pieces also involved 
abnormally dangerous activities.
739
 However, after the enactment of Article 191-3, the 
distinction between the two rules should rightly be made.  
Thus, in the Gasoline Leaks Case,
740
 because the storage of gasoline is an unusual, 
excessive, bizarre, and non-natural activity and because the risk of harm is great when 
a petroleum pipeline explodes, Article 191-3 shall apply.
741
 Under Article 191-3, C 
Petroleum is presumed negligent and has to prove that it exercised reasonable care in 
the maintenance of petroleum pipelines that transmitted the gasoline onto W‘s tanker. 
On the other hand, in the Electricity Overload Case,
742
 because the fire resulted from 
the long-term usage of electricity at B’s office, which had nothing to do with 
abnormally dangerous activities but rather concerned the general danger inherent in 
                                                     
737
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738
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740
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the improper maintenance of the wiring system of a building, Article 191 shall apply. 
Under Article 191, B bears the burden to prove that he exercised reasonable care in 
maintaining the wiring system of the building to rebut the presumption of negligence. 
B. Proposed Revisions & Comparisons, Notes, and Illustrations 
 In the following text, this Dissertation specifically demonstrates how the strict 
liability rules mentioned in Chapter Two
743
 could be modified into intermediate 
liability rules and compares the suggested revisions with the current statutes. 
1) Civil Aviation Act 
a. Article 89: Liability for Aircraft Accident  
Current Version Suggested Revision 
Where casualties or damage to property 
occur as a result of aircraft accident, the 
owner of the aircraft shall be liable for 
compensation regardless of whether 
such accident is due to willful action or 
negligence. Such an owner of the 
aircraft shall also be liable for damage 
caused by force majeure. The same also 
applies to damage caused by falling or 
dropping of objects from the aircraft. 
Where casualties or damage to property 
occur as a result of aircraft accident, the 
owner of the aircraft shall be liable for 
compensation, regardless of whether 
such accident is due to willful action or 
negligence. Such an owner of the 
aircraft shall also be liable for damage 
caused by force majeure. except where 
he has exercised reasonable care to 
prevent the injury. The same also applies 
to damage caused by falling or the 
dropping of objects from the aircraft. 
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i. Notes  
The current rule imposes absolute liability on the owner of an aircraft.
744
 To 
change the rule into intermediate liability, this Dissertation argues that exercise of 
reasonable care should be a valid defense for the defendant to establish. Moreover, the 
text “regardless of whether such accident is due to willful action or negligence” and 
“also be liable for damage caused by force majeure” should be deleted, since under 
intermediate liability the defendant is liable only if he was at fault for the plaintiff’s 
injuries. 
ii. Application of the Rule 
In the C-Air Flight 711 Incident,
745
 the accident resulted from negligent repairing; 
the repair crews failed to replace the damaged plate but rather covered the damaged 
area with another plate the same size as the area. Hence, under the proposed rule C-Air 
could hardly prove that it exercised reasonable care in preventing the incidents, because 
it failed to conduct proper supervision of the performance of its repair crews’ duties. 
Moreover, even if C-Air could escape liability under the proposed Article 89 of Civil 
Aviation Act by proving that it was not negligent in supervision, it may still be held 
liable under the theory of equitable liability because Article 89 of the Civil Aviation Act 
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does not preempt causes of action under the Civil Code.
746
  
On the other hand, in the T-Air Flight 555 Incident,
747
 T-Air could escape liability 
by proving that it exercised reasonable care to prevent the injury but nonetheless could 
not avoid the accident because of the extreme weather conditions. However, T-Air 
would have a difficult time rebutting the presumption of negligence if the court finds 
that T-Air was negligent in failing to cancel the flight when facing an approaching 
typhoon and that T-Air could have foreseen that an accident would occur in such 
extreme weather conditions; that said, the extreme weather conditions were a 
foreseeable act of God. Similarly, even if T-Air escapes liability by rebutting its 
negligence under the proposed Article 89 of Civil Aviation Act, it could still be held 
liable under the theory of equitable liability.
748
  
By so demonstrating, this Dissertation argues that 1) the imposition of 
intermediate liability in civil aviation incidents, accompanied by equitable liability as a 
fallback solution under the Civil Code, does not leave passengers with inferior 
protection compared with that offered by strict liability, and that 2) the Taiwanese legal 
system lacks compelling reasons to switch to strict liability for resolution. 
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b. Article 91: Liability for Accidental Harms 
Current Version Suggested Revision 
The aircraft operator shall be liable for 
accidental death or injury of passengers 
in the aircraft or while embarking or 
disembarking the aircraft. But if such 
death or injury is attributed to the 
passenger’s fault, such liability may be 
exonerated or reduced. 
The aircraft operator shall be liable for 
causing damage to passengers because 
of flight delay, provided that the aircraft 
operator can prove the delay is caused 
by force majeure. The liability shall be 
limited to the necessary extra expense 
incurred to the passengers through the 
flight delay. 
The aircraft operator shall be liable for 
accidental death or injury of passengers 
in the aircraft or while embarking or 
disembarking the aircraft, except where 
he has exercised reasonable care to 
prevent the injury. But if If such death or 
injury is attributed to the passenger’s 
fault, such liability may be exonerated 
or reduced. 
The aircraft operator shall be liable for 
causing damage to passengers because 
of flight delay, provided that the aircraft 
operator can prove the delay is caused 
by force majeure. The liability shall be 
limited to the necessary extra expense 
incurred to the passengers through the 
flight delay. 
 
 
i. Notes 
The current rule imposes strict liability on the aircraft operator. To change the rule 
into intermediate liability, the Dissertation suggests that the defendant’s exercise of 
reasonable care be a valid defense. As for the aircraft operator’s liability for delay under 
the second paragraph of this rule, it is a question of breach of contractual duty and is 
beyond the scope of this Dissertation.
749
  
                                                     
749
 More specifically, because the second paragraph of Article 91 of the CIVIL AVIATION ACT uses 
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ii. Application of the Rule 
The first paragraph of the proposed Article 91 of the Civil Aviation Act shall apply 
when passengers suffer injuries or death in the aircraft or while embarking or 
disembarking the aircraft, as was the situation in Andrews v. United Airlines, Inc.
750
  
 
2) Article 18 of the Nuclear Damage Compensation Law: Liability for Nuclear 
Disaster 
Current Version Suggested Revision 
The operator of a nuclear installation 
shall, in accordance with this Law, be 
liable for nuclear damages arising from 
the occurrence or expansion of a nuclear 
incident regardless of whether it is 
caused intentionally or through 
negligence, except when the nuclear 
incident is caused directly by 
international armed conflicts, hostilities, 
domestic rebellion, or grave natural 
calamity. 
The operator of a nuclear installation 
shall, in accordance with this Law, be 
liable for nuclear damages arising from 
the occurrence or expansion of a nuclear 
incident regardless of whether it is 
caused intentionally or through 
negligence, except where the operator 
has exercised reasonable care to 
prevent the injury or when the nuclear 
incident is caused directly by 
international armed conflicts, hostilities, 
domestic rebellion, or grave natural 
calamity.  
If compensation cannot be obtained 
according to the provision of the 
preceding paragraph, the court may, on 
the application of the injured person, 
take the financial conditions of the 
operator and the injured person into 
consideration, and order the operator to 
compensate for a part or the whole of 
                                                                                                                                                        
of contract concerning carriage of passengers. See Liu Cheuntang, Min Fa Jai Bian Ko Lun–Chung 
(Civil Code: Kinds of Obligations–vol. 2) 479 and 481-82 Taipei: San Min Book Co., Ltd., 2007. 
750
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the injury. 
 
 
a. Notes 
The current rule imposes liability on the operator of a nuclear facility regardless of 
fault, and allows the defendant to offer certain defenses. Under this Dissertation’s 
view, this rule should be modified into an intermediate liability rule, and the text 
“regardless of whether it is caused intentionally or through negligence” should be 
deleted. Additionally, since risk of harm from nuclear disaster is enormous and often 
financially ruinous for innocent victims, the proposed second paragraph directly 
incorporates equitable liability into this rule and authorizes the court to force the 
defendant to compensate for a part or the whole of the injury even though the defendant 
is not liable. 
b. Application of the Rule: Nuclear Facility Incident 
In the Nuclear-facility Disaster,
751
 if the disaster was foreseeable and the 
defendant was negligent in maintaining the facility, the defendant would have a 
difficult time rebutting the presumption of its negligence. For example, it might be 
foreseeable that the power supply facilities would be damaged should a tsunami hit the 
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power plant, thereby making it foreseeable that the emergency-cooling system would 
fail and the fuel rods would melt as a result. By contrast, if the defendant proves that it 
exercised reasonable care in preventing the injury, it could escape liability under the 
proposed first paragraph of Article 18 of the Nuclear Damage Compensation Law. 
However, under the proposed second paragraph, the court has discretion to impose 
equitable liability and require the defendant to compensate the victims in whole or in 
part. As with civil aviation incidents, nuclear-facility disasters do not offer compelling 
reasons for the Taiwanese legal system to switch to strict liability for resolution. 
 
3) Article 46 in the Mass Rapid Transit Act: Liability for MRT Accident 
Current Version Suggested Revision 
1. The operation organization of a mass 
rapid transit system shall be responsible 
for personal death or injury of 
passengers, and damage or loss caused 
by trains or other accidents. 
2. The operation organization of a mass 
rapid transit system shall pay for, at its 
discretion, consolation or medical aid 
subsidy for death or injury victims, even 
when the operation organization is not 
responsible for the train accident 
referred to the preceding paragraph. 
However, the above mentioned 
circumstance does not apply if the 
1. The operation organization of a mass 
rapid transit system shall be responsible 
for personal death or injury of 
passengers, and damage or loss caused 
by trains or other accidents, except 
where it has exercised reasonable care 
to prevent the injury. 
2. The operation organization of a mass 
rapid transit system shall pay for, at its 
discretion, consolation or medical aid 
subsidy for death or injury victims, even 
when the operation organization is not 
responsible liable in negligence for the 
train accident referred to in the 
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accident is caused by the victim 
intentionally. 
3. The regulations for the payment for 
consolation and medical aid subsidy 
referred to the preceding paragraph shall 
be prescribed by the central competent 
authority. 
preceding paragraph. However, the 
above mentioned circumstance does not 
apply if the accident is caused by the 
victim intentionally. 
3. The regulations for the payment for 
consolation and medical aid subsidy 
referred to in the preceding paragraph 
shall be prescribed by the central 
competent authority. 
 
 
a. Notes 
The first paragraph is modified to permit the defendant to escape liability provided 
that the defendant establishes their exercise of reasonable care in accident avoidance. 
The revised text “liable in negligence” in the proposed second paragraph serves to 
emphasize that intermediate liability is a variation under negligence principles.  
b. Application of the Rule 
In the MRT Station Case,
752
 because Article 46 of the Mass Rapid Transit Act 
applies in cases of injuries from trains or other rail accidents such as derailments,
753
 the 
plaintiff would not recover under the rule. Rather, the plaintiff might rely on causes of 
action grounded under the Civil Code. For example, the first paragraph of Article 41 of 
the Mass Rapid Transit Act provides that:
754
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The operation organization of a mass rapid transit system shall properly manage 
and maintain the carriages, route, depot and station facilities, and shall prepare 
emergency escape equipments and facilities necessary for passengers’ safety. The 
inspection and maintenance of carriages and devices must be implemented strictly 
in compliance with regulations. 
The rule is a statutory provision enacted for the protection of others,
755
 and the plaintiff 
could bring a suit under the second paragraph of Article 184 of the Civil Code against 
the MRT operator for injuries resulting from violation of the first paragraph of Article 
41 of the Mass Rapid Transit Act.
756
 
 
4) Article 64 of the Highway Act: Liability for Common Carrier 
Current Version Suggested Revision 
1) In the case of traffic accidents causing 
injury or death to passengers or other 
people, or damage or loss to money or 
property, automobile or trolley 
transportation providers shall be liable 
for the damage and compensate for it. 
However, the providers are not liable to 
pay damage compensation if it can be 
proven that the accident was due to force 
majeure or fault of the shipper or 
recipient of carried goods. 
2) (Paragraph Omitted)
757
 
3) (Paragraph Omitted) 
1) In the case of traffic accidents causing 
injury or death to passengers or other 
people, or damage or loss to money or 
property, automobile or trolley 
transportation providers shall be liable 
for the damage and compensate for it. 
However, the providers are not liable to 
pay damage compensation if it can be 
proven that the transportation providers 
have exercised reasonable care to 
prevent the injury or the accident was 
due to force majeure or fault of the 
shipper or recipient of carried goods.  
2) (Paragraph Omitted) 
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3) (Paragraph Omitted) 
 
 
a. Notes 
Under the proposed first paragraph, the defendant transportation provider could 
escape liability by proving that it exercised reasonable care to prevent traffic accidents. 
By so changing, the proposed rule is an intermediate liability rule rather than a strict 
liability rule.  
b. Application of the Rule 
In the Freight Transportation Case,
758
 because the damage was not incurred in a 
traffic accident, Article 64 of the Highway Act shall not apply. Rather, the plaintiff shall 
pursue an action grounded under Article 184 and Article 188 of the Civil Code.
759
 In 
other words, the plaintiff has to bring an action under the Civil Code against the 
employee-driver and W Express. On the other hand, in the Carriage of Passenger 
Case,
760
 because P suffered injuries as a result of a traffic accident occurring at a 
highway, Article 64 of the Highway Act shall apply.
761
 The current version is a strict 
liability rule, but this Dissertation suggests that it be modified into an intermediate 
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liability rule. Under the proposed rule, S Bus Company could escape liability by 
proving that it exercised reasonable care to prevent P’s injuries. Moreover, it could 
escape liability by proving that its driver was not negligent at the time of the accident 
and that the accident was caused totally by the fault of C, the third party. Given the 
proposed changes, the court in the Carriage of Passenger Case may reach a fairer result 
than that derived from applying the principle of strict liability. 
 
5) Article 7 in Consumer Protection Law: Liability for Products  
Current Version Suggested Revision 
Traders engaging in designing, 
producing or manufacturing of goods or 
in the provisions of services, shall 
ensure that goods or services provided 
meet and comply with the contemporary 
technical and professional standards 
with reasonably expected safety 
requirements when placing the goods 
into the stream of commerce, or at the 
time rendering services. 
All safety warnings and emergency 
response manuals shall be marked or 
labeled conspicuously on the goods or 
services provided which may cause 
harm to the lives, bodies, health or 
properties of consumers. 
Traders shall be jointly and severally 
liable in violating the foregoing 
Traders engaging in the designing, 
producing or manufacturing of goods or 
in the provisions of services, shall 
ensure that goods or services provided 
meet and comply with the contemporary 
technical and professional standards 
with reasonably expected safety 
requirements when placing the goods 
into the stream of commerce, or at the 
time rendering services. 
All safety warnings and emergency 
response manuals shall be marked or 
labeled conspicuously on the goods or 
services provided which may cause 
harm to the lives, bodies, health or 
properties of consumers. 
Traders shall be jointly and severally 
liable in violating the foregoing 
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paragraphs and thereby causing injury 
or damage to consumers or third parties, 
provided that if traders can prove that 
they have not been negligent, the court 
may reduce damages. 
paragraphs and thereby causing injury 
or damage to consumers or third parties, 
provided that if except where traders can 
prove that they have not been negligent, 
the court may reduce damages. 
 
 
a. Notes 
The current rule imposes strict liability on a product manufacturer. However, 
according to the third paragraph of Article 7 in Consumer Protection Law, the court 
may reduce the manufacturer’s liability if the latter proved that it exercised reasonable 
care. Accordingly, the current rule is not a pure strict liability rule under which the 
defendant shall pay the victim full compensation regardless of fault.
762
 Nevertheless, 
under this Dissertation’s view, the third paragraph of Article 7 should be modified to 
allow the manufacturer to escape liability if it established that it is not negligent. By 
so changing, the manufacture’s liability belongs to a fault-based regime.  
Moreover, this Dissertation argues that a revision toward intermediate liability 
will not affect the degree of protection enjoyed by product consumers. First, because 
the product manufacturer holds itself out as a specialist in producing a superior 
product and induces a special trust held by consumers, it is subject to a heightened 
                                                     
762
 See also: Hsu, Hui-Feng, The Economic Analysis on Tort Liability–Automobile Accident 88-89 
Master’s thesis, Indiana University School of Law–Bloomington (May 2001). 
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duty of care rather than that of ordinary reasonableness.
763
 In addition, according to 
Article 7-1 of this Law,
764
 
Trader shall bear the burden of proof where he claims that the goods or services 
provided meet and comply with the contemporary technical and professional 
standards of reasonably expected safety requirements when placing the goods into 
the stream of commerce, or at the time rendering services. 
Goods or services cannot be considered non-compliance [sic] with the safety 
requirements described in the previous paragraph for the sole reason that safer 
goods or services are subsequently available. 
The issue under Article 7-1 of this Law is whether the contemporary technical and 
professional standards at the time of distribution of a product could have foreseen the 
risk of harm and avoided the injuries to consumers. If the answer is affirmative, a 
product is considered defective when it fails to meet and comply with the 
contemporary technical and professional standards of reasonably expected safety 
requirements. Under the American products liability law, the issue concerning the 
relationship between accident avoidance and the technology available at the time of 
product distribution is related to the concept of “state of the art.”765 Different from the 
American products liability law under which “state of the art” is a defense, Article 7 
of the Consumer Protection Law turns the concept of “state of the art” into one of the 
elements of defectiveness, as defectiveness under Article 7 of this Law is defined as 
                                                     
763
 Mary J. Davis, Design Defect Liability: In Search of a Standard of Responsibility, 39 Wayne L. Rev. 
1217, 1282 (1992). 
764
 Article 7-1 of the CONSUMER PROTECTION LAW. 
765
 See supra note 574 at 309-12. 
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failure to meet or comply with the contemporary technical and professional standards 
with reasonably expected safety requirements when placing the goods into the stream 
of commerce.
766
 Because “state of the art” is actually a test about fault,767 in effect, 
Article 7 of this Law considers the manufacturer’s liability under a fault-based standard. 
Therefore, modifying Article 7 of this Law into an intermediate liability rule will not 
seriously affect the degree of protection offered to product consumers. 
b. Application of the Rule 
Pursuant to Article 7 and Article 7-1 of the Consumer Protection Law, the 
plaintiff has to prove that:
768
 1) there is a commercial product;
769
 2) there is a 
business entity which engages in the designing, producing, or manufacturing of goods; 
3) the business entity distributed the product into the market; 4) the plaintiff suffered 
injuries while engaging in the reasonably anticipated use of the product;
770
 and 5) 
there is adequate causation establishing the link between the plaintiff’s injuries and 
the product defect. In contrast, the manufacturer is subject to strict liability and has to 
                                                     
766
 See supra note 4 at 705. 
767
 A Modest Proposal to Abandon Strict Products Liability, supra note 25 at 663. 
768
 See supra note 4 at 709. 
769
 See also: Article 4 of the ENFORCEMENT RULES OF CONSUMER PROTECTION LAW. 
770
 Article 5 of the ENFORCEMENT RULES OF CONSUMER PROTECTION LAW provides that: 
“Goods or services provided meet and comply with the contemporary technical and professional 
standards with reasonably expected safety requirements” as referred in Paragraph 1, Article 7 of 
the Law shall be considered based on the following matters: 
1. The information labels on the goods or services;  
2. The reasonably expected use or acceptance of the goods or services; and  
3. The point of time when placing the goods or rendering the services into the stream of 
commerce. 
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satisfy its burden of proving that the product was not defective in order to escape its 
liability.
771
 
With the proposed revision to the third paragraph of Article 7 of the Consumer 
Protection Law applied, a product manufacturer is no longer strictly liable to 
consumers but rather has an additional way of escaping its liability—by rebutting the 
presumption of its negligence—whereas the five elements a plaintiff needs to prove 
remain unchanged. Significantly, in the Poisonous Milk Case,
772
 Mead Johnson could 
escape liability by proving that the powered milk was not defective. Even if the milk 
was defective, under the proposed rule Mead Johnson could rebut its negligence if it 
established that it exercised reasonable care in production and quality control 
procedures. Similarly, in the Exploding Bottle Case,
773
 C Company could escape 
liability by proving either that the bottle was not defective or that C Company 
exercised reasonable care in production and quality control procedures. Thirdly, in the 
Defective Ladder Case,
774
 because the plaintiff’s action is grounded under the theory 
of defective design, the manufacturer of the ladder bears the burden of proof in 
arguing that the ladder was not negligently designed. Finally, in the Defective Cleaner 
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 See supra note 27 and supra note 764. 
772
 See supra 26. 
773
 See supra 26-27. 
774
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Case,
775
 since the plaintiff sued the defendant P under the theory of failure to warn, P 
needs to prove that it exercised reasonable care in providing safety warnings in order 
to rebut its liability.  
C. Additional Notes on Costs of Reforms 
Having suggested several revisions of current strict liability rules, this 
Dissertation still leaves a question open regarding whether the costs of the proposed 
reforms will yield net social benefits.
776
 Indeed, all the proposed reforms are not 
cost-free.
777
 More significantly, Article 64 in the 1984 version of Highway Act was 
an intermediate liability rule,
778
 thereby making it more complicated to anticipate that 
the legislature would admit its “mistake” in taking this rule toward the realm of strict 
liability and restore this rule to its original status. However, although the issue of costs 
of institutional changes is beyond the scope of this Dissertation, this Dissertation 
believes that the overall suggested revisions are worthwhile because intermediate 
liability, a variation under the fault-based liability regime, is better able to reach more 
efficient results than strict liability. At minimum, this Dissertation offers a solution to 
the scholarly debate over the proper liability standard for Article 191-3 in the Civil 
                                                     
775
 See supra 28. 
776
 See supra note 49 at 319. 
777
 Id. 
778
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Code and its relationship with Article 191 of the Civil Code.
779
 Under the proposed 
theory, the current Article 191-3 is proper in preserving its current status as an 
intermediate liability rule and Taiwanese legislature need not revise its liability 
standard. If the proposed revisions regarding strict liability rules are rejected for the 
reason of costs of institutional changes, the proposed solution for preserving the status 
of Article 191-3 should be found favorable on the same basis. 
 
5.3 Recovery for Pure Economic Loss 
A. The Issue of Pure Economic Loss 
Pure economic loss refers to pecuniary loss that does not flow from physical 
harm to a victim’s person or property.780 Although no issues of recovery for pure 
economic loss arise in intentional torts because the scienter of the tortfeasor satisfies 
the requirement of foreseeability of harm to particular victims, recovery for pure 
economic loss in accidental harms is more controversial. Professor Wang argues that 
pure economic loss is not recoverable in negligence.
781
 He relies upon the 
                                                     
779
 See supra 164 and supra 165-166. 
780
 For more on the common law definition of pure economic loss, see Indianapolis-Marion Cnty. Pub. 
Library v. Charlier Clark & Linard, P.C., 929 N.E.2d 722 (Ind. 2010); Harris v. Suniga, 149 P.3d 224 
(Or. App. 2006); and the RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW THIRD TORTS: LIABILITY FOR ECONOMIC HARM 
§2 (Tentative Draft No.1, 2012). 
781
 Wang Tzejian, Min Fa Shiue Shuo Yu Pan Li Yan Jiou Di Ba Tse (Research of Civil Law Theory 
and Cases, Volume Eight). 300-01 Taipei: San Min Book Co., Ltd., 2009. 
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interpretations of the first paragraph of Article 184 in the Civil Code.
782
 More 
particularly, Wang made a distinction between the first part of the rule and the second 
part: the first part protects one’s individual rights from harm, whereas the second part 
protects one’s interests.783 Defining pure economic loss as the harm to interests rather 
than individual rights, Wang argues that pure economic loss is not recoverable as of 
right under the first part of first paragraph of Article 184.
784
 Additionally, he argues 
that because pure economic loss can be recovered in contract law (which provides a 
more efficient way to protect economic interests), recovery for pure economic loss 
under negligence principles is unnecessary.
785
 Taiwanese courts are divided on the 
issue. While some court opinions follow Wang’s approach,786 the majority holds that 
pure economic loss is recoverable as of right under Article 184.
787
  
In theory, it is possible to recognize economic loss under the “rights” category of 
Article 184. For example, pure economic loss is recoverable, in limited cases, in the 
American common law where a professional negligently performs services knowing a 
                                                     
782
 See supra 37. 
783
 See supra note 781. 
784
 Id. 
785
 Id.  
786
 Taipei Difang Fayuan 93 Nian Lao Su Zi No. 106 (Lao Su Zi No. 106 by Taiwan Taipei District 
Court in 2004). 
787
 Zuigao Fayuan, 91 Nian Tai Shang Zi No. 2096 (Tai Shang Zi No. 2096 by Supreme Court of 
Taiwan in 2002); Zuigao Fayuan, 88 Nian Tai Shang Zi No. 1827 (Tai Shang Zi No. 1827 by Supreme 
Court of Taiwan in 1999); Taichung Difang Fayuan 93 Nian Su Zi No. 951 (Su Zi No. 951 by Taiwan 
Taichung District Court in 2005); and Zuigao Fayuan, 77 Nian 19 Tze Minschi Di Er Chuehyi 
(Supreme Court of Taiwan, The Second Decision of 19
th
 Civil Case Convention, Nov. 01, 1988) 
CHUEHYI HUIBIAN vol. 1, 1040 (2001). 
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limited group of parties intend to rely on his work (and do, to their detriment).
788
 
Indeed, if parties are in privity of contract, indeterminate liability in tort may devour 
the law of contract.
789
 However, if a plaintiff not in privity suffers pure economic loss, 
such as the negligent misrepresentation case mentioned above, imposing a tort 
liability may be a better alternative.
790
 Under the current approach, a victim’s 
recovery for pure economic loss is considered on an all-or-nothing basis grounded 
upon the interpretations of Article 184. If the court declines to allow pure economic 
loss to be recovered as of right, the result may sometimes be unfair and unjust to the 
victims because the magnitude of economic harm to them may sometimes be too large 
to absorb.
791
 
The Supreme Court of Taiwan specifically addressed the issue in the Second 
Decision of 19
th
 Civil Case Convention of 1988.
792
 The case involved an employee 
who breached his duty and misrepresented the financial status of another. Based on 
this representation, his employer made a loan and suffered pure economic loss. The 
employer then sued the employee to recover pure economic loss as of right under 
                                                     
788
 Nycal Corp. v. KPMG Peat Marwick LLP., 668 N.E.2d 1368 (1998). 
789
 GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 87-94 (1974). 
790
 The accountant’s liability for negligent misrepresentation under Article 20 of the SECURITIES AND 
EXCHANGE ACT of Taiwan is also a tort liability to third parties.  
791
 In arguing against recovery for pure economic loss in accidental harms, Professor Wang takes pure 
economic loss suffered through the interruption of electricity for example and suggests that such harm 
is usually minor. See supra note 781 at 296.  
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Decision of 19
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Article 184. The decision by the Court implied recovery for pure economic loss is 
permitted under the first part of the first paragraph of Article 184, and that pure 
economic loss is recoverable under negligence principles.  
This Dissertation consents with the Supreme Court’s approach, and further 
argues that 1) economic interest is a recognized right under the first part of the first 
paragraph of Article 184 and pure economic loss is recoverable as of right;
793
 and 2) 
whether pure economic loss is recoverable under certain circumstances is a matter of 
coverage of recovery.  
In Taiwan, the primary goal of compensation is to restore the status quo before 
the harm to an injured party.
794
 Article 213 of the Civil Code provides that: 
Unless otherwise provided by the act or by the contract, a person who is bound to 
make compensation for an injury shall restore the injured party to the status quo 
before the injury. 
If the restoration of the status quo ante shall be paid in money, interest shall be 
added from the time of the injury. 
Under the circumstances of the first paragraph, the creditor may claim the 
necessary expenses for restoration instead of the restoration. 
Therefore, damages beyond restoring the victim to the status quo are possible only 
when the law or the contract provides otherwise.
795
 For tort actions, four methods of 
                                                     
793
 See also: Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647 (1958). 
794
 Case Analysis on General Prov. of Obligation of the Civil Code, supra note 5 at 152-53. 
795
 Id. at 152. 
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recovery are specifically available.
796
 None, however, explicitly refer to recovery for 
pure economic loss in tort. 
Moreover, Article 216 of the Civil Code provides a default rule of coverage by 
stating that: 
Unless otherwise provided by the act or by the contract, the compensation shall be 
limited to the injury actually suffered and the interests which have been lost. 
Interests which could have been normally expected are deemed to be the interests 
which have been lost, according to the ordinary course of things, the decided 
projects, equipment, or other particular circumstances. 
This rule adopts the principle of full recovery. The coverage of recovery includes two 
spheres.
797
 First, the tortfeasor must compensate the victim for harm to property or 
interests existing at the time of injury.
798
 Second, the tortfeasor also must pay for 
interests the injured should have received but for the tort.
799
 Furthermore, these 
expected interests are valued in accordance with the ordinary course of things, the 
decided projects, equipment, or other particular circumstances.
800
 
The general principle established by both Articles 213 and 216 is qualified with 
“unless otherwise provided by the act or by the contract.” However, none of the rules 
in the Tort Chapter explicitly mention recovery for pure economic loss in tort 
                                                     
796
 Id. at 119-23. 
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 Id. at 155. 
798
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799
 Id. at 156. 
800
 See the second paragraph of Article 216 of the CIVIL CODE. 
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actions.
801
 As a result, the current state of law in Taiwan is uncertain concerning tort 
recovery for pure economic loss. The current rules either fail to clarify whether pure 
economic loss is recoverable as of right under Article 184 or fail to stipulate whether 
pure economic loss is included within coverage of recovery. Although courts usually 
find recovery for pure economic loss available as of right under Article 184,
802
 they 
fail to provide a clear standard. Accordingly, recovery for pure economic loss under 
negligence principles is an all-or-nothing result—either it is recoverable in no cases 
for negligence or it is recoverable in all kinds of negligence cases. The same concern 
also arises in an action under Article 191-3 of the Civil Code and in other risk liability 
cases.
803
  
B. The Standard for Recovery 
To solve the issue, this Dissertation argues that it is instrumental to refer to the 
pure economic loss rule of American common law.
804
 Unlike the all-or-nothing 
approach in Taiwan, American law considers the pure economic loss rule under a 
category-by-category basis. Because relevant causes of action under intermediate 
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 Tort Chapter covers from Article 184 to Article 198 of the CIVIL CODE. 
802
 See supra note 787. 
803
 See supra note 4 at 659. 
804
 Article 1 of the CIVIL CODE provides that: 
If there is no applicable act for a civil case, the case shall be decided according to customs. If there 
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liability are those grounded under products liability and public nuisance,
805
 the 
following discussion will only address recovery for pure economic loss under the two 
scenarios. When a person suffers pure economic loss because of a defective product, 
parties often are in privity of contract, and contract law or warranty law could 
adequately address the issue.
806
 Despite this, the victim often bases his recovery on 
strict products liability rather than breach of contract or warranty claims because he 
would not have to prove either privity of contract or be subject to disclaimers.
807
 
Whether pure economic loss is recoverable in a products liability action is an open 
question. Recently, the Supreme Court of the United States answered this question in 
the negative.
808
 In East River Steamship,
809
 charters of four tankers brought suit 
against the defendant Delaval for damages suffered because turbines manufactured by 
Delaval were negligently designed, manufactured, and installed in their tankers.
810
 In 
finding no recovery for economic harm, the Court distinguished between contract and 
tort remedies.
811
 When a product injures only itself, the Court reasoned, the victim 
                                                     
805
 Generally, all offenses one suffers in public nuisance involve interference with the interests of the 
community at large—interests that were recognized as rights of the general public entitled to protection. 
State v. Lead Indus., Ass'n, Inc., 951 A.2d 428, 444 (R.I. 2008). See also: RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS §821B (1979). 
806
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could bring suit in contract law for redress.
812
 In turn, the tort concern with safety is 
reduced when an injury is only to the product itself because the users stand to undergo 
the loss of the value of products, unsatisfied expectation,
813
 or increased costs in 
using the products.
814
 Until then, pure economic loss is considered not recoverable in 
strict products liability, and Section 21 of the Products Liability Restatement also 
adopts the rule from East River Steamship:
815
  
For purposes of the Restatement, harm to persons or property includes economic 
loss if caused by harm to (a) the plaintiff’s person; (b) the person of another 
when harm to the other interferes with an interest of the plaintiff protected by tort 
law; or (c) the plaintiff’s property other than the defective product itself.816 
 
On the other hand, when a person suffers pure economic loss because of public 
nuisance,
817
 an action in tort is expected because privity of contract rarely exists 
between a victim and a tortfeasor. For example, a company negligently blocks a 
bridge and cuts off traffic between islands, thereby causing business interruption in 
nearby areas.
818
 Like in products liability cases, pure economic loss here generally 
cannot be recovered unless there has also been physical harm to the plaintiff 
                                                     
812
 Id. 
813
 The court held that such harm should be understood as warranty claim rather than as tort. Id. at 
2302. 
814
 Id.  
815
 PRODUCTS LIABILITY PROBLEMS AND PROCESS, supra note 457 at 627. 
816
 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 21 (1998). 
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 See also: Kinsman Transit Co. v. City of Buffalo, 388 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968). 
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victims.
819
 At the same time, it seems unfair to deny damages here because—unlike 
product liability cases—the plaintiff here has no way to seek contractual remedies. A 
case from the New York Court of Appeals may help to clarify this rule and its policy 
concerns. In 532 Madison Ave. Gourmet Foods, Inc. v. Finlandia Ctr., Inc.,
820
 a 
commercial tower collapsed as a result of the defendant’s negligence and caused 
nearby areas to close for at least two weeks.
821
 The owners of nearby stores brought a 
tort action to recover for lost profits arising out of the interruption of their business.
822
 
The court denied recovery, reasoning if the presence of members of public or other 
people traveling nearby was fortuitous, any economic loss they suffered would be 
unpredictable.
823
 To avoid indeterminate liability and to avoid unfairness between 
geographically similar plaintiffs, the court limited recovery to plaintiffs who suffered 
personal injury or property damage.
824
 Accordingly, pure economic loss is not 
recoverable in products liability because contract law and warranty law governs harm 
to the product itself.
825
 Similarly, pure economic loss is not recoverable in public 
                                                     
819
 See also: RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW THIRD TORTS: LIABILITY FOR ECONOMIC HARM §8 
(Preliminary Draft No.2, 2013) in which the rule permits the recovery for pure economic loss within a 
public nuisance scenario only when a plaintiff suffered loss distinct from that suffered by the public at 
large. 
820
 750 N.E.2d 1097 (2001). 
821
 Id. at 1099. 
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 Id. at 1099-1100. 
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824
 Id. at 1103.  
825
 See supra 189-190. 
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nuisance cases for fear that the defendant may be subject to indeterminate liability.
826
 
Consistently with this standard, this Dissertation argues that pure economic loss is 
irrecoverable in an action grounded under Article 191-3 of the Civil Code or in other 
risk liability cases. 
 
5.4 Other Collateral Issues 
A. Defenses to Negligence Also Applicable to Intermediate Liability 
With risk liability interpreted as the concept of strict liability, an issue arises as to 
what the available defenses are in an action grounded under strict risk liability.
827
 
More particularly, the issue concerns whether the legislature needs to stipulate 
defenses specifically designed for strict risk liability.
828
 However, when intermediate 
liability steps into the shoes of strict liability, a defendant’s liability is evaluated under 
a fault-based standard and all the defenses available to negligence are also available to 
risk liability, including any form of contributory negligence and assumption of risk.
829
 
                                                     
826
 See supra 190-191. 
827
 See supra note 4 at 720. 
828
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829
 In Taiwan, there is no separate concept recognized as “assumption of risk.” Rather, the related issue 
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B. Ceilings on Liability Are Not Required for Intermediate Liability 
A second issue concerns ceilings on liability when the defendant is subject to 
strict risk liability.
830
 Caps on liability are not essential to strict liability.
831
 Rather, 
the purpose of limitation on liability is to prevent excessive liability from driving out 
activities which are highly dangerous but beneficial to society.
832
 With strict liability 
imposed, the current version of the Civil Aviation Act,
833
 Nuclear Damage 
Compensation Law,
834
 and Highway Act
835
 all adopt caps on the defendant’s liability. 
However, when intermediate liability becomes the operative rule of risk liability, this 
Dissertation argues that a fault-based standard could sufficiently prevent excessive 
liability and the caps in the above-mentioned three statutes should be removed. 
C. Extended Statute of Limitation for Nuclear Damage Compensation Law and 
Consumer Protection Law 
Finally, the current version of the Nuclear Damage Compensation Law provides 
an extended statute of limitation for actions under this Law.
836
 Considering that 
product-related accidents bear similar characteristics to nuclear-related incidents in 
that both involve a long latency period before injuries manifest,
837
 the Dissertation 
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 See supra note 4 at 721. 
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 Id. at 694. 
832
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argues that an extended statute of limitation for products liability actions grounded 
under Consumer Protection Law is preferable. For example, the rule could provide 
that:
838
  
The claim for the injury arising from products liability shall be extinguished by 
prescription, if not exercised within THREE years from the date when the injury 
and the person bound to make compensation became known to the injured person. 
The same rule shall be applied if ten years have elapsed from the date when the 
product was delivered. 
As for other accidents involving common carrier’s liability, this Dissertation argues 
that unless otherwise specified by a statutory provision,
839
 a regular two-year statute 
of limitation under the first paragraph of Article 197 of Civil Code shall apply.
840
                                                                                                                                                        
836
 See supra 61-62. 
837
 See supra note 4 at 697. 
838
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840
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Conclusion 
 
The propositions of this Dissertation are simple and straightforward: 1) strict 
liability is no panacea to accident avoidance; and 2) intermediate liability, as a 
variation under negligence principles, is sufficient to protect innocent victims and to 
be the operative rule for risk liability. More particularly, this Dissertation regards risk 
liability as only a superordinate concept not necessarily equated to the principle of 
strict liability but rather waiting for the supplement of a doctrine.
841
 However, if 
Taiwanese legal scholarship would rather insist that risk liability always be equated to 
the doctrine of strict liability,
842
 then this Dissertation will suggest complete 
abandonment of the concept of risk liability.  
As had previously been noted by Justice Holmes, people should not be made to 
pay for accidents which they could not have avoided.
843
 In other words, accident loss 
should lie where it falls,
844
 and there should be no liability without fault.
845
 With 
strict liability reduced to a fallback variation under negligence principles—i.e., the 
concept of equitable liability—the newly proposed tort liability framework comprises 
                                                     
841
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only intentional torts, negligence, and variations under negligence, as Chart 1 
demonstrates in the following. 
Chart 1: The Newly Proposed Framework of Taiwanese Tort Liability 
 
 
Given the newly proposed tort liability framework, this Dissertation not only 
articulates the proper liability rule—intermediate liability—for Article 191-3, but also 
alleviates the rising tension between strict liability and negligence. 
Finally, because this Dissertation addresses general policy considerations for the 
doctrine of strict liability and proposes reforms to this principle, this Dissertation’s 
Tort Liability 
Intentional Torts Negligence 
Negligence 
Variations 
Intermediate 
Liability 
Equitable Liability 
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analysis may possibly shed light on legal systems outside of Taiwan, and its 
propositions may even be applicable to legal systems other than the Taiwanese legal 
system.
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